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This dissertation challenges the view that Lev Kamenev lacked a clear socialist vision and had no 
discernible objectives. It contends that Kamenev had an ideological line and political goals 
shaped by Ferdinand Lassalle. Kamenev adopted Lassalle’s desire for a democratic socialist 
republic and his method to achieve end aims. Through dialogical discourse Kamenev aimed to 
gain allies by overcoming differences by focusing on points of agreement. This was his 
‘Bolshevik Centrism’. Ideologically, Kamenev absorbed Lassalle’s concept of the ‘Fourth 
Estate’, which mandated proletarian culture first predominate in society before revolution could 
occur. This helps explain his opposition to revolution in 1905 and 1917, and sheds light on his 
assessment in the early 1920s that the Bolsheviks had not founded the ‘dictatorship of the 
proletariat’, but the ‘dictatorship of the party’. In trying to overcome this reality he adapted 
Lassalle’s vision for an all-encompassing selfless state and endeavoured to merge the party, the 
state, and the masses into one. His aspiration to win over peasants and workers placed him in a 
centrist position, whereby he used his authority to challenge Trotsky and Bukharin’s leftist and 
rightist policies. However, under the one-party dictatorship his actions directly contributed to the 
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 Historians have encountered great difficulties in positioning Lev Borisovich Rosenfeld 
(Kamenev) in the history of the Bolshevik party and the Soviet state from 1903 up to 1936. 
Notwithstanding his significance and prominence in the party there has not been a single worthy 
attempt to understand Kamenev’s ideological position, despite there being numerous works 
exploring Lenin, Stalin, Trotsky, and Bukharin’s motivations. This absence reflects a gap in our 
understanding of the theoretical range of opinions within the Bolsheviks and their impact on the 
development of the early Soviet state.  The three dominant narratives in the existing literature 
concerning Kamenev raise more questions than they answer. The most prominent analysis is that 
he was a simple follower of Zinoviev. The second one is that he was an opportunist with no 
political or theoretical line whatsoever, and both of these views combined has led to the final 
commonly held conclusion that Kamenev was simply an inveterate party intriguer. 
 E.H. Carr offered the damning judgement that Kamenev always depended upon a leader, 
and that this ‘weakness ultimately linked his fate with that of a man less intelligent, less upright, 
and in every way less attractive than himself.’
1
 Robert V. Daniels wrote that after the October 
Revolution he became ‘Zinoviev’s shadow’.
2
 Catherine Merridale contends that Kamenev 
followed Zinoviev’s policies in the 1920s and that the two were essentially a ‘duo’ from 1917 
onwards.
3
 From their assessments there appears to be a moment in Kamenev’s life where he 
simply stopped having his own ideological independent position and contented himself with party 
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work devoid of his own intellectual contribution. It is rather odd that someone who challenged 
Lenin at key moments before the revolution (without Zinoviev!) and who in October 1917 led the 
charge to oppose a revolution would suddenly surrender his values for the remainder of his life. 
While it is true that someone can indeed change positions, Carr, Daniels, Merridale, and others 
provide no adequate explanations. Carr chalks Kamenev’s conversion up to his lack of 
‘character’ and ‘intellect’. The depiction of Kamenev as a capable leader before 1917 and a 
follower with a weak ‘character’ afterwards is wrong and the characterisation of his personality 
untenable. Kamenev was after all the only Bolshevik ever bold enough to explicitly call for 
Stalin’s removal straight to his face at a party congress. An explanation is needed that can either 
adequately explain Kamenev’s abrupt personal change or one that can establish continuity that 
links the later Kamenev and his earlier self.   
 Carr is also responsible for popularising the second standard narration of Kamenev’s 
political rise as it stems from his first inadequate summation. To him Kamenev was devoid of 
‘any clear vision of a goal...’.
4
 In this light Kamenev was oddly an aimless Marxist with no 
immediate understanding of how to attain or move in the direction of socialism. Most historians 
brush off Kamenev as a non-entity in terms of developing party policy. Richard Pipes dismisses 
any independence of Zinoviev and Kamenev in their pre-revolutionary days by writing that they 
were simply Lenin’s ‘two most loyal followers’.
5
 Stephen Cohen labels the two as Lenin’s ‘chief 
lieutenants’ and nothing more.
6
 Merridale in a brief biography of Kamenev’s early political 
career cast off any notion that he had his own line, writing that despite his opposition there was 
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‘no consistent “Kamenevism”’, and concluded that ‘his thoughts and actions were not necessarily 
consistent, original, or admirable’.
7
 Chris Ward writes that concerning Kamenev’s role in the 
1920s there is a ‘broad consensus’ among historians that he was ‘bereft of any coherent goal’.
8
 
From Bogdanov, Lenin, Zinoviev and Lunacharsky to Bukharin, Stalin, and Trotsky, all the most 
prominent Bolshevik leaders save Kamenev have been evaluated by historians as having their 
own ideas, goals, and theoretical foundations. It is surprising that Kamenev could find himself 
among such men at the top-echelons of power without any convictions of his own. 
There is a surprising consensus between Western historians and Soviet historians in their 
judgement that Kamenev’s modus operandi was underhanded intrigue. The official Soviet 
explanation for Kamenev’s actions was that he was an ‘opportunist’ ‘vacillator’, proven by aiding 
the leftist Trotsky in 1927 and then the rightist Bukharin and Ryutin in 1928 and 1932.
9
 Ideology 
was unimportant in determining his position. Cohen contends that Kamenev moved against 
Bukharin and Stalin because he was ‘jealous of Stalin’s growing power’.
10
 Stephen Kotkin insists 
that Kamenev was an ‘inveterate intriguer’.
11
 Boris Souvarine stripped Kamenev of any 
theoretical foundation by maintaining that Kamenev’s alliance with Zinoviev and Stalin was 
motivated out of fear of being ‘deprived of the Lenin inheritance’.
12
 Isaac Deutscher echoes 
Trotsky’s version of events with the charge that Zinoviev and Kamenev fabricated ‘Trotskyism’ 
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from a thirst for political power,
13
 and Stalin’s belief in Kamenev’s machinations for usurping 
authority ended with Kamenev being branded an ‘enemy of the people’ and executed for 
‘counter-revolutionary’ activities. Dmitri Volkogonov slightly varied his interpretation by 
indicating Kamenev and Zinoviev acted out of fear of dictatorship rather than personal power.
14
 
All these secondary accounts interpret their actions by their despair of losing power with little to 
no credit given to any ideological reasons that may have compelled them to behave as they did. 
The scholarly literature on Kamenev in 1917 and before directly contradicts the view of 
Kamenev lusting for power. Rex A. Wade, Geoffrey Swain, and Leonard Schapiro all uphold the 
notion that in 1917 Kamenev’s desire for a socialist coalition government was sincere.
15
 This 
creates enormous difficulties for historians charging Kamenev with ‘opportunism’ and a desire to 
cling to power in the 1920s as it is inconsistent with the Kamenev of 1917 who was willing to 
diminish his party’s authority, and subsequently his own role in a new a government, to uphold 
an all-socialist democracy. Adam Bruno Ulam stresses Kamenev’s idealism and political 
commitment in explaining his pre-revolutionary career, writing that Kamenev was ‘little suited 
for the role of leader of the underground’ and that it was a ‘strange quirk of fate which thrust him 
forth as a militant revolutionary rather than as scholar and archivist of Marxism.’
16
 Kamenev 
certainly could not have been both the lustful power monger lurking behind the scenes to intrigue 
against his opponents for power alone and the pre-revolutionary man who was a ‘weak’ 
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‘follower’ willing to sacrifice his own authority for Social-Democratic unity. Again, while it is 
possible that something affected an irrevocable change in Kamenev, these contradictory 
assessments remain unexplained. Underlying this is an unfounded consensus among historians 
that ideology played no significant role in shaping his positions other than he was a Marxist. 
Jürg Ulrich’s biography of Kamenev fails to really resolve these questions. The study 
makes little use of the archives, and Kamenev’s views are presented without analysis and little 
effort is made to understand his motives. Important events such as Kamenev’s 1907 boycott 
position and opposition to the 1905 revolution are scarcely mentioned, and he generally agrees 
with historians that Kamenev’s struggle with Trotsky in 1923 was simply over power.
17
 
Kamenev’s alliance with Trotsky in the ‘United Opposition’ is left without any explanation.
18
 
Ulrich also avoids drawing any conclusions about Kamenev’s meeting with Bukharin in 1928, 
stating that Kamenev had acted as a ‘psychotherapist’.
19
 In Kamenev’s dispute with Stalin, Ulrich 
is certain that Kamenev’s internationalism was sincere, but that was just one of Kamenev’s 
struggles.
20
 There is no attempt to connect Kamenev’s ideas over time. The study reads as a 
summary of Kamenev’s articles and speeches rather than a historical work, and unfortunately, 
there are no new conclusions in his text that have not already been stated elsewhere. 
Chris Ward asserts that biography is a researcher’s dead end in attempting to understand 
the 1920s and Stalin’s political rise.
21
 However, it is clear that due to the lack of knowledge on 
the matter a Kamenev political biography would shed light on an aspect of Bolshevism which has 
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hitherto been ignored. Kamenev’s opposition to the revolutions of both 1905 and 1917, Duma 
participation, the Cheka, Trotsky, Bukharin and Stalin are all well-known, but his theoretical 
position and reasons are most certainly not. Without an understanding of Kamenev’s theoretical 
or ideological position at each critical junction in the development of Bolshevism historians lack 
the means for properly understanding the issues at stake. 
The aim of this dissertation is to investigate Kamenev’s ideological position as a means of 
illuminating the inner workings of the Bolshevik party at its highest levels and to ascertain to 
what degree Kamenev’s views on socialism influenced the development of Bolshevism and the 
early history of the Soviet state. The dissertation adopts a predominantly theoretical approach. 
Kamenev’s politics are examined to ascertain if there is a commonality in his decision making 
and to explore how his views influenced policy. His personal life, his relationships, and his 
associations with historical figures are included only as far as they are important to understanding 
his position. For example, his relationship with his wife, Olga Kameneva, their divorce and his 
re-marriage are largely ignored and the nitty-gritty of party infighting is at times sacrificed to 
keep focus on the theoretical underpinnings of Kamenev’s worldview. 
The first chapter traces how from the outset Kamenev challenged his opponents through a 
Lassallean paradigm under a Bolshevik banner and sets up the premise that Kamenev’s outlook 
can be defined as ‘Bolshevik Centrism’. Chapters 2 and 3 focus on 1917. They explore the sharp 
divergence between Lenin and Kamenev and how they treated opponents, as well as define the 
two men’s key ideological disagreements over revolution.  Chapter 4 explores the dilemmas 
which Kamenev confronted in maintaining his principles in the face of civil war. It also 
highlights the initial success of his ‘Bolshevik Centrism’ in England. Chapter 5 illustrates the 
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failure of Kamenev’s ‘Bolshevik Centrism’ to resolve Trotsky’s schism with the party. Chapter 6 
chronicles the power and theoretical conflict between Kamenev and Stalin and explores 
Kamenev’s alternative views on NEP and ‘state capitalism’. Previously neglected by historians, 
the chapter clearly defines the centrist objectives of the ‘platform of the four’, its theoretical 
basis, and questions the validity of the conceptualisation of Bukharin as a ‘moderate’. Chapter 7 
explores Kamenev’s role in the ‘United Opposition’ and how it maintained the ‘middle path’ of 
1925 and was not a total revival of left-wing idealism or Trotskyism. Chapter 8 finally answers 
why Kamenev met with Bukharin and evaluates the viability of Kamenev’s ‘Bolshevik Centrism’ 
beyond 1928. Finally, chapter 9 traces Kamenev’s final struggle with Stalin through his Aesopian 
writings and his infamous show trial.  
The first four chapters primarily utilise published materials, from newspapers, memoirs, 
collections, and journals, simply because there is very little material in the archives prior to 1921 
that go beyond what is already found in print. Even his personal letters available from this period 
prove of little value. However, in exploring Kamenev’s mission to England in 1920 the 
Parliamentary Archives in London were invaluable and were utilised accordingly. The remainder 
of the dissertation relies heavily on Kamenev’s personal archival fond at the Russian State 
Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI), which contained a wealth of unused material. The 
State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF) also had numerous insightful documents 
previously unseen concerning Kamenev’s role in STO. However, within these fonds there is an 
absolute dearth of material concerning his political thoughts, ideas, or relationship with Stalin 




Russian Social-Democracy began with Georgi Plekhanov, who was the first to truly apply 
Marxist principles to Russian conditions. Capitalism was only at its nascent at the end of the 
nineteenth century, but Plehkanov postulated that this gave the working class an advantage. The 
experiences from Western Europe would prove as the roadmap to develop the working class in 
Russia at a faster pace. From the outset the proletariat could coalesce around a political party 
capable of influencing the Russian state’s development and help topple absolutism and then 
proceed to challenge bourgeois constitutionalism until the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ could 
be established through revolution.
22
 Social-Democracy’s goal was to politically awaken the 
consciousness of the working class in its conflict with the bourgeoisie. In 1895 Lenin joined 
Plekhanov, but his 1902 What Is to Be Done? in time began to divide Social-Democrats over the 
role the party should play in developing class consciousness and how it should organise. Lenin’s 
outline for an underground network of professional revolutionaries jarred with Yu. Martov’s 
vision of a broad-based party and Russian Social-Democracy split between Lenin’s Bolsheviks 
and Martov’s Mensheviks. Despite their intense focus on the working class, both factions were 
caught unprepared for the Revolution of 1905. Workers and peasants distraught by a losing war 
with Japan and terrible living conditions revolted. Whereas the Bolsheviks pointed to the 
December Moscow Uprising of 1905 as evidence of the working class’s advanced consciousness 
and capabilities in leading the revolutionary struggle, the Mensheviks feared the uprising proved 
the contrary; the proletariat was not yet prepared and had to aid the bourgeoisie in toppling the 
Tsar before it could focus on its political objectives. These disagreements eventually divided the 
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two factions into separate parties in 1912. Kamenev joined Lenin’s Bolsheviks in 1902 and was a 
secondary figure in the Bolshevik leadership. He aided Lenin against the Mensheviks, agitated 
for the Bolshevik line in Russia among the rank and file, wrote assiduously defending Bolshevik 
ideas, and helped expel A.A. Bogdanov from their faction’s ranks. Historians have traditionally 
viewed Kamenev in this period as nothing more than an ideological rubber stamp to Lenin’s 
political line. It is the aim of this chapter to test the validity of that claim. 
The Influence of Ferdinand Lassalle and What Is to Be Done? 
To date there has not been any attempt by historians to understand the ideological reasons 
Kamenev
23
 took so quickly to the Bolsheviks and it has been largely assumed that Karl Marx and 
Lenin brought Kamenev to socialism. This, however, is incorrect and is rather shameful because 
the study of Kamenev’s early political career reveals an important influence on Bolshevism that 
has hitherto been largely ignored.  
Both Kamenev’s middle-class parents, Boris Rozenfeld and Mariya Federovna, were 
bright, university educated, and active in the radical student movement of the 1870s, but they 
were not the reason Kamenev became a socialist. While his father was working in Tiflis as an 
engineer on the Caucasus railway, Kamenev read the work that inspired him to pursue a life-long 
revolutionary career.
24
 As Kamenev later dictated to his secretary F. Muzika, Ferdinand 
Lassalle’s ‘Working Man’s Programme’ had imbued in him his ‘general desire and interest in the 
working class movement’.
25
 Lassalle, he maintained, was the reason he came to socialism. 
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Kamenev’s gymnasium teacher later recalled that as a teenager Kamenev’s interest in socialist 
thinkers was almost exclusively dedicated to Lassalle.
26
 
Kamenev’s experience was not unique. Both Plekhanov and Lev Trotsky were inspired by 
Lassalle.
27
 According to Isaac Deutscher, in his youth Trotsky had even dreamed of becoming the 
‘Russian Lassalle’.
28
 The underlying difference was that the imprint of Lassalle on Kamenev was 
more profound and long lasting. While Jürg Ulrich has noted the association, he failed to connect 
it to Social-Democracy, to Kamenev’s ideas, or to Bolshevism.
29
  
Lassalle was a remarkable, eloquent, and daring figure and is rightly considered the father 
of German Social-Democracy. He was a devout student of Hegel and although he agitated on 
behalf of workers in the revolution of 1848, he remained unsuccessful in politics until 1862 when 
he took up the cause of universal suffrage on behalf of the working class. He attempted numerous 
times throughout the 1850s to befriend Karl Marx and on occasion even lent him money, but 
Lassalle’s vanity and differences of opinion proved distasteful to the London-exiled Marx who 
tolerated him primarily because Lassalle laboured on his behalf to print his articles in German 
periodicals. To his followers Lassalle’s persuasive and impassioned oratory made him a living 
legend. To his detractors such as Eduard Bernstein and Friedrich Engels, the latter viewed 
Lassalle negatively as a ‘demagogue’ and the former claimed Lassalle cared only for ‘himself – 
his aims, and his plans’.
30
 These claims, however, are grossly exaggerated. Engels and Marx 
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were simply envious of a man who could connect directly with workers at a time their writings 
stirred very few. Bernstein’s charge that Lassalle was dictatorial in his views is rather 
unconvincing. Lassalle had a sincere desire to cooperate. David Footman has shown that Lassalle 
struggled to convince Marx and Engels to collaborate on a newspaper, and that it was they who 
had refused him. Lassalle had also wished to join the Communist League, and there too he was 
turned away.
31
 Loathed by fellow socialists as he was, he far outstripped Marx in notoriety in the 
two years before his death.  
The ideas outlined in Lassalle’s ‘Working Man’s Programme’ was what galvanised the 
German labour movement. The most influential component to his work was what he called the 
working class ‘Fourth Estate’, a concept he borrowed from the 1789 French Revolution. The 
‘Third Estate’ had initially consisted of both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat fighting to 
overthrow the French monarchy and unseat the dominance of the privileged ‘First’ and ‘Second’ 
‘Estates’ (the nobility and the clergy) who enjoyed power based on the ownership of land. As 
Lassalle and Marx saw it, within the ‘Third Estate’ the bourgeoisie betrayed workers when it 
established a government granting ‘privileges’ based on capital.
32
 In 1862 Lassalle emphasized 
that there was now a ‘Fourth Estate’, comprised exclusively of the working class which had its 
own values of equality, morality, and collective ownership. This idea led to his greatest 
contribution, the founding of the first completely independent working class political party, the 
German Workers’ Association, the precursor to the Social-Democratic Party. 
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Although many of Lassalle’s contentions would in time prove false, such as his ‘Iron Law 
of Wages’, the reason Lassalle has traditionally been omitted from discussions surrounding 
Russian Social-Democracy is two-fold. First, Marx and Engels painstakingly used their influence 
to stamp out his ideas. Marx and Engels were so uncompromising with Lassalle that they often 
threatened to abandon Social-Democracy if his views trumped their own.
33
 This then leads to the 
second reason. When Marxism became the official predecessor to Leninism under Stalin, the 
Soviet government strongly admonished him. Whereas as late as 1922 Lassalle was officially 
praised in Soviet Russia as ‘one of the greatest people of the past century’,
34
 under Stalin he was 
nearly vilified. In 1935 a Soviet play entitled, Dictator: The Death of F. Lassalle, unjustly 
blackened his image by absurdly suggesting he was a working class ‘traitor’.
35
 Despite his 
endorsement of revolution, official Soviet sources onwards branded Lassalle an ‘opportunist’ and 
his ideas ‘petty-bourgeois socialism’ because he operated through legal channels.
36
 
Marx and Engels strongly disagreed with Lassalle over his conceptions of the state and 
revolution. Lassalle had outlined that the bourgeois dominated ‘Third Estate’ had gained strength 
through acquiring capital, ever eroding the political base of the feudal nobility which claimed 
authority based on land. Some nobles recognized that their political power was in jeopardy and 
began to acquire capital in similar fashion to the bourgeoisie. The fundamental structure of 
society thus transformed culturally before the 1789 revolution completed it politically. Lassalle 
therefore envisioned that proletarian culture based on equality would become the dominant social 
                                                          
33
 See Friedrich Engels, letter ‘Engels to August Bebel’, in Karl Marx, ‘Critique of the Gotha programme’, p. 44, and 
Bernstein, chapter 5. 
34
 Izvestiya, April 23, 1922, p. 3. 
35
 N.N. Shapovalenko, Diktator: Smert’ F. Lassalya, Moscow: “TsED RAM”, 1935, p. 16. 
36
 V.A. Morozov, ‘Lassal’, Ferdinand’, Bol’shaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya, 3
rd
 edition, Moscow: Izdatel’stvo 
“Sovetskaya entsiklopediya’, 1973, p. 173. 
13 
 
value system prior to a revolution which would install a socialist republic. One of the few 
political scientists to truly understand the essential difference between Lassalle and Marx on the 
state was J.L. Talmon, who wrote that contrary to Marx, with Lassalle ‘it is not the State that will 
wither away, but rather society will be entirely absorbed into the State.’
37
 There was an 
evolutionary process in Lassalle’s vision that did not sit well with Marx. Treating the state as an 
independent entity meant there was some leeway in using the existing non-proletarian state to the 
proletariat’s advantage. This jarred with Marx, who contended that state structures were an 
outgrowth of bourgeois hegemony and had to be dismantled.
38
 
However utopian Lassalle’s views were that society would essentially rise above class 
conflict with an inherently selfless state, it meant that opponents could be won over; they did not 
have to be eliminated by force. As Lassalle wrote in the ‘Working Man’s Programme’ this was 
because after revolution the working class would become enlightened to such a degree that other 
social classes would adopt the working class’s inherent sense of equality because ‘its interests’ 
were ‘the interest of the entire human race’.
39
 The state would only expand in composition. In 
contrast, Marx believed that any future proletarian state would require continual repression of the 
bourgeoisie. 
The young Kamenev internalised Lassalle’s views on the development of society and the 
state with an enduring idealism that would mould his decisions the rest of his life. The key 
feature Kamenev completely absorbed from Lassalle was his dialogism, meaning, Lassalle’s 
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resolve to find unifying objectives to overcome disagreements by engaging in dialogue.
40
 As 
Robert S. Wistrich has written, Lassalle was able to galvanise workers because he took notice of 
worker grievances and could ‘translate them into political action.’
41
 The Social-Democratic 
founder listened to workers from different industries and areas and found whatever common 
ground they had and emphatically endorsed that commonality to organize the working class as a 
whole. He was not an ‘opportunist’ because he worked through legal channels; he strategically 
saw that by championing universal suffrage openly, workers from across Germany would begin 
to think about political objectives on a national scale. This proved so effective that Lassalle broke 
up the traditional practice of workers limiting themselves to local organisation.
42
 Listening to 
competing views and then combing them for points of agreement to forge unity was why he, and 
no one else, had established the first workers’ party. 
By the time Russian Social-Democracy was founded in 1898, Lassalle’s works had 
already been in Russian translation for nearly 30 years. His first collected works appeared in 
1870, reprinted again in 1882. The ‘Working Man’s Programme’ was published separately in 
Russian as early as 1902. His first Russian biographer, V.Ya. Klassen, praised his achievements 
as early as 1896.
43
 Bernstein’s more critical and less idealistic biography appeared in Russian in 
1906. Lassalle’s ideas were therefore well-known to Russian socialists and as yet untarnished he 
was lauded as a shining example of how one man could advance the working class movement. 
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Plekhanov was among the first who embraced Lassalle’s agitation and organizational 
views to be something truly of a ‘new socialism’. Adhering to Marx, he dismissed Lassalle’s 
economic views as ‘utopian’,
44
 but Plekhanov relied on Lassalle where Marx fell short, namely in 
judicial matters.
45
 Similar to Bernstein, Plekhanov understood that the underlying difference in 
theoretical orientation between Marx and Lassalle was that the latter’s socialism derived from a 
judicial perspective and the former’s economic. That was why Plekhanov denounced 
constitutionalism in 1883. Lassalle had maintained in his System of Acquired Rights that civil law 
was an expression of economic reality and that a citizen’s rights, even if favourable to workers 
through some form of constitution, were politically charged. This guided Plekhanov ideologically 
to spurn ‘economism’, as winning economic gains through legislature meant empowering the 
bourgeoisie if social relations were left unchanged.
46
 Later after 1905 when Social-Democrats 
denounced the October Manifesto, some Social-Democrats, Lenin and Kamenev specifically, 
explicitly used Lassalle’s views on constitutionalism to justify the continuation of the 
revolutionary struggle against the Tsar.
47
 
In 1899 Lenin acknowledged the debt owed to Lassalle for breaking the working class 
from the liberal bourgeoisie.
48
 Lassalle had uncompromisingly detested the bourgeois liberal 
Progressists of his time and had even compromised himself by trying to dupe Bismark into 
implementing state-sponsored socialist cooperatives to weaken bourgeois influence. Although 
anti-bourgeois sentiment was something shared by the majority of socialists, Lassalle had 
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significantly amplified the detestation of bourgeois political groups. Lenin’s shared enmity to the 
bourgeoisie is of no small importance. It later drove a tactical wedge between Lenin and Yu. 
Martov when the latter favoured limited cooperation with the bourgeoisie in 1905 and onward. 
Lenin understood that the difficulties of socialist agitation in Russia were paramount. If 
caught disseminating propaganda, staging protests, or rousing workers, revolutionaries faced 
arrest, imprisonment, or exile. Robert Service has shown that Lenin’s 1902 What Is to Be Done? 
was a platform to mitigate organisational setbacks when fellow socialists were removed from the 
political scene by the Tsarist police.
49
 Adopted from the People’s Will Party, the model of 
organization Lenin advocated in What Is to Be Done? was that the party should be comprised of a 
small group of leading revolutionaries directing a web of party cells. This could successfully 
operate underground because it was centrally directed yet had divided parts capable of 
withstanding police repression. His proposal was to create a party directed through an illegal 
central newspaper published from abroad to avoid police repression. 
Kamenev first read What Is to Be Done? in Paris shortly after he had joined the Social-
Democratic Party in 1902. Earlier that year he had entered the law faculty of Moscow 
University
50
 when student organizations were in protest over the university’s strict policy that 
student meetings had to be supervised by rector appointed professors.
51
 Kamenev was an astute 
observer of how the student’s rather open agitation was promptly squashed when the police 
arrested the student leadership on 29 January. Showing great tactical acumen he kept aloof from 
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the police, secretly organising the Second United Council of zemlyachestva to coordinate student 
protests in St. Petersburg and Moscow. Then on 13 March he emerged, brazenly leading a 
student-worker rally down Tverskaya Street. The police quickly incarcerated Kamenev as one of 
the rally leaders in Moscow’s Butyrki and Taganka prisons. He was then expelled from the 
university and released on condition he returned to Tiflis under police supervision.
52
 Soon after 
he joined the underground Social-Democratic Party, whose members were so impressed with his 
efforts that they sent him on to Paris to give a first-hand account of the student events to the Iskra 
editorial board. When he read What Is to Be Done? there, he gravitated to its organisational 
outline as his own experience with police repression had shown the impossibility of overt 
agitation. 
Trotsky and Rosa Luxemburg were not convinced that having tight control over the party 
to escape police outweighed the loss of the party’s democratic norms. Trotsky felt that in Lenin’s 
schema the party would be in danger of substituting itself for a politically developed proletariat 
as centralisation and limited party membership ensured the dominance of a conspiratorial 
directing few.
53
 Trotsky believed that this Jacobin thread within What Is to Be Done? would 
mean that the most revolutionary elements within the party would remain a minority.
54
 Rosa 
Luxemburg later complained that Lenin’s style of organization would suppress independent 
working class consciousness and would enslave the proletariat to the revolutionary cause and 
forego its natural development.
55
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Although Kamenev never directly replied to the two’s attacks on Lenin’s organizational 
plan, it is important to understand that Kamenev viewed What Is to Be Done? through the lens of 
Lassalle, and from this understanding it is possible to discern why the criticism of Trotsky and 
Luxemburg was never enough to turn him away from Lenin. Lars T. Lih has pointed to a striking 
passage in What Is to Be Done? where Lenin relies on Lassalle to illustrate how Social-
Democrats could work from within the spontaneous worker movement to divert them from 
‘trade-union’ consciousness.
56
 Employers in Germany had typically placated worker grievances 
with small economic concessions to local trade-unions when unrest surfaced. This practice was 
extremely effective at stonewalling national unity because enterprises selectively granted 
concessions to specific worker groups to break the chain of widespread discontent.
57
 Trotsky’s 
argument that the party would only act in the ‘interests’ of the proletariat and not be a true 
working class organ failed to convince Kamenev because he understood from Lassalle’s example 
that it was the party’s responsibility to first free the proletariat from their unequal relationship 
with their oppressors before the proletariat could truly develop. 
Alan Shandro has demonstrated that Lenin’s misgivings about the ‘spontaneity’ of the 
working class were indeed out of worry that the bourgeoisie would subvert the movement, and he 
is right to argue that Lenin did not oppose worker initiative; it was that the proletariat needed 
Social-Democracy to provide the proletariat ‘strategic independence’ and as its class 
consciousness awakened, its leaders would be able to advance Marxist ideology from within the 
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 Kamenev was not forsaking Lassalle’s direct connection with 
workers as Trotsky complained; he endorsed strict party leadership to combat Russian conditions 
so that the Social-Democratic connection could be made with workers in the first place. 
Another reason Kamenev was drawn to Lenin was because Lassalle’s emphasis on the 
political struggle had for some time been sorely neglected. Prior to 1905 the majority of Social-
Democrats contended that directing the proletariat to economic understanding remained central 
because only then could political consciousness be developed. Peter Struve and Pavel Axelrod 
were both of this opinion. Lenin’s What Is to Be Done? was a repudiation of that approach, and 
Kamenev followed Lenin into the factional struggle with Martov due to his commitment to 
political agitation. 
It was also Lenin’s bold leadership which drew Kamenev to his views. Lenin had risen 
through the ranks of Social-Democracy as a champion of orthodox Marxism against populism 
and ‘economism’. Following Plekhanov’s lead, Lenin demonstrated in The Development of 
Capitalism in Russia of 1899 that the populist belief that socialism could arise based on peasant 
values bypassing capitalism was moot because capitalism in Russia was already well 
established.
59
 In conjunction with Plekhanov and Martov, Lenin also continually attacked Struve, 
S.N. Prokopovich, E.D. Kuskova, and the so-called ‘economists’ over their endorsement of 
Bernstein and his vision to forego political agitation and revolution. In total, his efforts earned 
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him his place as a leader within Social-Democracy in his own right.
60
 The impressionable 
Kamenev had likeminded views and quickly fell under his dominating influence.
61
 
The relationship between Lenin and Kamenev was one of mutual respect. Kamenev was 
just twenty years old and within two years would be part of Lenin’s trusted inner circle and given 
responsibility in running numerous Bolshevik publications. Lenin welcomed Kamenev’s writing 
talent and desire to exchange ideas rather than to write for Iskra ‘duty bound’, and found him 
useful for his aims; Kamenev completely agreed with his focus on political action, he typically 
approached problems coolly and thoughtfully, spoke French fluently, had an amazing gift for 
oratory, rarely let emotions cloud his judgment, was not afraid to voice disagreement, and was 
willing to give himself to the cause as a full-time professional revolutionary. Kamenev’s talents 
were to become so essential to Lenin that he soon was paying all his expenses out of his own 
personal income.
62
 Despite the close relationship Lenin had with Grigori Zinoviev, Lenin would 
grow to value Kamenev much more.
63
 When Lenin outmanoeuvred Martov at the Second Party 
Congress in July-August 1903 to reject the latter’s call for a decentralised party, Kamenev joined 
Lenin’s Bolsheviks (the majority) over Martov’s Mensheviks (the minority) without hesitation. 
The final important reason Kamenev became a Bolshevik was due to Bogdanov. A 
medical doctor by profession but a revolutionary and writer by vocation, the intelligent Bogdanov 
became part of the unofficial Bolshevik Centre together with Leonid Krasin and Lenin when the 
faction initially formed. He was extremely militant, promoting revolution by arguing workers 
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should be armed and trained to take action when the occasion should arise.
64
 As Bogdanov 
wholeheartedly defended Lenin’s organisational views,
65
  Lenin had accepted Bogdanov as a 
Bolshevik in hopes of gaining his left-wing followers as supporters.
66
 Kamenev was less 
concerned with strategic alliances at the time and according to Anatoly Lunacharsky, Kamenev 
quickly became the ‘right hand’ of Bogdanov.
67
 This recollection has always been rather odd 
considering Kamenev’s affinity to Lenin. Through Lassalle though it is possible to discern why 
Bogdanov’s views resonated so profoundly with Kamenev. In his soon to be published 
Empiriomonism, Bogdanov contended that collective consciousness could transform the real 
world, meaning that as the collectively thinking proletariat politically and socially awakened, the 
physical world would be transformed by their values. As David Rowley succinctly wrote, in 
Bogdanov’s world view ‘ideology was not a superstructure but the very foundation of the social 
system.’
68
 His idea bore some striking similarities to Lassalle’s vision of the gradual 
transformation of society along proletarian lines. Although Bogdanov did not reference Lassalle 
specifically for that work, evidence suggests Bogdanov was to some degree influenced by 
Lassalle. When Bogdanov began to focus less on revolution and the philosophical dimensions of 
Marxism later in his life and concentrated on the development of proletarian culture, he referred 
to Lassalle as someone with an ‘aura of genius’ for his concept on the ‘Fourth Estate’.69 
Bogdanov was also in awe of Lassalle’s ability to advance the German proletariat beyond the 
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consciousness of the working class in England’s more advanced industrial society.
70
 It is 
therefore rather surprising that historians studying Bogdanov, namely Zenovia A. Sochor, John 
Eric Marot, Avraham Yassour, and David Rowley never took Lassalle into account.
71
 Bogdanov, 
Lassalle, and Kamenev all shared the more evolutionary contention that proletarian culture’s 
transformation of society was a pre-requisite to revolution. 
Kamenev soon became one of the faction’s best promoters as his oratory proved of 
incredible value. In September 1903 in Tiflis and later Moscow, he was at the forefront of the 
party among the rank-and-file gaining support for their position. After a brief period of 
imprisonment in early 1904, he returned to Tiflis, where as part of the Union Caucasus 
Committee his fierce sparring with the Menshevik Tsereteli over party organization was so 
impressive it convinced a wavering Iosif Vissarionovich Djugashvili (Stalin) to join the 
Bolshevik faction.
72
 Acknowledging his persuasive talent, Lenin personally placed him on the 
All-Russian Bolshevik organization to promote his desired congress to turn the tables on Martov 
and his Menshevik supporters.
73
 Under the tutelage of both Bolshevik leaders, Kamenev was a 
rising star in the Bolshevik faction. 
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More Bolshevik than Lenin – More Bolshevik than Bogdanov! 
With Russia in the throes of revolution, the seriousness of Kamenev’s commitment to the 
Bolshevik faction was on full display when at the Social-Democratic Party’s Third Party 
Congress in London April-May 1905 where he assailed both Lenin and Bogdanov for backsliding 
on the principles of What Is to Be Done?. At the centre of his condemnation of the faction’s two 
party leaders was his contention that they were inadvertently following in the footsteps of the 
ideologically misplaced Mensheviks by denying the revolting proletariat its political 
independence. His argument is particularly poignant and is worthy of discussion because it 
illustrates that Kamenev was not simply a ‘loyal lieutenant’ of Lenin and Bogdanov or a closet 
Menshevik. At the congress he was more Bolshevik than Lenin or Bogdanov. 
Kamenev criticized the Mensheviks, Lenin, and Bogdanov from principles outlined in 
What Is to Be Done?. In Iskra the Mensheviks had urged workers to cooperate with the Kadets 
(the Constitutional Democratic Party) and to concentrate on obtaining much needed economic 
gains. This was the exact position Lassalle had preached against, and what What Is to Be Done? 
considered detrimental to the cause. It was no surprise that in the absence of the Mensheviks who 
had boycotted the congress Kamenev backed Lenin’s resolution condemning them as being 
‘anarchists and French syndicalists’.
74
  
However, at the congress Kamenev judged that Lenin, Bogdanov, and Lunacharsky’s 
support for armed insurrection erred in the same manner as the Mensheviks. On 15 April Lenin 
had announced that the events unfolding showed the ‘conscious masses’ in revolt and had come 
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to the conclusion that the time to prepare for revolution was at hand.
75
 For a Bolshevik, this 
contention was problematic. True, the revolution had begun spontaneously on 9 January 1905 
with workers who had brought their grievances in petition before the Tsar, but their desire for an 
8-hour work day, better working conditions, and the abolition of overtime were of an economic 
orientation and had not been political. The Social-Democrats had neither prompted the unrest nor 
were at the head of the movement. It was the liberal Union of Liberation which had taken the 
initiate in making political demands after 9 January, not the Social-Democrats.
76
 By April, the 
working class had still yet to show any great signs of political agitation. At the end of January 
and beginning of February there had been workers who had made political demands in the 
Shidlovskii Commission,
77
 but Kamenev rightly pointed out that it had been an isolated event and 
was a microcosm in proletariat development.
78
  
By and large the momentous actions of the proletariat were well within what the 
Bolsheviks defined as ‘trade-union’ consciousness. Kamenev was therefore right to declare the 
revolution to be of a ‘pronounced bourgeois character’.
79
 Of course Kamenev had no idea that in 
a month’s time worker soviets would start to spring up across Russia, but no one did.
80
 Both 
Lenin and Bogdanov were forcing the pace of events by wanting an unprepared proletariat to lead 
the struggle in revolution. In essence, if the Bolsheviks endorsed revolution they would be aiding 
a bourgeois revolution by supporting workers’ economic grievances in the same vein as the 
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Mensheviks. Using Bogdanov against himself, Kamenev declared that enlightening workers was 
the vital question, ‘not whether revolution is necessary or not’, complaining that they had already 
spent ‘too much attention devoted to bombs’.
81
 
Lenin tried to parry his criticism by endorsing Bogdanov’s resolution to bring more 
workers into the party to bridge what he claimed was an intelligentsia and proletariat divide. 
Robert Service has contended that this manoeuvre was to placate the Mensheviks, such as A.S. 
Martynov and V.P. Akimov, who accused Lenin of employing conspiratorial populist methods 
through an organisation dominated by intellectuals.
82
 Indeed, M.S. Leshchinskii explicitly 
attacked Lenin and Bogdanov for giving ground to the Mensheviks. However, this only partly 
explains his position. The damning Bolshevik criticism spearheaded by Kamenev that the party 
was advancing a worker movement subservient to bourgeois interests accentuates the fact that 
Lenin’s decision to aid Bogdanov was conveniently opportune. Lenin and Bogdanov had come to 
the untenable position that the proletariat had miraculously become Social-Democratic overnight. 
Their desire to accept more workers into the party was simply a ploy to strengthen their position 
calling for revolution and to make the party relevant to a working class prepared for revolution 
without them. Kamenev called a spade a spade, charging Lenin and Bogdanov with 
‘demagogy’.
83
 Kamenev had shown that the outrage of the working class had not been of a 
Social-Democratic origin, and considering that workers were demanding economic reforms, their 
acceptance into the faction would have favoured the Mensheviks. Kamenev’s speech of course 
drew the fury of Lenin who interrupted him with shouts of protest, but the majority, among which 
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were A.I. Rykov and M.M. Litvinov, agreed with Kamenev on the matter of recruiting more 
workers and overcame Lenin and Bogdanov’s opportunism. 
This entire episode with Kamenev calls into question Neil Harding’s contention that 
Lenin was not acting as a Jacobin.
84
 Certainly Lenin was optimistic the working class was 
outpacing Social-Democracy, but in early 1905 this was simply conjecture. Kamenev’s salient 
critique that there was a serious lack of political independence emanating from the proletariat 
cannot be ignored. Lenin chose to blame ‘economist’ influence and the lack of Social-Democratic 
leadership as the source of the working class’s failure to articulate their political demands, but 
this does not negate the fact that such demands were for the most part absent.  
To argue that working class actions showed that they had surpassed Social-Democratic 
expectations raised serious questions as to the faction’s Marxist views of the revolutions of 1848 
and of the French Revolution. According to Marx and Lassalle, the bourgeoisie had used a 
working class in arms for their own ends and then subsequently discarded them. Both Marx and 
Lassalle later emphasized that the proletariat had to be kept independent of the bourgeois 
movement if it ever hoped to succeed. Lenin failed to explain how the situation in 1905 was 
playing out differently. The workers of nineteenth century France had certainly not been ahead of 
Social-Democracy. The Marx, Lassalle, and Bolshevik premise was that those working class 
movements had failed primarily due to their subservience to liberals, and Kamenev was 
accurately arguing in 1905 that workers in the present moment were similar and not Social-
Democratic.  
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Whether Lenin had despaired or was emphatically enthusiastic about worker spontaneity 
is irrelevant in determining whether he acted as a Jacobin when someone in his own party, 
chiefly Kamenev, was essentially accusing him of it from a Bolshevik perspective. A successful 
revolution would have had two possible outcomes: either the bourgeois liberals would have won 
and then abandoned the working class, or as remote a possibility as it was, the working class 
would have triumphed independently. According to Bolshevik principles, in the first scenario 
Lenin and Bogdanov would have wrongly pushed the proletariat to follow the bourgeoisie, and in 
the second their small party would have most definitely acted as Jacobins in seizing power as 
there was a near complete lack of working class political initiative. Put simply, the working class 
was not ready, and Kamenev cautiously urged the dissemination of propaganda but not 
revolution. In confronting the party’s two strong and persuasive leaders, he was, however, largely 
ignored, and the congress ultimately endorsed revolution.
85
  
The only thing that mended the divide between Kamenev and his mentors was the 
surprising events which unfolded in rapid succession soon after the congress. In May 
predominantly self-organised ‘soviets of workers’ deputies’ throughout Russia began to emerge 
making economic and political demands.  Kamenev saw them as the ‘highest stage’ of the 
revolutionary movement prior to the November general strike. Then even after 17 October when 
the Tsar presented the country with his October Manifesto and established a Duma granting the 
elected body limited legislative power, a working class led uprising in Moscow shook the 
foundation of the country. The reservations Kamenev once held about the class character of the 
revolution quickly dissolved, as he felt the failed Moscow December uprising had finally proven 
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that the proletariat was truly becoming politically independent from the bourgeoisie.
86
 Although 
he was not convinced that the workers in Moscow personified the whole of the proletariat, seeing 
what he believed was Lenin and Bogdanov’s great foresight about the proletariat’s growing 
political consciousness renewed Kamenev’s devotion to the two faction leaders. 
In the Wake of the Revolution of 1905 – Social-Democracy Divided 
Although his discord with Lenin and Bogdanov was smoothed over, his critical view of 
the Mensheviks sharpened after 1905 along with the rest of the Bolshevik faction. Under 
Martov’s direction the Mensheviks completely broke from the fundamentally Socially-
Democratic idea of the ‘hegemony of the proletariat’ by contending that the failed Moscow 
Uprising was due to the lack of coordination with the bourgeoisie and that the party had to bolster 
bourgeois liberal efforts for revolution through legal channels rather than endorse a completely 
independent political line to safeguard success. Considering Social-Democracy’s fundamental 
purpose of maintaining proletarian independence from the bourgeoisie, the Mensheviks were 
certainly veering off course. The Bolsheviks blamed the failed uprising on the lack of Social-
Democratic leadership. They were impressed by the strength of the working class and Lenin 
postulated that due to the proletariat’s superior strength to the bourgeoisie, when revolution 
occurred in Russia there would be an ‘uninterrupted revolution’ that would in time transform the 
accomplished bourgeois revolution into a democratic ‘dictatorship of the proletariat and 
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peasantry’. This was not a purely proletarian regime, but one which ensured continued capitalist 
development under conditions advantageous for the working class.
87
 
Trotsky came to a far more drastic conclusion. Unlike the Bolsheviks he had no faith in 
the peasantry as a revolutionary force. His theory of ‘permanent revolution’ maintained that in 
Russia the advanced proletariat would not limit itself to bourgeois democratic norms if it 
succeeded in toppling the Tsar and would instead erect a ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ whereby 
Russia would serve as a springboard for further revolution in more economically developed 
countries. The successful proletariat from those countries would then come to Russia’s aid to 
overcome its industrial backwardness. It has been well established that the inspiration for his idea 
primarily came from A.L. Parvus,
88
 but what has not been considered was Lassalle’s influence on 
Trotsky. In Trotsky’s book 1905, he justified his theory of ‘permanent revolution’ by advocating 
that ‘victory is possible only along the path mapped out by Lassalle...’
89
 Trotsky was taking 
Lassalle’s defining message about the necessity of the proletariat’s political independence to its 
maximalist conclusion, but this stripped it of its more evolutionary character. There were no 
secrets that Lassalle felt the peasantry an ineffectual reactionary mass, but Lassalle never 
proposed seizing power with a minority. 
Kamenev denounced Trotsky’s international gamble as a path to Jacobinism.
90
 He had 
only recently levied the same charge at Lenin and Bogdanov, and would do so again twice in 
1917 against his own party. From Marx Kamenev had acquired an internationalist connection to 
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the labour movement, but he typically approached Russian socialist development on its own 
terms. In 1899 Lenin had dismissed Lassalle’s contempt for the peasantry to ensure strategic 
allies in the fight against Tsarist absolutism,
91
 and it is clear that he was able to convince 
Kamenev to do the same, but Kamenev’s disdain for Trotsky’s position stemmed from his 
idealistic contention that the state had to be representative of the collective will of the populous. 
The ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ was not so much a political force as it was a social one. 
Trotsky’s outline for the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ cast a working class minority as political 
oppressors with no socialist objectives other than to hold power. From the two, Kamenev was 
ideologically more in tune with Lassalle by concentrating on the ultimate object of the state. The 
means determined the end, and any oppressive Jacobin style rule would be counterproductive to 
advancing proletarian values of equality. 
Kamenev’s ‘Bolshevik Centrism’ 
Thus far, Kamenev’s main contribution to the Bolsheviks had been his adherence to the 
faction’s core principles of directing political agitation and in assailing Trotsky and the 
Mensheviks. However, his future role in the faction was defined by the centrist position he 
proffered to try to maintain faction unity. 
The matter of the Duma granted by the October Manifesto divided the Mensheviks from 
the Bolsheviks, and disrupted the cohesion of the Bolshevik ranks. Their dispute with the 
Mensheviks was immediate. In contrast to the Bolsheviks who boycotted the first Duma as a 
sham, the Mensheviks felt it an advantageous opportunity to disseminate their views and aid the 
liberal bourgeoisie. They therefore participated in elections and gained 18 seats when the Duma 
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opened on 10 May 1906. After the government dissolved the First Duma on 8 July for its unruly 
nature, Lenin argued that the Bolsheviks should cut their losses and turn their eyes to the Duma 
as an avenue to promote their views and regain their strength. Bogdanov argued the opposite and 
demanded the faction boycott the Second Duma as they had done the first. Further complicating 
matters was that there were two sub-groups, the ‘otzovists’, and the ‘ultimatists’, the former 
meaning ‘recallists’ for their desire to remove the party’s delegates from the Duma should they 
disobey the Central Committee, and the ‘ultimatists’ demanded that any Social-Democrat in the 
Duma strictly adhere to the Central Committee or resign.
92
 Three groups thus supported some 
form of participation, but Bogdanov’s majority group, which included Maxim Gorky, Krasin, 
G.A. Alexinsky, and Lunacharsky, pressed to retain the boycott so the party could focus on 
promoting revolution. In order to turn the tables on Bogdanov since Lenin was in the minority, he 




Lenin’s unabashed intrigues continued. To ensure the continuation of his policies, during 
the May 1907 Fifth Party Congress Lenin expanded the unofficial Bolshevik Centre from 3 
members to 15 in preparation for a widening conflict with the Mensheviks. Many of Lenin’s 
supporters, notably Kamenev, Zinoviev, V.P. Nogin, M.N. Pokrovskii, Rykov, I.A. Teodorovich, 
and V.K. Taratuta joined. As Lenin had hoped, expanding its composition now removed 
Bogdanov and Krasin’s 2 to 1 majority over Lenin.
94
 However, only a month after Lenin’s 
position was secure, on 1 June 1907 the Prime Minister Peter Stolypin charged Social-Democrat 
                                                          
92
 Yassour, p. 1. 
93
 Service, Lenin: A Political Life,Volume I, p. 153-155. 
94
 B.I. Nikolaevskii, ‘K istorii ‘Bol’shevistskogo tsentra’, Voprosy istorii, no. 7, July, 2010, p. 13. 
32 
 
Duma deputies with plotting insurrection and had them arrested. With the Tsar’s acceptance 
Stolypin then rigged the electoral laws so that the Third Duma would have more seats allocated 
to the nobility and the landowners.  
The news of the Third Duma’s blatant manipulation deepened the Bolshevik divide and 
Kamenev proposed an alternative boycott scheme to unite the party. Surprisingly, historians have 
given his position little attention. In the vast majority of literature discussing the importance of 
the Duma debate from authors such as Robert V. Daniels, Zenovia A. Sochor, Neil Harding, and 
others, there is no mention of Kamenev’s opposition position whatsoever. Alfred Levin 
mentioned Kamenev’s stance, but he failed to make a distinction between Kamenev and 
Bogdanov’s differing positions.
95
 Levin adequately conveyed Bogdanov’s desire for a boycott as 
a tactic to bolster revolutionary forces, but he completely missed the point that Kamenev was 
attempting to find the ‘middle way’ to prevent a Lenin and Bogdanov split.
96
 
To Lenin, a boycott was a ‘declaration of war’ and useful only in times of increasing 
upheaval. In Kamenev’s June 1907 article, ‘About the boycott of the Third Duma’, Kamenev did 
not reject Lenin’s reasoning, but argued they could better serve Social-Democracy by boycotting 
the Duma for a different reason other than the Duma’s legitimacy. Kamenev was alarmed that the 
disbandment of the Second Duma had been met with political ‘passivity’ among the masses and 
the crux of his proposal was that the faction should raise political awareness by boycotting the 
new 'police order to the ballot box’ to re-elect new deputies to a Third Duma rather than the 
Duma itself. If the party engaged workers in protest, resisting the ‘police order’ would require 
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Kamenev hoped that active demonstrations would ‘undermine trust in the Duma’ as 
worker protest would cause the peasantry to question the government’s position. Then when 
policies in the Duma failed to meet peasant expectations, the party could point out its flaws and 
offer an alternative (this was the Bolshevik strategy of 1917!). Lenin, Kamenev hoped, would see 
that trying to gain ground in the Duma could have an adverse effect. He pointed out that if the 
Bolsheviks entered the Duma as a significant minority, there might be times they would have to 
side with the Kadets against the Octobrists. That would tarnish their image and would 
ideologically muddy their message of class warfare. Trying to win him round, Kamenev used 
Lenin against himself, quoting from him that he had always said that Social-Democrats had to 
stand at the front of the movement ‘resolute’ and engage in the ‘most direct form of struggle’.
98
 
Challenging the Duma arrests was the ‘most direct form of struggle’ and would spread Social-
Democracy unadulterated to the end Lenin desired.  
The arrest of their Duma deputies was despised by all Bolsheviks, and by urging the party 
protest the ‘police order to the ballot box’ rather than the Duma, he had forged a centrist position 
to safeguard unity. A boycott would have given Bogdanov the action he desired, but it would 
have deprived him the substance of his vision to retain the militancy of the proletariat for 
revolution. Had Kamenev’s position been accepted, the heated arguments between Bogdanov, 
Lenin, the ‘otzovists’, and the ‘ultimatists’ would have greatly diminished because Kamenev’s 
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platform would have alleviated the factional divide among the Bolsheviks by removing the 
debate about Duma participation altogether by redirecting agitation to protest the ‘police order’.  
This marked the beginning of Kamenev’s most important contribution to the party. In a 
party where rigid views were the norm, his dialogism produced a centrist position formulated on 
the basis of compromise. Kamenev had in essence applied Lassalle’s organizing strategy for the 
splintered working class to the party itself, searching for unifying directives to maintain cohesion. 
Even though it was the first time he tried to hold a centrist position to unify the faction, it would 
certainly not be the last, and it is therefore this dissertation’s endeavour to show how Kamenev’s 
‘Bolshevik Centrism’ influenced his policies, decisions, and the Bolsheviks.   
Kamenev’s first attempt at a centrist policy failed miserably. Lenin won the Duma debate 
by use of the Mensheviks and despite his tolerance of Kamenev’s dissenting view, Lenin was 
certainly not going to let his political hold over the faction slip away. Lenin cared significantly 
more about his ideas dominating the party line than about conciliation. Furthermore, the party 
congress had already resolved the matter of Duma participation and few were willing to re-open 
the debate for something that would at most delay participation. Kamenev’s position garnered 
dismal support. Despairing that he could not mend the faction divide he appealed to Bogdanov on 
26 November 1908 in a letter, pleading for Lenin and Bogdanov to resolve their differences.
99
 
Kamenev had a difficult choice. His ‘middle way’ had failed and he had to choose a side. 
To Bogdanov he admitted that although he was ready to support Lenin politically, he 
theoretically pledged himself to him.
100
 This shows that Kamenev’s backing of Lenin was not 
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unconditional and challenges the historical narrative that Kamenev was Lenin’s simple 
‘lieutenant’. His statement also invites deeper exploration. Zenovia A. Sochor has argued that 
Lenin’s focus on preparing the working class for political agitation and revolution was at odds 
with Bogdanov’s belief that a cultural awakening among the proletariat was a pre-requisite to 
revolutionary action.
101
 In this she relies on Lenin’s adherence to Marx’s contention that the 
working class cultivates consciousness and culture during and after revolution. John Eric Marot 
has also made this contention.
102
 
Were these explanations accepted, it would mean that Kamenev occupied a contradictory 
position, but their premise is based on Marx and they never took Lassalle into consideration. 
Lassalle saw political agitation as the necessary means to create working class collective identity, 
meaning that culture and political consciousness could develop simultaneously outside of an open 
revolutionary struggle. Lassalle had never believed revolution could be forced, and neither did 
Kamenev.
103
 Not only had Kamenev opposed the 1905 Revolution for a lack of a developed and 
politically independent working class consciousness, but he would maintain a similar position on 
revolution in 1917. Kamenev explicitly stated in 1910 that ‘…such a tactic of artificially forcing 
events has never been a tactic of the proletariat in the revolution.’
104
 It was not the revolutionary 
determination of Lenin’s Marxism that appealed to Kamenev, it was that he believed the political 
tactics Lenin employed would promote Social-Democratic ideals and develop the proletariat 
better than Bogdanov’s militant path. Kamenev highly valued the state as the vehicle for socialist 
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transformation, and Lenin’s explanation that the ‘otzovists’ were leading workers to see no value 
in state institutions was paramount in his decision to side with Lenin.
105
 
The Expulsion of Bogdanov  
Whilst Sochor is right in emphasizing that Lenin’s Marxist influence had deficiencies in 
assessing how exactly to develop proletariat culture and that this divided Lenin and Bogdanov, 
Kamenev shows that the views of both of the Bolshevik faction leaders could have been 
synthesized through a Lassallean paradigm. That said, there needs to be an explanation as to why 
Kamenev’s long-standing relations with Bogdanov soon deteriorated to the point where together 
with Lenin and Zinoviev he broadsided Bogdanov to expel him from the faction at the 21-26 June 
1909 Meeting of the Expanded Editorial Board of Proletarii.  
The primary reason Kamenev moved against Bogdanov was due to his follower, 
Lunacharsky, who in one of the Bolshevik’s legal journals, Literaturnyi Raspad, praised 
socialism as a religious movement. Violating the agreement Bogdanov and Lenin had made 
abroad about not quarrelling on philosophical questions,
106
 Kamenev argued in his 12 February 
1909 Proletarii article ‘Not on the Path’ that ‘the mistake of Lunacharsky is the fact that in 
essence he offers a different way in attracting the working class to the banner of scientific 
socialism other than from an economic process’.
107
 His denunciation of Lunacharsky as going 
beyond the limits of Marxism was a position easily defended, and his pointed attack that 
Marxism was supposed to ‘free humanity from any kind of oppression, including from the 
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oppression of religious fetishes,’
108
 was undeniably accurate. Marx had never contended that 
communism was akin to religion, and Kamenev rightfully felt that trying to attract peasants and 
workers to the revolutionary movement through ‘god-building’, by way of fashioning socialism 
as something spiritual in nature, was alien to Social-Democracy.
109
 
Even though Lunacharsky recalled many years later that Kamenev had simply done 
Lenin’s bidding,
110
 this was not true.
111
 Kamenev had just four years earlier been the ‘right hand’ 
of Bogdanov and his rupture with Bogdanov confirms what Karl G. Ballestem and Marot have 
argued concerning Lenin’s break with Bogdanov when Lenin published Materialism and 
Emperio-criticism a month later, that the divide between Bogdanov and Lenin had in fact been a 
sincere philosophical dispute and was not simply the spilling over of politics into the 
philosophical realm.
112
 Marot has contended that Lenin and Bogdanov’s political and 
philosophical disagreements were separate affairs, but Kamenev is proof that their conflict forced 
their followers to make choices that pitted theoretical beliefs directly against political decisions. 
Kamenev explicitly told Bogdanov that philosophical disagreements were determining politics.
113
 
Similar to Lenin’s entrenched unwillingness to accept Bogdanov’s Empirio-monism, Kamenev 
wanted no part in Lunacharsky’s ‘religious atheism’. It was therefore from these disagreements 
Kamenev officially surrendered on 4 April 1909 to Lenin’s political line on Duma 
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 Now a strong political ally, in Geneva Lenin invited him to work together with 
him and Zinoviev on Proletarii and to make Kamenev chair of the International Socialist 
Bureau.
115




The June 1909 Meeting of the Expanded Editorial Board of Proletarii proved that 
although Kamenev had deep misgivings about Lunacharsky, and by association, Bogdanov, he 
had great ambivalence about formally splitting with Bogdanov. As the Proletarii editorial board 
was in itself an extension of the Bolshevik Centre, Lenin’s supporters significantly outnumbered 
Bogdanov’s at the meeting.
117
 Zinoviev and Kamenev again raised the issue of Bogdanov 
defending ‘otzovists’, illustrating that when Social-Democrat Duma deputies visited worker clubs 
in St. Petersburg, ‘otzovists’ were speaking against them alongside syndicalists.
118
 The 
Bolsheviks were not against central government, and Zinoviev feared that retaining ‘otzovists’ 
would allow anarchist influences to creep into the faction.
119
 Kamenev concurred, declaring that 
the ‘embryo of anarchism…needs to be amputated.’
120
 Their complaints were sincere. A socialist 
republic could not be established by pseudo-anarchists. 
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In vain Bogdanov protested his expulsion from the editorial board, citing that as he was 
elected by a congress only it had the right to remove him.
121
 Kamenev did not condemn 
Bogdanov for being outside the faction, or declare that his views were incompatible with the 
party. Instead he argued that Bogdanov could not ‘organize a faction within a faction’.
122
 The 
thrust of Kamenev’s attack was against Lunacharsky, and that his ‘religious atheism’ and its 
aspiration to create a ‘complete merger of the socialist proletariat and the peasantry’ was a 
complete abrogation of the ‘hegemony of the proletariat’.
123
 There remained within him an 
uncertainty as to how to deal with Bogdanov’s group, and together with M.P. Tomskii and his 
former 1905 ally Rykov, Kamenev refused to support his own article attacking Lunacharsky to 
become party policy.
124
 Voted as party doctrine anyway, Lenin declared that ‘“Bolshevism” must 
now become strictly Marxist.’
125
 The majority, with only two abstentions, voted to eject 
Bogdanov and Lunacharsky from the editorial board, and in essence, the faction. 
The Proletarii episode illustrates the pressure both Lenin and Bogdanov brought to bear 
on their supporters to enact the split. Kamenev’s November plea to Bogdanov had in fact been a 
response to a letter in which Bogdanov had pressed him for support against Lenin.
126
 With his 
1907 ‘middle way’ entirely ignored, Kamenev was forced to side with Lenin for his politics out 
of concern for Lunacharsky and his ‘un-Marxist’ views emanating from the Bogdanov camp.
127
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Whatever ‘middle way’ Kamenev had tried to find between Lenin and Bogdanov, his 
search for compromise only briefly extended to the Mensheviks in the period leading up to the 
First World War. Numerous members of the Menshevik faction had become weary of difficult 
and dangerous underground work and were advocating Social-Democratic efforts focus on 
affecting change through legal channels. Lenin and the Bolsheviks branded them ‘liquidators’, 
and at the 21-27 December 1908 Fifth Party Conference condemned them as ‘anti-party’ 
agitators. Even Plekhanov seemed a potential ally to root them out. While at first Bolshevik 
animosity for party ‘liquidators’ and Menshevik disdain for ‘boycottists’ paved the way for 
possible rapprochement as both factions agreed to expel the equally problematic groups from the 
party and suspend both their faction newspapers Proletarii and Golos Sotsial-Demokrata 
respectively, cooperation through Trotsky’s Vienna Pravda quickly fell apart and in 1912 party 
unity ceased with a definitive Bolshevik and Menshevik split. 
Kamenev’s role in trying to bring the ideologically sparring factions together was decided 
during the expanded editorial board meeting of Proletarii on 13 June 1909, where in search of 
funds and support the board accepted Kamenev’s proposal for him to negotiate with Trotsky in 
hopes of having a Bolshevik enter Pravda’s editorial board. The thought was that they could not 
bring Trotsky to the Bolsheviks, Trotsky would be willing to toe the line of the Bolshevik 
dominated Central Committee.
128
 The arrogant and inflexible Trotsky wrecked the promising 
possibility. Despite his maintaining a centrist position, Trotsky refused to uphold the decision of 
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the joint Bolshevik and Menshevik Central Committee. On 25 February 1910 Trotsky published 
‘A letter from Pravda to thinking Workers’ where instead of challenging the party ‘liquidators’ 
as the central committee dictated, he asked for uncompromising unity. Confronted with Trotsky’s 
stubbornness Kamenev refused to continue to work with him. On 6 April Lenin urged Kamenev 
to understand that ‘genuine ideological rapprochement’ with Plekhanov and building the ‘party 
core’ was all that was important, and that he should not resign,
129
 but Kamenev could not work 
with unyielding opponents like Trotsky who continued to run Pravda as if Kamenev was not 
even there. 
This episode illustrates one of Kamenev’s failings, for what he disdained about Trotsky 
he overlooked in his allies. Both Lenin and Zinoviev had characteristics completely at variance 
with Kamenev’s calm, moderate, honest, and accommodating nature. Lenin could be obstinate, 
divisive, and at times unforgiving. One need only look to Lenin’s attack on Bogdanov in 
Materialism and Emperio-criticism to see how he ruthlessly treated his opponents. Zinoviev was 
dogmatic, ambitious, and self-absorbed. What drew Kamenev to Lenin and Zinoviev was their 
like-minded ideas, and for that he consciously overlooked Lenin’s rather ruthless handling of 
adversaries. That was why he and Zinoviev became fast friends and why their friendship lasted 
the rest of their lives. Zinoviev may have had a character most found unpleasant, but his 
willingness to accept and often follow Kamenev’s lead kept the two bound together by both 
friendship and common ideological understanding. 
The difference between Kamenev and Lenin’s opposition to the Mensheviks was one of 
degree, but it was hardly subtle. Lenin alluded to the ‘liquidators’ as being ‘enemies of Social-
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 Kamenev had his own apprehension of the Mensheviks, but he had yet to attack 
them with such ideologically damning words. It was not until August 1911 that Kamenev wrote 
something with heated vitriol against them, but that was only because Lenin forced his will upon 
him and heavy-handedly supervised him to write Two Parties in an effort to enact a split between 
the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks. More a theoretical discussion than an attack, Kamenev’s 
usual prose was lengthy and passive. In comparison, Lenin’s language was abrasive, terse, 
divisive, and bold, and he desired the same from Kamenev. In a letter to Zinoviev on 27 August 
1909 concerning one of Kamenev’s articles,
131
 Lenin complained that Kamenev ‘rambles’ and 
‘does not get to the heart of the matter’.
132
 Indeed, with such a work needing belligerent discourse 
to force a divide, Lenin’s wife Nadezhda Krupskaya recalled how Lenin ‘expounded his views’ 
to Kamenev for Two Parties outside Longjumeau.
133
 Lenin instructed Kamenev to ensure that in 
Two Parties he stressed that it was the ‘liquidators’ that had broken from the party, not the 
Bolsheviks.
134
 Therefore, through Kamenev’s words Lenin struck at the Mensheviks, calling 
them ‘enemies’, ‘renegades of the revolution’, ‘anti-revolutionary’, and even ‘traitors’, and 
explained how the Mensheviks were trying to transform the party to serve liberal ends.
135
  
Lenin’s influence is rather obvious, as Kamenev’s younger brother Alexander had been a 
Menshevik until his untimely death from typhus in 1907. They had exchanged ideas by letter and 
despite their differences their relations had remained cordial.
136
 More significantly, Kamenev’s 
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wife was a Menshevik!
137
 He had married Olga Davidovna Bronstein after seeing her at a 
meeting of the Jewish Bund in 1903. To compound matters, she was the beloved sister of the 
Menshevik leaning Trotsky, and thus Kamenev’s ties to the Mensheviks were a family affair. He 
did not consider them ‘enemies’. The same year Kamenev wrote Two Parties he had also written 
articles for Zvezda, independent of Lenin, and in those writings the greatest charge he levelled at 
his opponents was that the ‘Mensheviks and SRs are liquidating elements of socialism in their 
policy’ by supporting the liberal bourgeoisie.
138
 Martov, ‘in principle’, Kamenev wrote, ‘is a 
revolutionary Marxist, but in practice he is an opportunist.’
139
 At the Prague Sixth Party 
Conference on 5-7 January 1912 Kamenev supported the official Bolshevik and Menshevik split 
into two separate parties but he did not consider them enemies or non-socialists.  
Conclusion 
Despite the near complete absence of his influence in the historical literature on Lenin and 
the Bolsheviks, it is clear that Ferdinand Lassalle had a decisive impact on Kamenev’s early 
development and was quite influential in the development of early Bolshevism. Lenin’s 
understanding of the proletariat’s inability to overcome ‘trade-union’ consciousness and his 
desire for the working class to maintain its political independence originated from Lassalle and 
were essential in formulating What Is to Be Done?. Further, Lassalle’s views on proletarian 
culture and the ‘Fourth Estate’ are so strikingly similar to Bogdanov’s that his influence cannot 
be ignored. It is therefore no surprise that Kamenev, whose socialist awakening was exclusively 
due to Lassalle, gravitated to the Bolsheviks immediately. His opposition to the Mensheviks, 
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Trotsky, Bogdanov, and liberals was therefore not out of some toady adoration for Lenin, but was 
born of his own values and ideological convictions. He took both Lenin and Bogdanov to task 
over failing to uphold their own faction’s principles at the outset of the 1905 Revolution, 
challenged the Mensheviks over their endorsement of liberal bourgeois cooperation, and ended 
his relationship with Bogdanov due to his own experiences and theoretical views. 
Although Kamenev created no solid theoretical models of his own, he came to his own 
position by synthesizing the two main Bolshevik currents headed by Lenin and Bogdanov 
through a Lassallean worldview, and this set the foundation for his ‘Bolshevik Centrism’. 
Kamenev sought to amalgamate views by focusing on points of unity. His first centrist position 
may have fallen flat over the Third Duma boycott, but his dialogism continued. With the 
Mensheviks, for example, he invited them to debate, rather than like Lenin, to assault them with 
odious language to drive them away. Kamenev wanted to have an independent party because he 
was genuinely concerned with the Menshevik’s continual aspirations to tail a weak liberal 
bourgeois leadership, but he considered them allies and not enemies in the cause for socialism. 
Kamenev’s early shortcoming was in his succumbing to pressure. Trusting Lenin’s guidance and 
politics after his rupture with Bogdanov over Lunacharsky’s ‘religious atheism’, for a brief time 
he became the mouthpiece of Lenin in writing Two Parties to enact a split with the Mensheviks. 
He did not consider political opponents to be enemies, yet he had allowed Lenin to force his 
hand. 
Kamenev had a meteoric rise through the Bolshevik ranks, but his influence in the 
leadership prior to 1914 was rather mild. The ‘Bolshevik Centrism’ that emerged was a near 
paradox within the Bolshevik faction at the time. He had been unable to keep Bogdanov and 
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Lenin together or to persuade Trotsky. The opposing views between Bogdanov and Lenin forged 
rigid ideological battle lines and neither side had wished to concede, but the episode reveals that 
Kamenev was not the unconditional ‘follower’ of Lenin historians have hitherto described. The 
choice between Bogdanov and Lenin had been an extraordinarily difficult one. Kamenev had 
attempted to hold the faction together and in doing so set the precedent for future returns to his 





The outbreak of the Great War on 2 August 1914 drastically changed the political 
landscape between socialists. Socialists of the Second International and those that attended the 
Basel Conference had agreed that if war erupted the primary task of all socialists was to confront 
the event with agitation for a proletariat revolution. Their pledges rang hollow and socialists 
divided when the war started. Some endorsed war credits for their governments, some urged 
peace, some supported the war effort so long as it was to defend their country’s borders and 
others such as the Bolsheviks advocated revolution to halt the war. Russia’s losses and economic 
troubles prompted a war-weary populous to overthrow the Tsar in February of 1917. Socialists in 
Russia marked it as the victory of the bourgeois revolution. Workers and peasants led by 
Mensheviks established the Petrograd Soviet which rivalled the Kadet and Octobrist Provisional 
Government. Mensheviks and Bolsheviks began to openly discuss unity. Lenin expedited his 
passage through Germany to shape events in Petrograd and presented his April Theses which 
derailed cooperation and defined the party’s long-term objectives to take power. Kamenev was 
the leading Bolshevik critic against Lenin’s proposals. The origins and theoretical basis for his 
disagreement and the alternative path Kamenev set before the party is the focus of this chapter. 
The Great War – Understanding Events 
Neil Harding has aptly demonstrated that from the outset of war in 1914, Lenin 
underwent a dramatic shift in his theoretical orientation. Best expressed in his 1916 Imperialism, 
the Highest Stage of Capitalism, Lenin argued that the world was witnessing the final stage of 
capitalism, as capitalist countries directed all aspects of their economy, culture, and politics for 
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war to control foreign markets. With state and military operations intertwined with monopolistic 
corporations, Lenin was convinced that this proved the ineffectiveness of parliamentary reforms 
to legislate socialism into being and predicted that the proletariat would soon engage in 
revolutionary civil war to halt the war to bring down their capitalist oppressors.
140
 This vision 
was similar to even what some establishment figures such as Russia’s former Minister of Internal 




The ideological divergence over Russia’s development between Lenin and Kamenev first 
emerged when Lenin advocated ‘defeatism’, a position whereby he encouraged Social-Democrats 
to work to hasten Russia’s downfall so that the proletariat could prepare for civil war. Russia was 
not as economically or industrially advanced as Europe, nor was its proletariat as large or 
developed. Lenin therefore did not believe revolution was going to take place first in Russia and 
spread outwards, but with cold practicality understood that the first country’s proletariat to 
instigate revolutionary civil war was bound to result in that country’s immediate defeat. A 
simultaneous working class uprising spanning the whole of Europe was an unrealistic 




Kamenev completely rejected the idea of ‘defeatism’ on the grounds that if the proletariat 
was not developed enough to overthrow the Tsar, logically it was in no better position to 
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overcome the German Kaiser.
143
 Other leading Bolsheviks shared Kamenev’s sentiment, 
including Nikolai Bukharin, Alexandra Kollontai, and Alexander Shlyapnikov, and together they 
prevented Lenin’s position from becoming official Bolshevik policy.
144
 
It is important to delineate Kamenev’s theoretical reasons for disagreeing with Lenin in 
order to understand how he arrived at his February 1917 position which pitted him against Lenin. 
The essence of his resistance to ‘defeatism’ was that the Russian proletariat was impossibly 
overwhelmed by both feudal rulers and bourgeois capitalists. Kamenev contended that in Russia 
the Great War had brought about an atypical bourgeois-feudal union which varied greatly from 
its European counterparts, and although part of the explanation for his reasoning can be found in 
his 1916 About A.I. Herzen and N.G. Chernyshevskii, the origins of his view can be traced to his 
dispute with Peter Struve concerning the latter’s interpretation of Lassalle. As an ex-Marxist 
turned liberal, Struve had evoked the name of Lassalle in 1900 to demonstrate how the Russian 
government could use religion as a common bond to unite state and society.
145
  Lassalle had 
written that one mission of the state was to transform society by being a ‘moral’ authority, where 
governing workers would set the enlightening example to convert opponents. Struve wanted to 
apply Lassalle’s transforming mission to the Tsarist Russian state, maintaining that a Bismarkian 
Stolypin combined with a popular belief in a ‘Great Russia’ could become a ‘religious idea able 
to soften the corners of radicalism, its rigidness and severity’.
146
 This adoption of Lassalle 
dramatically perverted Lassalle’s original intent. Lassalle had never desired the state to be 
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morally coercive and directed from above. The state was supposed to express ingrained 
institutional values. In About A.I. Herzen and N.G. Chernyshevskii, Kamenev attributed Struve’s 
quasi-religious messianiac ideas to slavophilism and ‘not from the democratic heritage of the 
Russian ‘enlightened philosophers’ such as Herzen, Chernyshevskii, and Dobrolyubov.’
147
  
Kamenev returned to Struve’s ideas to understand Russia’s participation in the war. In it 
he wrote that these bourgeois liberals had twisted Herzen and Chernyshevskii’s messianic vision 
to socially transform Russia by fusing liberalism with feudalism in a ‘messianic fever’ of ‘intense 
hatred’ against Herzen and Chernyshevskii’s socialist ideals.
148
 Russian liberals did not have a 
period of self-actualization as their counterparts in eighteenth century France or in Cromwell’s 
England, so with the idea of liberation having already been superseded by an imperialistic 
agenda, Russia’s nascent bourgeois were in essence skipping their development of democracy, 
forging an unnatural alliance with feudal pre-capitalist remnants of a bygone era and creating a 
‘philosophy of reactionary imperialism’.
149
 Thus Slavophil’s had accepted European bourgeois 
individualism and infused it with Russian Orthodoxy ‘to not only stray from western beginnings, 
but to oppose the West, subdue it, give it their “new word”, and rebuild it according to their 
nature.’
150
 Inheriting their western counterparts’ capitalist ‘imperialism’ without their experience 
of democracy had resulted in the liberals’ merger with Russian messianism and the Russian 
autocracy in favour of war.  
Taking his analysis to its conclusion, it is clear why Kamenev opposed Lenin. With a 
bourgeoisie unwilling to overthrow absolutism, he had little hope that the proletariat was 
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developed enough to succeed in overcoming both the influences and power of the bourgeoisie 
and the remnants of feudalism. Russia could therefore not lead in a proletariat revolutionary civil 
war, but could unite with a revolutionary movement emanating from the West to gain strength. 
In general, Kamenev’s understanding of events did not exactly place him at odds with Lenin. 
He accepted his proposal for civil war and his analysis that the West was in its final stages of 
capitalist development. His differences were on tactics in regards to Russia. In his mind the 
bourgeois-feudal alliance was going to break as Russian losses increased, but that had to occur of 




‘There is no middle way’ 
Two days after World War I began socialist parties in Germany and France voted for their 
countries respective war loans, violating their agreement with the Second International’s promise 
to exploit war-time conditions to hasten the overthrow of capitalism. This marked Lenin’s 
complete animus against all other international socialist parties. Although he had shown his 
ideological rigidity in forcing a split with Bogdanov and the Mensheviks prior to August 1914, 
the scale of his inflexibility dramatically increased. R. Craig Nation has remarked that Lenin was 
‘uniquely severe’ to his opponents.
152
 As Jacob W. Kipp has insightfully argued, Lenin turned to 
Clausewitz and adopted the general’s view that war was an extension of politics.
153
 Everything 
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had to be done in preparation for revolution and everyone against that idea, wavering, or even 
neutral, was a detriment to the cause and had to be overcome. 
Relatively unchallenged at the head of the Bolsheviks Lenin’s monological discourse 
fully matured. Far less tolerant than he was before 1914, he insisted that all socialists, including 
his fellow Bolsheviks, accept his views with little to no discussion. His platform was not only a 
competing idea; to him it was the only legitimate one. So focused he was on his ideas 
surrounding socialism that he venomously attacked fellow socialists as if they were equal to the 
capitalist governments which had started the war. A brief look at his discourse will help illustrate 
the point. 
With Lenin’s internalization of Clausewitz, his words became the instrument with which 
to wage war against his adversaries. Lenin wrote that the German Social-Democratic Party’s vote 
for the war loan was a ‘direct betrayal of socialism,’ and branded all socialists voting for such 
war credits as ‘traitors’. He demanded that socialists carry out ‘a ruthless struggle against the 
chauvinism and “patriotism” of the philistines and bourgeoisie of all countries without 
exception.’
154
 Although Lenin’s tone grew milder as time passed, often exchanging the word 
‘traitor’ for ‘social-chauvinist’, his language remained hostile. In November of 1914, he wrote 
that ‘the first and foremost task of Social-Democrats in every country must be to fight that 
country's chauvinism.’
155
 This was a revision of his priorities. The primary task was not 
preparing for revolutionary civil war, but to battle against other socialists. In December 1916 he 
wrote that any kind of compromise was impossible, maintaining his previous conviction that 
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unity could only be achieved by expelling the ‘social-chauvinists’ from socialism.
156
 After the 
failure of the 5-8 September 1915 Zimmerwald Conference to establish a new international he 
was even more resolute, proclaiming that ‘true internationalism’ was a call ‘demanding a struggle 
against the social-patriots above all else in your own country!’
157
  
Lenin even condemned those who had not even voted for war loans. Inside Russia the 
Menshevik and Bolshevik Duma deputies remained united in opposing war credits, but Lenin still 
polarized politics by challenging ‘social-chauvinists’ like Plekhanov, noting in 1914 that if he 
and other ‘social chauvinists’ in Russia had not yet betrayed internationalism in deed, Lenin 
believed they would soon prove traitors against socialism’s cause.
158
  
It was not long before Lenin militarized his discourse, leaving no room for compromise. 
He despised pacifists, and the socialists supporting their governments’ stance on the war were 
labelled ‘turncoats’ and Lenin charged them with ‘desertion’ for abandoning their fellow 
socialists. By using such war-time words as ‘desertion’ and ‘turncoat’, his language left no doubt 
that he sought total capitulation. Even those socialists demanding peace were suspect. To Lenin 




Although shocked by the failure of the socialist internationalist community to uphold the 
November 1912 Basle Congress’ decision to immediately foment revolution in the face of war, 
Kamenev refused to demonise his opponents and instead focused on finding common ground, the 
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hallmark of his ‘Bolshevik Centrism’. In January of 1914 Lenin and Kamenev had agreed that 
Kamenev was to go to Russia to better organize the party’s Pravda newspaper and their Duma 
group, where the Mensheviks outnumbered their representatives seven to six. Writing their 
speeches, the Bolshevik Duma deputies, A.E. Badaev, G.I. Petrovskii, M.K. Muranov, N.R. 
Shagov, F.N. Samoilov, and R.V. Malinovskii, were directly under Kamenev’s purview. A 
written declaration of the Bolshevik faction presented to the Duma at the outbreak of the war 




At first glance this appears to be the centrist position Robert Grimm would later advocate. 
Instead of furthering internal antagonisms over endorsing war credits or promoting civil war 
socialists needed to direct the working class to agitate for peace. Kamenev agreed with Lenin 
over the inevitability of civil war breaking out in Europe, but he was more politically cautious. 
He knew that such a message would not be tolerated in the Duma and that it would stoke discord 
with other socialists abroad. He therefore avoided direct confrontation. 
Proof of Kamenev’s resolve against dividing international Social-Democracy can be 
found at his 1915 trial. The failure of the Bolshevik and Menshevik Duma deputies to support the 
war brought with it political repression. When Kamenev had summoned their Duma deputies to a 
meeting just outside Petrograd in Ozerki for the 4 November 1915 general party conference at 
which Kamenev denounced Lenin’s views on the war, a well-informed Tsarist police force 
arrested them on the charge of plotting to overthrow the state. On 10 February 1915 the ‘trial of 
                                                          
160
 A.E. Badaev and V.A. Bystryanskogo, eds., Bol’shevistskaya fraktsiya IV gosudarstvennoi dumy, Moscow: 
Gosudarstvennoe sotsial’noe-ekonomicheskoe izdatel’stvo, 1938, p. 508. 
54 
 
the Duma Deputies’ began in Petrograd. The public prosecutor, G.P. Nenarokomov, tried to 
prove that Kamenev was one of the organization’s leaders and was therefore guilty of the views 
expressed in their paper, Sotsial-Demokrat, where Lenin had advocated ‘defeatism’. Not only had 
a defence witness, M.V. Berenshtam, said that Kamenev had not said anything similar to the 
views expressed in the party press, but Kamenev’s defence counsel, A. F. Kerensky, pointed out 
the fact that there was absolutely no evidence linking Kamenev to the expressed paper’s views.
161
 
At the trial Kamenev spoke little, and the few words he managed to utter were about his 
organizing the meeting in hopes of opening a new paper.
162
 There was certainly the opportunity 
to denounce ‘social-chauvinists’, as G. D. Kuchin had attempted to so when the judge halted his 
testimony,
163
 so Kamenev’s general silence indicated that he did not wish to use the trial to divide 
Social-Democrats. Even though he faced a possible death sentence, his criticism of fellow 
socialists would not have warranted capital punishment. For his anti-war views, Kamenev was 
sentenced to 4-8 years exile. 
No one understood Kamenev’s silence better than Lenin, who wrote of Kamenev’s failure 
to denounce ‘social-chauvinists’ as most definitely an ‘incorrect method, and from the point of 
view of a revolutionary Social-Democrat, it is intolerable.’
164
 In contrast, Lenin praised the Duma 
deputies M. K. Muranov and G. I. Petrovsky for their attempt to prove worker support for the 
central organ’s position. 
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While Lenin regarded supporters of the war as being beyond the pale, Kamenev left the 
door open for rapprochement. His three major works written in exile in Achinsk aimed to 
convince, not divide. One short work entitled The Collapse of the International never used the 
words ‘traitor’, ‘renegade’, ‘desertion’, or ‘turncoat’ to describe the ‘social-chauvinists’, the 
socialists of the International in general, or Kautsky. A single sentence in his brochure noted that 
nationalism had made ‘former allies enemies’, but the use of the word ‘enemies’ was not a call 
for socialist division but an observation of the current war. He never mentioned combating other 
socialists as a primary goal, maintaining that the real tragedy of the International was not its 
collapse, but the ‘bloodless’ triumph of imperialism over it. In Imperialism and the Balkan 
Republic he limited himself to merely putting the word ‘socialist’ in quotes when describing self-
proclaimed socialists in government posts. When condemning the behaviour of the German and 
Austrian socialists’ position of trying to include the Balkans into a ‘Central Europe’, he called 
them the ‘servants of imperialism’, but nothing more.
165
 His 1916 book, About A.I. Herzen and 
N.G. Chernyshevskii was exclusively devoted to lambasting liberals and said absolutely nothing 
about international socialist parties. 
What Kamenev and Lenin did agree on was the need to establish a Third International to 
combat socialism’s strengthened capitalist adversary ‘on the basis of the new aspirations of a new 
epoch of world development.’
166
 However, for Kamenev it was a waste of revolutionary 
resources to divide socialists, and he believed they did not have to tear down the Second 
International before they could begin anew. Winning over opponents remained possible. Lenin 
may have had a sincere interest in creating a Third International, but he remained fixated on 
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attacking the remnants of the Second International for what he believed was its acceptance of 
some form of Marxist revisionism, writing that the bankrupt ‘social-chauvinists’ farce in 
continuing the institution served only to conceal their ‘betrayal’.
167
 
An ‘Incomplete’ Bourgeois Revolution and Supporting Revolutionary Civil War 
In Achinsk exile with Stalin, V. Vardin, and S.P. Medvedev, when news reached 
Kamenev that the 23 February Petrograd women’s protest for bread had culminated in the 
toppling of the Tsar, the formation of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, 
and the Duma Committee’s establishment of a ‘Provisional Government’ to direct the country, he 
quickly dispatched a telegram to the capital in support of the Petrograd Soviet.
168
 In the absence 
of any workers and almost completely surrounded by officer regiments and a yet to be disbanded 
police force, Kamenev acted practically and joined a committee composed of officers and local 
bourgeois merchants. The overthrow of the autocracy was a revolutionary step and the committee 
dispatched a telegram supporting the Provisional Government and congratulating Michael 




It was at this point that Kamenev developed his theory that would pit him against Lenin in 
early 1917. The Tsar had abdicated, but the nobility’s domination of the countryside persisted 
and no land had transferred to the peasantry. His 1916 fear that the bourgeoisie would not break 
                                                          
167
 Lenin, PSS, vol. 30, p. 38. 
168
 RGASPI 323/2/103/108. 
169
 To save face later against accusations stemming from the SR paper Eniseiskii Krai, 8 April Pravda published 
Kamenev’s denial of ever having endorsed the telegram to Michael Romanov. Virtually unimportant in party affairs 
at the time, Stalin would later use this episode to tarnish Kamenev’s reputation in 1926. See RGASPI 323/2/76/77, 
323/2/103/1 and chapter 7 of this dissertation. 
57 
 
completely from feudalism was realised, and in his view the bourgeoisie had in essence stalled 
the revolution from completing in mid-development in order to use the old aristocratic order for 
legitimacy. He therefore dubbed the February Revolution an ‘incomplete’ bourgeois revolution.  
Upon arriving to Petrograd 12 March he was further convinced that the revolution was 
‘incomplete’ by the fact that inside the Petrograd Soviet workers had formed a bloc with the 
peasant petty-bourgeois SRs. Kamenev argued that had the bourgeois revolution truly been 
completed ‘that block could not exist’, because according to Marxist principles of class 
antagonism, instead ‘the proletariat would be conducting a revolutionary struggle against the 
petty bourgeois bloc.’
170
 This ideological inflexibility showed his commitment to both Marx and 
Lassalle’s contention that a self-aware working class would exhibit a distinct proletarian line. Its 
alignment with ‘petty-bourgeois’ peasants signalled that a united struggle continued against the 
old feudal order. It was thus under this premise that as the senior ranking Bolshevik and acting 
party leader in Petrograd, Kamenev directed the Bolsheviks to cooperate within the Soviet 
worker-petty-bourgeois bloc to exert their ‘hegemonic control’ over the Provisional Government 
to ‘complete’ the bourgeois revolution. 
As an experienced editor and organiser, Kamenev knew that his first task upon returning 
from exile was to try to steer Pravda in favour of his views by curtailing its far left pursuits. V.M. 
Molotov, P.Zalutsky and A.G. Shlyapnikov, as members of the Bureau of the Central Committee 
controlled Pravda, and supported Lenin’s line advocating Russia transform the imperialist war 
into a civil war.
171
 The Bolshevik Vyborg District Committee was demanding another revolution 
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to install a Revolutionary Provisional Government to carry out revolutionary war. Both their 
messages were so out of tune with the vast population that it wrought only indignation from 
fellow socialists. The paper had become so associated with these far left slogans that Kamenev 
entertained the idea of shutting down its publication and starting up a whole new one 
altogether.
172
 Instead, in an ‘editorial revolution,’ senior party leaders, Stalin, Kamenev, and 
Muranov replaced Molotov, M.I. Kalinin, and K.S. Eremeev as Pravda’s editors.
173
 However, 
still upset with Kamenev’s breach of discipline during his 1915 trial where he had failed to 
advocate defeatism or attack fellow socialists, the Bureau of the Central Committee mandated 
that Kamenev’s published articles be left unsigned.
174
 
D.A. Longley has shown the various competing Bolshevik currents within Petrograd at 
the outset of revolution, and as he demonstrated, absent of the Vyborg District Committee’s 
radical enthusiasm, the Bolshevik Petersburg Committee was more in line with Kamenev’s 
principles. Unlike the Vyborg District Committee, its members had not directly participated in 
directing the worker protests that had helped topple the autocracy as they had been in prison at 
the outbreak of revolution. With their cooler revolutionary enthusiasm, they had taken a more 
moderate position by passing a resolution on 3 March to not oppose the Provisional government 
as long as it coincided with the interests of the proletariat.
175
 Their support was critical for him to 
lead Pravda to call on workers to distrust liberal promises, remain steadfast in their demands, and 
‘support every step leading to the eradication of all the remains of the Tsarist-landowning 
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 Using the exact words from Lassalle’s ‘Working Man’s Programme’, Kamenev 
declared that the proletariat had to act as a ‘watchman’ to control the Provisional Government.
177
  
It is at this point that historians such as Alexander Rabinowitch, R. Nation, and Robert G. 
Wesson have wrongly assessed Kamenev’s position.
178
   Kamenev was not advancing 
‘conditional support’ for the Provisional Government or Tsereteli’s Menshevik ‘socialist-
defencist’ position in his 15 March Pravda article where he called upon soldiers to ‘remain at 
their posts’ and to answer the attacking nations ‘bullet for bullet and shell for shell’.
179
 The real 
purpose of the article is clear only at its conclusion, where Kamenev called for the proletariat to 
‘pressure’ the government to ‘immediately open peace negotiations’. Similar to Lenin, Molotov, 
and Shlyapnikov, Kamenev was in favour of revolutionary civil war, but he did not believe 
Russia would be the war’s starting point. It had to originate from more developed Western 
countries such as Germany, and proposing peace was a tactic to obtain that end. At a meeting of 
the Bolshevik Petersburg Committee four days after the Pravda article concerning the war, 
Kamenev explained that by adopting slogans to halt the war the Russian peasantry would 
together with the party take the Provisional Government ‘by the throat’ to propose peace, and 
then, ‘when’, not if, Wilhelm II refused that peace, the ‘German Social-Democrats will have the 
basis for an uprising…’
180
 The primary aim of his policy was therefore to foment revolution 
                                                          
176
 Pravda. March 14, 1917, p. 1-2. 
177
 Ibid., p. 1-2. 
178
 See Nation, p. 175, Alexander Rabinowitch, Prelude to Revolution: The Petrograd Bolsheviks and the July 1917 
Uprising, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968, p. 36, and Robert G. Wesson, Lenin’s Legacy: The Story of 
the CPSU, Stanford: Hoover Institution Publication, 1978, p. 52 
179
 Pravda. March 15, 1917, p. 1. 
180




abroad and not to actually achieve peace. He was not a Menshevik ‘defencist’, but a Bolshevik 
promoting revolutionary civil war. 
With no knowledge of Kamenev’s intent, Kamenev’s poorly phrased ‘bullet for bullet’ 
remark had enraged the party left. On 15 March an emergency meeting of the Central Committee 
Bureau and the new editors was summoned to discuss Kamenev’s article. Kamenev refused to 
yield. A new editorial board was elected. Despite protests from Nogin, G.I. Bokii, and M.S. 
Olminsky, Kamenev’s editorial talent could not be ignored and he remained at the head of 
Pravda.
181
 As a compromise, Molotov and Ereveev were restored to maintain balance.
182
  
Kamenev could have avoided the stiff resistance he met from the party’s left-leaning 
adherents over his position if he had told them upfront of his long-term strategy, but he had kept 
his plans close to his chest to gain much broader support. Kamenev’s political talent was in 
finding common ground between opponents. Upon Tsereteli’s return from Siberian exile the 
Mensheviks had taken up the cause of defencism; to agree to support the war to preserve the 
gains of the revolution. This served to alienate those Mensheviks most committed to 
internationalism.
183
 Directing the party to agitate for peace was more important than overtly 
advocating for revolutionary civil war because they could ally with Martov’s dissatisfied 
Menshevik-Internationalists to aid them in the steps to reach their ultimate aim. 
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Longley’s assessment that Kamenev and Stalin had only achieved a ‘public relations’ 
triumph is wrong.
184
 The anger of the party left soon proved irrelevant for the moment as 
Kamenev was in fact gaining support; he and Stalin were elected to be the representatives of the 
party in the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet.
185
 Then just three days later on 18 
March, Kamenev’s position received the Petersburg Committee’s official approval.
186
 At 
meetings between workers and servicemen in the Sestrortsrkii small-arms factory, workers 
declared their acceptance of the Petersburg Committee’s new policy to press the Provisional 
Government to conclude the war without annexations or indemnities.
187
 His tactics had advanced 
their party’s aims by increasing working class support, and as shall be shown, began to close the 
divide between the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks. 
Kamenev’s ‘Bolshevik Centrism’ and the Mensheviks 
Much of the animus between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks had dissipated with the 
February Revolution. Party organisation was no longer an important issue as all political parties 
were legal and free to operate openly. The bourgeois revolution had arrived and therefore the 
theoretical debate surrounding to either support them or lead an independent working class 
movement was for the moment moot. Further, unlike other Social-Democrats abroad the 
Mensheviks were in common cause with the Bolsheviks in opposing war credits. They had also 
played an important role in establishing the Petrograd Soviet, and had opposed any kind of 
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participation with the bourgeoisie in government.
188
 The Menshevik defencist stance to the war 
was the only major divide remaining. 
Kamenev was absolutely right in believing his ‘peace’ strategy could forge cooperation 
between the Bolsheviks and Martov’s Menshevik-Internationalists if the Bolshevik’s were less 
direct about transforming the war into revolutionary civil war. At the 19 March joint meeting of 
the Central Committee Bureau and the enlarged Petersburg Committee two resolutions had been 
put forward from both ‘left’ and moderate Bolshevik groups. The first resolution desired to ally 
with the Menshevik-Internationalists in hopes of possible unification. The second, put forward by 
Kalinin and V.L. Zalezhskii, advised to share information with the Menshevik-Internationalists 
on the condition that they openly break with the defencist group operating in the newspaper 
Rabochaya Gazeta. With both resolutions committed to rapprochement, Kamenev had a mandate 
to pursue cooperation with Menshevik-Internationalists, which he did. The party lines between 
the left-wing Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks began to blur, deepening the divide between 
Martov’s minority and Tseretelli’s defencist majority, and by the end of March a small group of 
internationalists joined the Bolshevik delegation at the All-Russian Conference of Soviets. So 
successful was Kamenev in finding grounds for cooperation that his friend and Menshevik-
Internationalist N.N. Sukhanov reflected, ‘I cannot conceal my deep conviction that if all the 
Bolsheviks had shared Kamenev’s views – at least during the first year of the revolution – then I 
would have been a Bolshevik too, and a left one at that.’
189
 Stalin and Muranov supported 
Kamenev’s ‘Bolshevik Centrism’ to find common ground and they very quickly had no reason to 
                                                          
188
 Ziva Galili, The Menshevik Leaders in the Russian Revolution: Social Realities and Political Strategies, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989, p. 58. 
189
 Sukhanov, p. 257 and p. 258. 
63 
 
worry over their party’s left-wing party indignation as Bolshevik moderates arriving from the 
provinces backed the three leaders now representing the party majority.
190
 
Therefore, under Kamenev’s leadership at the 28 March to 3 April All-Russian 
Conference of Soviets, Kamenev directed his party towards a Bolshevik-Menshevik alliance by 
acknowledging the Mensheviks as equals. Kamenev no longer concealed his strategy and subtly 
declared that they needed ‘to transform the Russian national revolution into the prologue of an 
uprising of all nations against their belligerent countries...’
191
 The main purpose of socialists in 
Russia should be to ‘create a new International, a new brotherhood of nations’, which would 
unite the proletariat for the war’s end. He focused on socialism’s sworn enemy, the capitalist 
imperialists, and avoided open disagreements. He addressed Mensheviks and SRs as ‘comrades’, 
as members of the ‘revolutionary democracy’. Despite there being fewer than 80 self-proclaimed 
internationalists, a significant part of the delegates applauded his speeches. 
Seeing Kamenev’s influence and ability to broaden Bolshevik support for peace, the 
Bolshevik leadership began to come round to Kamenev’s political strategy, electing him over 
A.M. Kollontai to be their representative for the remainder of the conference. Although the 
Bolshevik resolution which called for an end to the war without annexations or indemnities with 
a clause calling for class civil war in Europe only obtained 57 votes to Tsereteli’s 325 majority, 
Kamenev found compromise concerning the Provisional Government. At a key point in 
Kamenev’s 1 April speech he proclaimed that the Bolsheviks were not seeking the overthrow of 
the Provisional Government and would support the government on the condition it fulfilled the 
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aims of the revolution as guided by the Petrograd Soviet.
192
 This public declaration was milder 
than when he had told fellow Bolsheviks that they had to take the Provisional Government ‘by 
the throat’ and act as a ‘watchman’ to control it, but it was a tactic. The declaration achieved its 
aim and prompted the Mensheviks to withdraw their resolution drawn up by Yu. M. Steklov and 
to support a joint resolution more in line with Bolshevik aspirations to reflect the ‘various 
tendencies’ present at the conference. With both parties supporting, it passed. 
Soon after talk of unification between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks began in 
earnest, with Stalin one of the chief supporters,
193
 but as Sukhanov recalled, Kamenev ‘had his 
own views and was working on Russian revolutionary soil. But, he was casting a “sideways” 
look abroad, where they had their own views, which were not the same as his.’
194
 
No Social-Democracy – Lenin and his April Theses 
Whilst Kamenev was contemplating cooperation with the Mensheviks, Lenin was intent 
on dividing Social-Democracy in Russia. One of his first instructions to the party in Petrograd on 
6 March was to have ‘no rapprochement with other parties.’
195
 At this time he had long made 
enemies of the ‘social-chauvinists’ and ‘social-patriots’ such as Plekhanov, Potresov, and K.A. 
Gvozdyov within Russia, but his call to avoid ‘any rapprochement’ showed that at the outset 
Lenin had no intention of ever cooperating with any socialists, a rather odd decision considering 
the fact that the Mensheviks headed the Petrograd Soviet and had distanced themselves from the 
Provisional Government. Lenin simply wanted his ideas to remain central to the Bolsheviks; 
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disagreements over the war and his unshakeable belief that they were living during capitalism’s 
final stage made inter-party compromise intolerable for him. 
In his 12 March Second Letter from Afar he wrote that the appointment of the socialist 
Trudovik Kerensky into the Provisional Government meant that he had ‘deserted’ to the 
bourgeoisie, warning that a ‘call to support the new government is, one can say, a classical 
example of betrayal of the cause of the revolution and the cause of the proletariat… independent 
of how sincere and committed to socialism the leaders and supporters’ may be.
196
 
Lenin and Kamenev were thus headed in opposite directions. Acting courier and 
Bolshevik, Kollontai, had already arrived by the time of the 19 March meeting and brought with 
her Lenin’s first two Letters from Afar.
197
 While Lenin was drawing lines in the sand to thwart 
any compromise to his views, Kamenev was downplaying theoretical differences in favour of 
broadening Bolshevik appeal. 
Lenin’s belligerent discourse had its desired results as upon his arrival he terminated 
Bolshevik and Menshevik cooperation. Upset with Kamenev’s actions, on 3 April Lenin rebuked 
Kamenev at the Beloostrov train station outside Petrograd, asking ‘what is this that you are 
writing in Pravda? We have seen several issues and really cursed at you.’
198
 At the train station 
in Petrograd Lenin purposely ignored the Menshevik and Petrograd Soviet welcoming 
delegations headed by Chekhidze and M.I. Skobelev. He then proceeded to use his April Theses 
the following day on 4 April at the All-Russian Conference to derail Menshevik and Bolshevik 
deliberations over forming a single party. 
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In Lenin’s April Theses he proposed a government derived from the soviets whose 
support base consisted exclusively of the working class and the peasantry. While this certainly 
was consistent with the Bolshevik position from post-1905 advocating an ‘uninterrupted 
revolution’ leading to the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry’, Lenin failed to express 
the precise timing power should pass to the soviets. Lenin was not calling for immediate 
revolution, and that much is clear. However, in his theses he specifically stated that the ‘second 
stage’ of the revolution was already underway. This charged wording was deliberately contrived 
to provoke the Mensheviks who felt that Russia could not move towards socialism without a 
sustained period of capitalist development. Lenin insisted that the Bolsheviks had to deny any 
and all support for the Provisional Government and eradicate the bourgeois elements within the 
workers’ section of the Soviet in preparation. It was essential they ready for the next revolution 
and the establishment of a republic of Soviets of Workers’, Agricultural Labourers’ and Peasants’ 
Deputies. Clearly, Lenin did not accept Kamenev’s strategy of a Russia declared ‘peace’ to 
befriend the Mensheviks. To even use ‘peace’ as a strategy would betray his convictions. 
Revolution had to begin everywhere, including Russia. His plan was bolder, more direct, and 
would ensure the primacy of his views by creating a policy that would garner few party allies.  
Lenin’s proposed government also completely jarred against what the Mensheviks and 
Bolsheviks had long believed; that the socialist government would be a parliamentary republic. 
This was what the Social-Democratic Party founder Lassalle had envisioned. This is a theme that 
shall shortly be discussed in the following section, but for now it is important to note that Lenin’s 
support of a soviet style government was more closely connected with anarchist ideals rather than 
with Social-Democracy because it proposed a decentralised form of government where local 
67 
 
autonomy outweighed central direction in a federation style system of local governing 
institutions. The Mensheviks were immediately repulsed by the idea. 
To solidify Bolshevik isolation from Social-Democracy at large Lenin proposed the 
formation of a new International, ensuring his domination of its composition with like-minded 
left-wing socialists. Then, to deepen division at home, he called to change his party’s name to the 
‘Communist Party’. This was a gesture to illustrate that only the Bolsheviks were the true 
Marxists. More specifically, only Lenin knew the correct course. 
His theses showed Lenin’s monological discourse par excellence. Zinoviev would soon 
admit that they were deliberately worded to make a loud noise with a ‘big policy’.
199
 His goal to 
divide the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks was a success.
 
At a later meeting of the All-Russian 
Conference the ex-Bolshevik Social-Democrat I.P. Goldenberg declared that Lenin’s anarchism 
made it ‘ludicrous to talk of unity with those... who are placing themselves outside Social-
Democracy of their own accord!’
200
 By the end of the evening all hopes of a revived Social-
Democracy were dead. 
Kamenev’s Struggle against the April Theses 
 Lars T. Lih has contended that Lenin’s April Theses displayed ‘more continuity than 
discontinuity’ to the ‘Old Bolshevik’ position on revolution in 1905.
201
 As illustrated previously, 
Lenin’s call to establish a government based on the working class and the peasantry was certainly 
well within the ‘Old Bolshevik’ framework. Lih, however, is wrong to assert that Kamenev’s 
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‘incomplete’ bourgeois revolution theory would have led to the October Revolution regardless of 
Lenin’s April Theses. Kamenev did not support the Provisional Government, but his theory 
prevented him from endorsing preparations for revolution. Kamenev was convinced that on 
Marxist principle the working class and the ‘petty-bourgeois’ peasantry would remain united in a 
bloc to overcome feudalism. Discussing revolution was pointless. The vast majority of the 
working class were not Social-Democratic. This meant that the proletariat first had to be divorced 
from the petty-bourgeois peasant in order to ensure its hegemony. Kamenev could not endorse 
Lenin’s ‘second stage’ of revolution because the ‘first stage’ had not yet completed.
202
 Strictly 
adhering to Lassalle, further working class development was needed. Kamenev did not envision 
that the Bolshevik party could replace what was to be genuine proletarian management of the 
state. The ‘continuity’ Lih failed to outline when evaluating Kamenev’s position was that his 
1905 and 1917 position remained constant. He did not believe the proletariat was ready to rule. 
He made the argument in 1905, and throughout 1917. To rid themselves of the counter-
revolutionary Provisional Government, Kamenev would have led the party to the Constituent 
Assembly, not to October. 
That was precisely why Kamenev wrote on 12 April in Pravda that in Lenin’s theses 
there was no ‘answer to a single question to the political life in Russia today’ and that Lenin was 
formulating positions capable of implementation only in German, French, or British 
circumstances. In Marxist terms Kamenev was right. Socialist revolution had prospects in 
Western Europe where decades of industrial development had passed. Russia seriously lagged 
behind. Although there was nothing in his statement that was contrary to Lenin’s previously 
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formulated ‘uninterrupted’ revolution, it is evident that he wished to carry it to the letter and 
complete the bourgeois revolution before moving forward. Kamenev bluntly admitted on 24 
April that he was presently ‘against the transformation of the bourgeois-democratic revolution 
into a socialist one.’
203
 
Lih has also put forward the idea that the Old Bolsheviks did not find Lenin’s proposal for 
a government based on the soviets particularly ‘shocking or unacceptable’. Given that Kamenev 
and Nogin led the VII Party Conference to reject Lenin’s proposal, it is clear that it did rattle Old 
Bolshevik sensibilities.
204
 For Kamenev the inherent syndicalist and anarchist leanings in Lenin’s 
Soviet-dominated government ran contrary to the whole concept of Lassalle’s future state as a 
merging of society and state into one. Kamenev used the current situation to explain his severe 
apprehension to Lenin’s vison. At the Patronnyi and Sestroretskyi factories managers had fled in 
the days following the February Revolution and workers themselves had been forced to take 
control of production. With similar situations prevalent in numerous plants and factories, 
representatives from twelve of the largest state-run artillery factories employing 100,000 workers 
met in mid-March to discuss how best to organize and manage the factories. Workers at the 
conference refused to take responsibility for the technical and administrative organization of 
industry and instead desired a ‘constitutional factory’ where workers could control the work-shop 
floor and defend their interests against plant administrators. Not only did Kamenev point to these 
events as evidence he was right as to the lack of a general working class will to take ‘the decisive 
steps to socialism’, but in explaining the workers’ aims it is possible to see in Kamenev’s words 
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the essence of his Lassallean views. He wrote that the path to socialism would:  
‘not go through the partial seizure of factories or plants, nor through separate 
communes, but through the seizure of the central apparatuses of all government-
economic practices, to the transition of power to the hands of the proletariat, as a 
class, managing banks, the railroads, and food supplies on a state scale. And in 
this we are entirely with the workers’ conference of factories of the Artillery 




The state was to be managed and directed through a central government agency. It would not 
embrace syndicalist or anarchist ideas of local power structures. The Old Bolshevik Kamenev 
was certainly against Lenin on more than just a ‘strategic outlook’ detailed by Lih. He had 
legitimate theoretical concerns. 
The differences enumerated between Lenin and Kamenev had been developing since the 
outbreak of war and led the two into ideological and political conflict. Initially the majority 
backed Kamenev against Lenin’s April Theses. Krupskaya recalled that ‘a struggle started within 
the Bolshevik organization.’
206
 True to his ‘Bolshevik Centrism’, even though in disagreement 
the dialogical Kamenev defended Lenin’s right to publish his views. However, he wrote 8 April 
in Pravda that pending some kind of new Central Committee decision, the resolutions accepted 
by the Central Committee Bureau and the Bolshevik delegates at the All-Russian Conference 
‘remains our platform, which we will defend.’
207
 S. Ya. Bogdat’ev, I.A. Teodorvich, and 
Kamenev spoke for the party majority against the theses at a 6 April Central Committee Bureau 
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 Kamenev’s Petersburg Committee supporters flatly rejected it on 8 April in a vote of 
13 to 2, and party committees in the provinces followed suit.
209
  
The War Loan 
Accounts of Lenin’s triumph over Kamenev’s majority position have focused mainly on 
Lenin’s personal leadership. The narrative runs that Lenin simply cajoled the rank and file to 
accept his theses. Robert V. Daniels, Ronald Clark, Beryl Williams, and Robert Service have all 
dwelt on this theme. Service goes a bit further and attributes part of Lenin’s success to the outside 
influence of the ‘Miluikov note’, but this only favoured his position as it regarded opposition to 
the Provisional Government and not the party’s attitude towards the Mensheviks.
210
 These 
explanations fall short of explaining how the Bolshevik faction came to break from Menshevik 
cooperation to accept Lenin’s divisive April Theses.  
The most important factor which brought Lenin the party majority’s support against the 
Mensheviks was the Provisional Government’s ‘Liberty Loan’.
211
 Issued by the Provisional 
Government 27 March under Minister-President Prince G.E. L’vov, the Liberty Loan sparked 
intense debate within the socialist parties because the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks had hitherto 
stood united in opposing war credits. If the Mensheviks changed course and endorsed a war loan 
issued by a bourgeois government, to the Bolsheviks it would be tantamount to the same betrayal 
in August 1914 when the French and German socialists voted for war credits. That was why 
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Kamenev did his utmost in the Petrograd Soviet to prevent it approving the war loans. In the 
Petrograd Soviet on 16 April, Kamenev tried to convince the Mensheviks and SRs with a sensible 
alternative to raise money ‘not from a loan, but from the pockets of the bourgeoisie.’
212
 
Menshevik leaders were afraid to take any step which may reduce the country’s capacity to wage 
war and directed the Petrograd Soviet to support war credits on the condition the Provisional 
Government publically accepted the Soviet’s 14 March declaration that denounced any 
annexations or indemnities. Their trust was clearly misplaced as the Kadet Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs Pavel Miliukov tried to circumvent the Soviet by dispatching a secret message (the so-
called ‘Miliukov note’) to its allies 18 April that promised Russia would continue the ‘war to a 
victorious end’. When the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet heard the message the 
next day, Kamenev felt his position secure, asserting that ‘the majority that were standing for the 
loan cannot now remain in their position.’
213
  
Outside the Petrograd Soviet thousands of workers flooded the streets in protest at 
Miliukov’s note on 20 April and a hopeful Kamenev joined by Sukhanov took part in a joint 
session of the Provisional Government, the Executive Committee, and the Committee of the 
Duma that night to discuss the situation. At the meeting Tsereteli ignored Kamenev and 
Sukhanov and staked his party’s future on maintaining an alliance with the bourgeoisie, 
proposing that the Provisional Government simply issue a new declaration more in line with the 
Soviet’s 14 March proposal. On 21 April the Provisional Government announced the desired 
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response and the ‘April Crisis’ protests subsided.
214
 The Menshevik leadership believed they 
were safeguarding the gains of the revolution, but they had to break their solidarity with the 
Bolsheviks over war credits to do it. 
To many Bolsheviks the Menshevik support for war credits brought irrevocable 
separation. Bolshevik policy was centred on its international position and supporting the war 
meant supporting capitalism. The shift of party opinion from Kamenev’s position of compromise 
to Lenin’s call to completely break from the Mensheviks was so abrupt that it can only be 
explained by the sense of betrayal the Bolsheviks felt over the ‘Liberty Loan’ and not by intra-
party manoeuvres, especially since it was during the Petrograd Soviet discussion of the war loan 
and the ‘April Crisis’ that the 16 to 22 April First Bolshevik Petrograd City Conference convened 
to determine Bolshevik policy. Lenin tactfully used the loan to his advantage, putting in his draft 
resolution that in relations with other socialist groups the ‘the voting for the loan and 
commitment to revolutionary defencism in general is considered an absolute betrayal of 
socialism’.
215
 In tandem, Zinoviev in Pravda declared that the loan goes ‘in the face of all 
principles of socialism’ and offers only a ‘new sea of blood’.
216
 A strong showing of Vyborg 
Bolsheviks had ensured that Lenin’s resolution denouncing Mensheviks and SRs passed in a vote 
33 to 6, despite Lenin’s reprimands that their revolutionary zeal was pure ‘adventurism’. Even 
Kamenev’s previous supporters from the Petersburg Committee began to desert to Lenin as 
among those elected to draft the committee’s resolutions were Lenin, Molotov, Zinoviev, and 
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Stalin, all favouring Lenin and outvoting Kamenev.
217
 Kamenev could not retain support for his 




An Airplane to the Revolution 
From the outset of the February Revolution there had been high hopes that unification 
between the Mensheviks and Bolsheviks would occur, and Kamenev’s ‘Bolshevik Centrism’ 
which had tried to achieve cooperation without sacrificing Bolshevik values had been central to 
that discussion. Although now in the minority due to the war loan, at the VII All-Russian 
Conference of the Bolsheviks which began 24 April, Kamenev gave a concerted effort to justify 
his theory of the ‘incomplete’ bourgeois revolution and this sharply contrasted with Lenin’s 
revolutionary aspirations. Central to their disagreement was how to deal with their opponents. 
Lenin felt that only his position was truly Marxist and castigated all his non-Bolshevik critics as 
enemies, whereas Kamenev was willing to leave a dialogue open between socialist parties so that 
unity on specific objectives could still be achieved. It was therefore at this conference that their 
divergence came into full view and forced the party to decide between the two. Whereas one was 
monological and would set an authoritarian path, the other was dialogical and would pursue more 
democratic ends. 
At the conference and throughout 1917 Lenin and Kamenev’s attitude to political 
discourse was best revealed by their contrasting definitions of the term ‘revolutionary 
democracy’. The phrase itself was used by every group, from the Kadets and Socialist 
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Revolutionaries to the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks, with each defining it differently. To the 
Mensheviks the term encompassed all layers of society which had overthrown the Tsar, from the 
workers to the bourgeoisie. Lenin defined ‘revolutionary democracy’ in an effort to thwart 
Moscow Bolsheviks from seeking socialist cooperation to be ‘not suited anywhere; it is a phrase. 
It covers up rather than lays bare the antagonisms of class interests.’
219
 He believed the ‘phrase’ 
was allowing ‘petty-bourgeois’ influences into their ranks and wanted the words struck from their 
resolutions.
220
 The words illustrate Lenin’s refusal to acknowledge any other party’s participation 
in shaping Russia but his own. The Bolsheviks would gain nothing in cooperation. In total 
disagreement, Kamenev saw ‘revolutionary democracy’ as a near synonym for ‘Social-
Democracy’. He excluded liberals and right-wing groups but included every socialist party. He 
complained that ‘Lenin does not like the words “revolutionary democracy”’ because there ‘are 
shades of socialism among the proletariat…’ and ‘a collision of the bourgeoisie with the entire 
revolutionary democracy is inevitable.’
221
 He saw value in joint collaboration and in achieving 
common goals. 
As for the tactical programme adhering to Kamenev’s ‘incomplete’ bourgeois revolution 
and his pursuit of cooperation, it took prompts from F.E. Dzerzhinsky to hear out Kamenev’s 
proposal.
222
 Unlike bourgeois revolutions of the eighteenth century, Kamenev maintained that the 
‘hegemony’ of the proletariat was capable of controlling the bourgeois Provisional Government 
through mass pressure as the government was dependent on labour and the forces of production 
                                                          
219
 Lenin, PSS, vol. 31, p. 248. 
220
 Sed’maya (aprel’skaya) vserossiiskaya konferentsiya RSDRP (bol’shevikov): protokoly, p. 67. 
221
 Ibid., p. 82. 
222
 Ibid., p. 78. 
76 
 
in order to prosecute the war.
223
 However, the proletariat still needed allies and believed that their 
influence would grow as war weariness would bring soldier support. This would then drive the 
petty-bourgeoisie into a revolutionary alliance with the proletariat on a Bolshevik platform of 
peace.
224
 As the Bolsheviks worked from within the worker-petty-bourgeois bloc, they could 
push forward their agenda and even win the non-proletarian elements to their side.
225
 This was 
not the line Lenin was espousing by openly declaring that the ‘second stage’ of the revolution 
was afoot. Kamenev desired mass support and socialist cooperation to complete the bourgeois 
revolution.  
In order to demonstrate that much of what he proposed was already in place and working, 
Kamenev and V.P. Miliutin pointed to the Petrograd Soviet’s authority as evidence. During the 
‘April Crisis’ the Soviet had successfully ordered soldiers under General L.G. Kornilov not to 
enter Petrograd.
226
 This was an effective use of the Petrograd Soviet’s ‘Order Number One’, 
which was a decree subjecting soldiers to orders from the Provisional Government only if 
approved by the Soviet. The Petrograd Soviet had also used its authority to push forward the 8-
hour work day and had arrested government officials of the old regime. The Provisional 
Government would not have done those things without Soviet authority. Miliutin indicated that it 
was a ‘display of our force which dictated the moment.’
227
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Lenin was not convinced, stating plainly that ‘control without power is an empty 
phrase.’
228
 Supporting Lenin’s majority position, A.S. Bubnov called the feats enumerated by 
Kamenev and Miliutin as ‘paper control,’ believing government decrees nothing more than 
printed words without force of application.
229
 Control to him was to eventually use the masses to 
engage the bourgeoisie in open civil war.
230
 
Kamenev understood the dangers of Lenin’s position; the party leader’s policies had all 
the hallmarks of Jacobinism because the masses were not behind them.
231
 He had said it when 
Trotsky had proposed ‘permanent revolution’ in 1906, and he was saying it now. He was willing 
to concede that Lenin’s views could be used as their ‘maximum’ policy, but without concrete 
steps he worried the party would continue to vacillate as it had during the ‘April Crisis’ when the 
left-wing of the party had protested with the masses calling for the downfall of the Provisional 
Government.
232
 Lenin had reversed course by urging revolutionary restraint, but that had only 
served to disorganize the party due to mixed messages.
233
 V.V. Kuraev summed up the issue by 
stating that a tragedy similar to the fate of the Paris Commune would follow if they successfully 
seized power without a plan.
234
  
Kamenev worried what the result would be if they led an immature proletariat to 
revolution, stating on 24 April that Lenin was ‘boycotting the revolutionary process’. This was a 
brief reference to his Lassallean contention that only with a culturally and politically developed 
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working class could they push for revolution. It was so important to him that he threatened to 
leave the party announcing that ‘if this path is offered to me to go to the socialist revolution in an 
airplane, then I will refuse, because in that case I will go alone’ and continued that he wanted ‘to 
go to the socialist revolution with the masses’.
235
 His message was clear.  
Lenin was dangerously close to heading down the path of Jacobinism. Lenin himself said 
their immediate aim was not socialism, but taking power.
236
 Even though Leopold Haimson has 
pointed out that Lenin desired ‘to take steps forward’ for the ‘second stage’ of the revolution,
237
 
Lenin had completely failed to outline just what those steps were. Kamenev had devised practical 
policy to rally workers to press for peace to hopefully spark revolution in Germany, whereas 
Lenin had provoked other parties with his vision for a future government of soviets and about 
raising international civil war in Russia without outlining how the party was to achieve those 
aims. Discussing taking power in a Jacobean fashion to realise policy was not a practical step, 
and it did not correspond with Kamenev’s belief that the state was to be a reflection of proletarian 
values. Kamenev thought social transformation would come first, political power second. Politics 
had always been the primary tool in which Kamenev hoped to bring the proletariat to 
consciousness, but he had never seen it as an end in itself. With Lenin politics and power came 
first, and reality had to bend to meet the image he created. 
Kamenev understood that Lenin had realigned the party. The Bolsheviks were no longer 
dedicated to raising the consciousness of the proletariat for revolution, but instead were a party 
intent on gaining political power to only then uplift the proletariat. That was why Lenin 
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advocated the party separate the ‘communist elements of the proletariat from the petty-bourgeois 
ones’
238
; he desired a resolute proletarian base for the party to take action. Kamenev remained 
interested in winning the ‘petty-bourgeois’ ones to their side. By reducing the role of the 
peasantry, his proposal to seize state power and wait for aid from abroad was becoming far more 
similar to Trotsky’s theory of ‘permanent revolution’ rather than the pre-1917 Bolshevik 
position. 
At the conference Kamenev’s ‘Bolshevik Centrism’ once again resurfaced as he was 
successfully able to forge a compromise. Kamenev’s criticism of Lenin’s policies steered the 
party to accept Lenin’s April Theses as its ‘maximalist’ policy. Kamenev hoped this would 
prevent the party left from trying to take action immediately by officially placing Lenin’s ideas as 
a distant goal. This placated those such as Kamenev, Nogin, and Miliutin who worried that 
seizing power was terribly premature. The conference decided that the newly elected Central 
Committee would draw up a ‘minimum’ program in two months’ time and present it at the next 
party congress.
239
 To further moderate Lenin’s ‘maximalist’ ideas, Nogin had allied with 
Kamenev to question Lenin’s ‘All Power to the Soviets’ policy and the establishment of a 
government of soviets. Nogin maintained that the Soviets themselves would be reduced to 
municipal management or even become obsolete once the future Constituent Assembly 
determined the mode of government.
240
 Lenin therefore resigned himself to note in the resolution 
on ‘the revision of the party program’ that it was only important to know the class characteristics 
of the government rather than its actual form.
241
 Lenin’s proposal to change the Bolsheviks to the 
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‘Communist Party’ and to create the ‘Third International’ was also rejected on the grounds that 
building socialism was not yet underway. Nevertheless, in the face of the ‘Miliukov note’ and the 
‘Liberty Loan’, Lenin had moved the party to accept his divisive Petrograd City Conference 
resolutions as general Bolshevik policy.  
Conclusion 
The Bolshevik party had two distinct paths presented to them at the April 1917 Bolshevik 
conference, and this chapter has presented the origins of how Kamenev arrived at his 1917 
position against Lenin. His view that the February Revolution was an ‘incomplete’ bourgeois 
revolution originated from his 1916 contentions that in Russia the war had forged an unnatural 
alliance between bourgeois capitalism and feudalism. Lenin focused his attention on the 
international working class movement with his analysis that the war signified the final stage of 
capitalism. While Kamenev had no objections to this model as it applied to Europe, from these 
differences there emerged an escalating conflict between Kamenev and Lenin as to how to 
proceed in Russia. The war had radically changed Lenin. He had become militant, and even more 
obstinate, unbending, and self-assured than before. His monological discourse sharpened and he 
made enemies of all non-Bolshevik socialists who challenged his principle views. Unity with 
other socialists could only be achieved if they completely capitulated to his theoretical position. 
This inflexibility combined with his commitment to revolution and the conquest of power set the 
foundation for the Bolshevik leadership’s resistance to compromise throughout 1917. 
 Unlike Lenin, Kamenev did not label party opponents ‘traitors’ for disagreeing, and felt 
that their future struggle with the bourgeoisie would require the entire ‘revolutionary democracy’ 
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and compromise. Lenin’s actions and behaviour outweighed his words calling for worker 
democracy in his April Theses. Only by appreciating Kamenev’s position can the true importance 
of Lenin’s triumph at the April Conference be completely understood. Gaining the party’s trust 
over the debate with the ‘Liberty Loan’ enabled Lenin to dramatically shift the party away from 
their Social-Democratic roots of working with other socialists out of solidarity. Accepting all 
‘shades of socialism’, Kamenev was the leading Bolshevik voice fighting for a more democratic 
socialist future. 
In terms of theoretical direction, Kamenev’s Bolshevism remained Social-Democratic. He 
espoused wanting to advance the proletariat culturally and politically before seizing power. It is 
evident his inspiration was Lassalle, and this led him to spurn Lenin’s vision for a socialist state 
organised through the soviets on theoretical grounds. Lenin had proposed a fundamental change 
to the function of a future socialist state and Kamenev and Nogin managed to thwart its becoming 
accepted as part of the official party platform. The controversy around Lenin’s April Theses was 




 The year 1917 was a tumultuous one. In the beginning the Mensheviks and the SRs 
dominated the Petrograd Soviet and when in May their two parties joined the Kadets and 
Octobrists in coalition in the Provisional Government, the two institutions had a much easier 
political relationship. However, it was not enough to reduce the war weariness setting in among 
the population, nor did it help in speeding up the convocation of the Constituent Assembly or in 
resolving the peasant demand for land in the countryside. Soldiers exhausted by the bloody war 
attempted insurrection in July, and in August General Kornilov organised a military coup to save 
Russia from extremism. The Bolsheviks were nearly ruined after the July Days, but emerged as 
the leading force for change following Kornilov’s failed coup and seized the majority for the first 
time in the Petrograd Soviet. Riding on their growing popularity, they organized the overthrow of 
the Provisional Government in October with promises to resolve the nation’s political and 
economic woes. The role Kamenev played in 1917 was an important one, and understanding his 
theoretical and political reasons for the actions he undertook at each critical juncture is essential 
to not only understanding how the Bolsheviks triumphed in 1917, but also what role his 
‘Bolshevik Centrism’ played during the year of the October Revolution.  
The ‘Old Bolshevik’ versus Lenin – In Pursuit of Cooperation 
Throughout 1917 there were essentially two prominent contradictory messages emanating 
from the Bolshevik party, one stressing a desire for socialist unity against the bourgeoisie and the 
other trumpeting that the Bolsheviks were the only true Marxists and that with or without the 
support of other socialist parties they were prepared to take power. There were various groups 
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among the Bolsheviks which shall be enumerated upon, but Kamenev and Lenin best express the 
two dominant Bolshevik positions. Although the two men and their followers clashed, it was the 
duality of their contentions that ensured their party’s ultimate victory and success of the October 
Revolution. 
There were Mensheviks and Bolsheviks, and Kamenev considered both parties socialist. 
Lenin’s view was increasingly becoming that only the Bolsheviks were socialists. There was thus 
a struggle between the pre-1914 Bolshevik view that there could be competing socialist ideas 
between parties which still operated under the unitary mission to bring about a proletariat 
revolution and Lenin’s narrowing worldview that only the Bolsheviks knew the true Marxist 
path. Lenin thought competing views only served to impede, delay, or outright oppose the 
oncoming proletariat revolution he envisioned. 
From the outset it is possible to discern that Kamenev remained committed to Social-
Democracy as a whole. With how closely the right-wing of the Bolsheviks and the left-wing of 
the Mensheviks were to each other, one might consider that Kamenev’s ‘Bolshevik Centrism’ 
would be better defined as him being a centrist Russian Social-Democrat, but the fact remained 
that he was committed to promoting revolutionary civil war abroad and was against any and all 
cooperation with the bourgeoisie, a decidedly Bolshevik feature. 
Nevertheless, Kamenev pursued socialist solidarity to a degree which nearly 
compromised his Bolshevik standing. After the ‘April Crisis’ and the forced resignation of 
Foreign Minister Miliukov and the Minister of War, A.I. Guchkovn, on 2 May Chkheidze and 
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Tsereteli negotiated with Prime Minister Prince G.E. Lvov to create a coalition government.
242
 
Two Mensheviks and four SRs joined Octobrists and liberal Kadets in the Provisional 
Government. Both Kamenev and Stalin had entertained the idea that joining the bourgeois 
ministers could be a more practical way of controlling the government than by constantly 
negotiating with it through the Soviet.
243
 He had anticipated that they would leverage their 
positions to force the bourgeoisie to adhere to policies emanating from the soviet and to his mind 
and others such as his Menshevik-Internationalist friend N.N. Sukhanov, if they held a firm 
position it would not violate Lassallean principles.
244
 Kamenev and Stalin’s optimism was short-
lived as it became immediately apparent that Tsereteli desired sincere cooperation with the 
bourgeois ministers and refused to denounce the country’s war effort. 
Three specific examples immediately following the April Conference illustrate how 
Kamenev and Lenin set different Bolshevik tones in regards to politics for the remainder of 1917. 
Leading the Bolsheviks in the Workers’ section of the Petrograd Soviet, on 10 May Kamenev put 
forward a compromise proposal that for the municipal elections the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks 
should run on a united socialist ticket, stressing that they should tell citizens ‘not to vote for the 
list of bourgeois candidates, but choose one of the socialists.’
245
 Lenin’s mouthpiece, Zinoviev, 
quickly denounced the Mensheviks and the SRs for cooperating with the bourgeoisie in 
government and upset the hall.
246
 One message was conciliatory, and the other was combative. 
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This created a rather confusing image as to whether the Bolsheviks were friends or foes. In 
rejecting cooperation, one Soviet representative summed up their difficulties in understanding the 
Bolshevik’s confused statements, declaring that ‘the Bolsheviks are not enemies but comrades...,’ 
however, ‘they are our enemies during the election campaign.’
247
 
The second example is in regards to how Lenin and Kamenev handled socialists abroad. 
Whereas Kamenev was searching for alliances to achieve Bolshevik ends, Lenin insisted on the 
party acting independently. For example, Kamenev and Nogin advocated that the Bolsheviks 
participate in the upcoming Stockholm Conference to try and broker peace between all 
belligerent powers on the basis of no annexations or indemnities.
248
 Kamenev hoped that such a 
declaration would give strength to his cause in pushing the Provisional Government to ask for 
peace in an effort to spark revolution in Germany. Lenin refused to open a dialogue with the 
‘traitors’ and with Zinoviev’s aid persuaded the CC to boycott the conference. Lenin was so 
antagonistic to others criticising his views that he unjustly imagined that the internationalist 
socialist community was in league with the bourgeoisie to forestall a proletarian revolution!
249
 
However, having regained support following the war credits row, Kamenev and Nogin 




The third example was in how the two men treated their opponents. Lenin saw his 
adversaries as irreconcilable enemies, branding them as ‘traitors’. Kamenev, on the other hand, 
                                                          
247
 Ibid., p. 50. 
248
 Almost all the major powers refused to allow socialists to leave their respective countries to attend the conference. 
It never met. 
249
 Tsereteli, Vospominaniya o fevral’iskoi revolyutsii, p. 241. 
250
 At the conference there were to be two seats left ‘unoccupied’ for the Bolshevik delegates. See ibid., p. 292. 
86 
 
was careful not to personally attack other socialists. The most striking example of this tactic was 
his treatment of Kerensky.
251
 In May the Provisional Government issued a ‘Declaration of the 
Rights of Soldiers’, which allowed officers to execute insubordinate soldiers in wartime 
situations despite the abolition of the death penalty. On 14 and 18 May Kamenev attempted to 
absolve Kerensky of personal responsibility and stated in public that his party did not distrust him 
but placed the blame on General A.A. Polivanov.
252
 Lenin was belligerent and Kamenev was 
civil. 
The Bolshevik party had two conflicting messages to other socialist parties. Channelled 
through Lenin’s position, one brokered no compromises and did its best to exacerbate the divide 
between them, and the other through Kamenev worked with great effort to keep political 
channels open in hopes of cooperation.  
The June Demonstrations – The Failure of Political Dialogue 
The Mensheviks and the Soviet in general ignored Kamenev’s early overtures for 
cooperation. Just as easily as Lenin had hastily branded his opponents as ‘traitors’, the Soviet 
majority mistakenly viewed all the Bolsheviks as if they were all as rigid as Lenin. This failure of 
dialogue from the side of the Soviet leaders cost them not only an important opportunity to 
change Bolshevik opinion, but strengthened Lenin’s hard-line position. 
Among the Bolsheviks Kamenev made a substantial gain in winning over Zinoviev from 
Lenin. Robert Daniels has contended he began to favour Kamenev’s position out of spite for 
being overshadowed by Trotsky when he entered the party in August, but his shift occurred much 
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 When Zinoviev became a representative in the Workers’ Section of the Petrograd 
Soviet, he quickly saw the majority’s disdain for Lenin’s platform and this influenced him to 
temper his views. Zinoviev had a strong gift for oratory, and when he abandoned Lenin’s position 
Kamenev and Zinoviev became the head of a formidable Bolshevik minority in the Soviet with a 
strong public presence. Kamenev’s line was therefore strengthened at the early June All-Russian 
Congress of Soviets when the two were elected onto the Executive Committee.
254
 
However, within the party the far left was stirring. The Bolshevik Military Organization 
(BMO) led by K.A. Mekhonoshin, K.N. Orlov, V.I. Nevsky, N.I. Podvoisky, P.V. Dashkevich, 
and F.F. Raskol’nikov
255
 began preparations for a soldier demonstration in opposition to the 
Provisional Government’s proposed military offensive. At the 6 June joint meeting of the CC, the 
Military Organizations, and the Executive Commission of the Petersburg Committee Lenin, 
Stalin, Y.M. Sverdlov, and G.F. Fedorov came out in favour of the BMO’s protest. Lenin feared 
that the Provisional Government might be able to bolster its political support with a military 
victory. Alexander Rabinowitch has shown that this decision was deliberately kept from the 
congress delegation.
256
 No doubt Lenin wanted to safeguard his own position without the 
interference of Kamenev’s political line. This began to unravel when the delegation heard about 
the news, as Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Nogin quickly formed a strong minority against the protest. 
Kamenev feared that given the isolation of the Bolsheviks the protests could trigger a revolution 
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 This created a rather tense atmosphere in the congress as the Bolshevik decision 
pitted their party against the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which on the 8 June had publically 
prohibited any demonstration without the authorization of the Petrograd Soviet.
258
  
Kamenev, Zinoviev, and Nogin were so concerned about defying the will of their fellow 
socialists that they persuaded the CC to have an emergency meeting at midnight to try to cancel 
the demonstration. Lenin and Sverdlov chose to abstain over fear of the consequences of seizing 
power with what they considered an inept Menshevik and SR Soviet majority.
259
 Kamenev, 
Zinoviev, and Nogin won the vote to call off the armed protest to maintain Bolshevik and Soviet 
unity.
260
 The political meaning was for Lenin a retreat, but for Kamenev’s group it was a 
conciliatory display of restraint to their fellow socialists that the Bolsheviks were willing to keep 
a political dialogue open.  
The Executive Committee of the congress took little notice and chose to escalate tensions 
with the Bolsheviks. This was clearly a mistake as they could have adopted a strategy to leverage 
Kamenev, Zinoviev, and Nogin against Lenin and the Bolshevik left by promoting and praising 
their efforts. In a special joint meeting of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd soviet and 
the Presidium of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, Tsereteli, A.R. Gots, M.I. Liber, and K.M. 
Ermolaev completely ignored Kamenev’s message and moved that the Soviet should disarm the 
Bolsheviks. Fedor Dan, B.O. Bogdanov, and L.M. Khinchuk were the only ones who understood 
that a move against the Bolsheviks would alienate sections of the proletariat and be seen as 
counterrevolutionary. It was rather odd that Tsereteli charged the Bolsheviks with conspiracy for 
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not making their intentions public. Sukhanov was right that there was a not ‘even a shadow of 
illegality’ in the Bolshevik’s action.
261
 If anything, by the Bolsheviks yielding it showed loyalty. 
Kamenev of course was indignant and led the Bolsheviks from the hall in protest.
262
 
Tsereteli’s remarks struck a sour note with Kamenev for he had struggled within the 
Bolshevik party to cancel the demonstration, and had even enumerated his difficulties in hopes of 
showing the party’s obedience, and his own, to the Soviet.
263
 Instead of relief or praise, he 
received ridicule. On 11 June the Soviet passed Dan’s rather lenient proposal to simply censure 
the Bolsheviks, but they missed an important opportunity. Had they instead emphasized 
Kamenev’s defiance within his party with more appreciation, they could have gained favour with 
Bolsheviks contemplating Kamenev’s position.  
Instead, they helped divide the Executive Committee from the Bolsheviks even further. In 
a special meeting between the Petersburg Committee and the CC on 11 June, I.T. Smigla and 
Stalin unsuccessfully tried to resign from the CC over the cancellation. Zinoviev tried to persuade 
the Petersburg Committee that the climate at the Congress had been so anti-Bolshevik that ‘if you 
had been in our situation you would have voted with us,’ but the Petersburg Committee remained 
hostile.
264
 Most endorsed M.P. Tomski’s opinion that the party organs had voted for a 
demonstration knowing of the congress’s opposition and therefore found fault with the 
leadership’s decision.
265
 The intra-party discord quickly abated as Tsereteli’s hysterical attack on 
Kamenev had made him look to be the very ‘counter-revolutionary’ Lenin claimed him to be and 
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thus Lenin and Zinoviev were able to channel party discontent by uniting opinion against 
Tsereteli.
266
 Lenin had labelled his fellow socialists ‘traitors’ and ‘enemies’ when they originally 
were not. With Lenin and the BMO creating the hostile atmosphere, the Bolsheviks truly became 
the Executive Committee’s enemy. The Soviet leaders heard only Lenin’s invectives drowning 
out Kamenev’s voice. Their failure to welcome Kamenev’s position prevented the party’s 
internal disputes from maturing into a divide, for even the Bolsheviks of Kamenev’s persuasion 
aligned with Lenin, seeing that an open hand of cooperation to the Mensheviks and SRs was 
pointless. 
The July Days – Gaining the Trust of the Petrograd Soviet 
The Bolshevik leadership remained hesitant on the question of seizing power. The whole 
nation was not as militant as Petrograd. Kamenev saw this clearly and sought to curtail the 
growing militancy of the Bolshevik left by illuminating socialist principles. On 22 June he wrote 
in Pravda that the bourgeois stage of the revolution could not be skipped and implored caution. 
Lenin soon also called for restraint, but Leopold Haimson has accurately conveyed that he was 
worried about the ability to hold power, not questioning whether it should be taken or not.
267
 The 
real essence of the dispute between Lenin and Kamenev continued to be that unlike Lenin, 
Kamenev was interested in taking power only if the new government represented all ‘shades of 
socialism’ and had the backing of the masses. 
The first overture from Kamenev after the June Demonstration dispute to show his desire 
for socialist solidarity came the day of the 18 June demonstration. At the Kresty Vyborg prison 
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the Anarchist-Communists staged a jail break to free F.P. Khaustov, a Bolshevik editor of the 
soldiers’ paper Okopnaya Pravda.
268
 Kamenev took action to break up the mob by acceding to 
the release of four additional political prisoners. He sought to quell the unrest in order to 
safeguard the Soviet, not just his party.
269
 Had it been a Bolshevik affair, the words of a 
disciplined left Bolshevik would have sufficed much more than Kamenev in calling off the 
crowd. 
Matters between the Bolsheviks and the Soviet began to deteriorate on 3 July when anti-
government sentiments within the First Machine Gun Regiment emboldened them to take to the 
streets of Petrograd in pursuit of a direct overthrow of the Provisional Government. Kamenev 
quickly sent BMO Raskol’nikov a message instructing him to restrain the Kronstadt sailors.
270
 
Unable to pacify the movement, the BMO’s All-Russian Bureau, the Petersburg Committee’s 




Trying to prevent Bolshevik isolation and make the best of a bad situation as the regiment 
approached, Kamenev lost his usual equanimity and jumped up on the tribune at a Petrograd 
Soviet meeting and with emotional fervour proposed they seize power and elect a bureau of 25 to 
organize a peaceful transfer of power.
272
 The Bolsheviks were sure to be blamed once the sailors 
were repressed. Therefore Kamenev’s actions were not completely altruistic, but he certainly was 
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vocalizing his desire to get Soviet support to save his own party from condemnation. However, it 
cannot be forgotten that Kamenev had been working for a socialist alliance since his March 
arrival. He truly wanted a Soviet government with all parties represented. Trotsky’s quick 
acceptance of Kamenev’s motion cannot be seen in the same light.
273
 Kamenev was consistent. 
Trotsky, for example, later turned his back on political dialogue once the Bolsheviks gained a 
Soviet majority. 
Proof of Kamenev’s sincerity came when despite the representatives of the SRs and the 
Mensheviks walking out in protest, Kamenev ensured that should the regiment seize power they 
would be represented in the new government. Confident the unrest was an isolated Bolshevik 
phenomenon, the Mensheviks and SRs refused to join Kamenev’s attempt to expand the gains of 
a potential revolution from a Bolshevik minority into a far-reaching endorsement by the Soviet. 
Nevertheless, under Kamenev’s leadership the remaining delegates unanimously passed his 
resolution calling for an all-socialist government with 276 votes. Kamenev instructed the Soviet 
to only select 15 of the 25 members so that the remaining 10 would be held for the other parties 
when they returned.
274
 The Bolsheviks could have taken every seat. Leaving places open showed 
a sincere commitment for future cooperation as there was no way of knowing at the time that the 
commission was never going to meet.  
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Up to the very end of the July days Kamenev aided the Soviet. In the face of failure, 
Lenin ordered the BMO to stand down and the CC demanded workers return to work.
275
 On 
behalf of the Central Executive Committee (TsIK) of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets 
General Lieber brought in Kamenev to aid in retaking the Peter-Paul Fortress from the Kronstadt 
sailors. Kamenev was successful at pacifying the sailors and the Bolshevik Kronstadt leaders S. 
Roshal and Raskol’nikov, but his willingness to help the Soviet nearly cost him his life. On the 
way to Kronstadt the Menshevik M.I. Lieber and the SR A.R. Gots had to intercede to stave off 
an angry mob intent on murdering him. It was a strange turn of circumstances that the leading 
Bolshevik leader who championed the position to safeguard the Soviet nearly died at the hands of 
Soldiers who wanted to execute him for the Bolshevik’s endangering its existence.
276
 
Kamenev and Lenin on Politics 
The positions that Lenin and Kamenev took up following the Provisional Government’s 6 
July call to immediately arrest all the individuals responsible for the armed demonstration 
strongly conveyed their divided views on politics. Lenin and Zinoviev chose to go into hiding 
and labelled the Provisional Government under Kerensky a ‘military dictatorship,’ arguing that 
under the present conditions courts were ‘but an episode in the civil war,’ and that those 
Bolsheviks such as Kamenev, Trotsky, Lunacharsky
277
, and Nogin, who were urging him to stand 
trial simply did not understand the nature of the ‘war’ and its lengthening duration.
278
 To Lenin 
any questioning of his conduct was tantamount to counter-revolution and by escaping the 
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authorities he placed himself above the Soviet’s collective judgement; in essence – above 
politics. He now committed his efforts to planning violent revolution, although it is highly 
doubtful that he ever gave a peaceful transition of power much consideration. Not wanting to 
include SRs and Mensheviks in a future government as he now considered their leaders ‘the aids 
of butchers’,
279
 Lenin proposed a new form of government with a proletariat and peasant 
powerbase other than the soviets.
280
 This is proof that his talk of gaining a party majority in the 
soviets had always truly been a means to take power rather than any indication he was supporting 
worker democracy in 1917.   
Lenin ran roughshod over any possibility for a true ‘revolutionary democracy’ in the work 
he wrote in hiding, State and Revolution. Drawing heavily from Marx, Lenin outlined that the 
future socialist state would be of a commune-type which would ‘wither away’ as a classless 
society developed. Lenin contended that politics was simply an outward expression of material 
self-interest, meaning that if the economic conditions were changed the proletariat in a 
proletarian state would have no reason for disagreement and thus a proletarian government would 
have no need for politics.
281
 As Marx had written, the only thing the future state would require to 
maintain cohesion was force and repression; not against the proletariat, but against the 
bourgeoisie. Two historians that have elaborated on this theme and accurately portrayed Lenin’s 
intentions are Samuel Farber and A.J. Polan. For example, Farber correctly notes that State and 
Revolution focused only on worker administration and made no mention of the ‘political 
processes’ necessary to resolve differences of opinion.
282
 Likewise, Polan has argued that State 
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and Revolution showed Lenin’s commitment to ending politics because the government he 
outlined was without a separation between the government and the people.
283
 Either there was 
going to be an unrealistic general unified will of the proletariat, or force was going to be a 
necessity to overcome disagreement. Alfred B Evans has skirted the issue by advocating that 
Lenin was not intending State and Revolution to be a socialist roadmap for Russia specifically 
and was therefore a more theoretical exploration of ideas rather than a political programme of 
action.
284
 James Ryan has argued that Lenin’s endorsement of violence in State and Revolution 
has been exaggerated by historians not taking into account when the work was written. In this 
view Lenin was invigorated by the revolutionary enthusiasm of 1917 and did not envision 
perpetual repression.
285
 These latter two views ignore the fact that Lenin was contemplating this 
form of government while he was at ideological war with fellow socialists at home and abroad 
and was in fear of arrest by a socialist backed Provisional Government. Taken in this context, it is 
impossible to see how Lenin’s State and Revolution was anything but an unequivocal call to 
overcome differences of opinion through coercion.   
In contrast, Lassalle’s advocacy of a permanent socialist republic and not a state 
‘withering away’ showed that Lassalle had desired politics remain to sort out differences of 
opinion. The use of force as a method to repress the bourgeoisie under proletarian rule was also 
something Lassalle never advocated. Power and politics were based on privilege, and if the 
proletariat dominated the republic, repression would be unnecessary because the proletariat’s 
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inherent sense of equality would mandate an end to coercion.
286
 The state expanded, eventually 
drawing in everyone to participate. The opinions of other socialists mattered. This Lassallean 
influence explains why Kamenev invested himself in the current system, participating in the 
Soviet, conferences, and elections. He chose not to go into hiding because he still valued the 
authority of the soviets and saw them as more than just a means for revolution. They were part of 
a gradual transformation to a more proletarian directed state. Just as Lenin and Zinoviev were 
accused of being German agents, the right-wing press charged Kamenev with being a spy and a 
former Okhrana agent to tarnish the Bolsheviks.
287
 Kamenev allowed himself to be arrested on 9 
July. It was a public gesture supporting the Soviet and its pursuit of socialist democracy. 
This was made clear in a short letter to Chkheidze a week after his arrest, Kamenev wrote 
‘I gave myself to justice and have trusted the authority of the Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ 
Deputies’ and its resolutions about “judicial guarantees”…’ To the Petrograd Soviet he pleaded 
that the deputies ‘could not surrender their duty of honour to provide their own member the 
possibility to defend his reputation as a socialist and revolutionary.’ 
Kamenev even made a veiled swipe at Lenin, stating: 
‘I want to think that the Soviet’s behaviour will not force me to recognize that the 
comrades who failed to submit to the directives of the Soviet acted more 
reasonably than myself. I turned myself over to the hands of the judicial power 
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and agreed to the wishes of the Central Executive Committee. I have waited a 
week. It is long enough. It is even too long. I demand that I be given the facts 
which are keeping me in prison as a bribed traitor.’ 
Zinoviev, Lenin, and later, Trotsky, all wrote letters to justify their positions, but none of them 




Kamenev’s gesture finally obtained the desired result. His socialist peers came to his aid. 
Unlike for other Bolsheviks, at the request of Kamenev the Executive Committee opened an 
investigation as to the veracity of the charges against him. What the Executive Committee 
discovered was hardly incriminatory. His dealings in Kiev had truly been of a personal nature and 
he was not a member of the Okhrana.
289
 The Soviet then pressured the Provisional Government 
to release Kamenev on 4 August, but it refused to officially clear his name. In a defiant gesture 
Kamenev vowed to leave public life until the Executive Committee supported him.
290
 This 
worried Martov who quickly suggested to N.D. Sokolov that he address the public prosecutor 
personally, and Dan agreed to work through the Justice Department and establish a commission 
to communicate with the public prosecutor about his case.
291
 In the meantime, Kamenev and 
Lunacharsky protested the allegations in Maxim Gorky’s newspaper Novaya Zhizn’ and in the 
Moscow based Sotsial-Democrat to stir fellow socialist support. This brought conflict between 
the Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet and placed the Soviet in a difficult position; 
                                                          
288
 Vladimirova, vol. III, p. 371. 
289
 Kamenev had gone to Kiev in 1908 in part because of hopes of obtaining documents to go abroad, and in part, 
because of an alarming telegram from his mother. There he failed to acquire the proper documents to depart, and his 
mother’s emergency proved false. His only other encounter with the police that year was when they told him about 
the murder of his father. See RGASPI 323/1/4/6-8. 
290
 Vera Vladimirova, ed., Revolyutsiya 1917 goda: khronika sobytii, vol. IV, Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe 
izdatel’stvo, 1924, p.314. 
291
 Protokoly tsentralnyi komitet: Avgust 1917-Fevral’ 1918, Moscow: Gosudartvennoe izdatel’stvo, 1929, p. 31. 
98 
 




Kamenev’s plan was a resounding success and therefore Lenin’s assessment that the 
arrests were ‘but an episode in the civil war’ were completely off base. The Executive Committee 
ruled unanimously that the evidence the Justice Department provided them proved Kamenev’s 
innocence. Dan, Lieber, and Gots
293
 signed their names to a declaration on 30 August completely 
exonerating Kamenev of all charges.
294
 It is of great importance to note that his liberators were 
not left-leaning Mensheviks or Left SRs, but were staunch defencists. This showed that the 
Mensheviks and the SRs as a whole, not just their left factions, were coming round to the idea of 
working with the Bolsheviks who were like Kamenev and could be partners in a socialist 
democratic republic. 
Missed Opportunities 
At no time after March of 1917 were the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks so close to the 
possibility of reconciliation than when the two parties effectively banded together to thwart 
General Lavr Kornilov’s attempted military coup on 27 August.  Despite Lenin’s protestations 
earlier in the month that there was to be absolutely no cooperation with the Mensheviks or SRs, 
the Bolshevik CC ignored Lenin’s demand and officially advocated joint cooperation on 29 
August to halt Kornilov. Their victory had shown the insurmountable strength of socialist unity 
and fresh from his prison release Kamenev became invigorated with the prospects of a broad 
Menshevik and SR alliance.  
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The atmosphere had for the moment truly turned in Kamenev’s favour against Lenin’s 
divisive message. For one, his cooperation with Martov and the Menshevik-Internationalists was 
stronger than ever as Martov had come to accept Kamenev’s theoretical outlook that the 
revolution had been an ‘incomplete’ bourgeois revolution. For reasons explained in the previous 
chapter, Ziva Galili is wrong to assert that this was Martov’s idea.
295
 Thus Martov’s acceptance 
of Kamenev’s theoretical position helps explain why Lunacharsky had high hopes that Martov’s 
Menshevik-Internationalist group would soon join the Bolsheviks and strengthen the rightist 
position.
296
 Second, Kamenev’s 31 August call to form a socialist bloc against the ‘conspiracy’ of 
Kornilov and the ‘entire’ Russian bourgeoisie was not entirely left unanswered.
297
 The 
Mensheviks and the SRs were now officially committed to excluding the Kadets from any future 
government.
298
 In general, political opinion was shifting left. The Socialist Revolutionaries were 
splitting between right and left, and the Mensheviks were trying to break the left bourgeois 
liberals from their right Kornilov supporters.
299
 Even Dan would soon be courting Martov to 
form a left bloc.  
The Mensheviks, however, were yet unwilling to accept leftist policies partly out of fear 
of aiding the Bolsheviks to power.
300
 Even Kamenev could not allay their concerns when he 
promised that the Bolsheviks were not plotting a revolution, explaining that ‘We never planned a 
conspiracy and we never will.’
301
 Tsereteli and Martov understood that while Kamenev headed 
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the conciliatory Bolsheviks, Lenin yet remained and the question of an outright alliance was 
extremely difficult to contemplate. The most damning roadblock that persisted was Tsereteli and 
Skobelev’s insistence on seeking a coalition among the bourgeois intelligentsia. In vain Kamenev 
tried to change their opinion as this was something every Bolshevik abhorred. However, many 
like Tsereteli were more concerned with the principles of democracy than their power base, 
believing that any future government would need peasants, workers, and bourgeoisie alike. This 
position was contentious as the vast majority of workers wished to abandon the bourgeoisie. 
Tsereteli stubbornly pushed this platform throughout September, but the attempted military coup 
had radicalised views to such a degree that a Bolshevik resolution linking the entire bourgeoisie 
with Kornilov was approved by the Soviet by 227 votes to 115 with 51 abstentions.
302
 Kamenev 
hoped, as he had when working with the Mensheviks in the Duma before 1917, that the masses 
would compel the Mensheviks and the SRs to change their direction. 
There existed a brief opportunity for a broad coalition of socialists if the Mensheviks had 
simply cast aside the bourgeoisie. Had the two parties come together Kamenev would have 
headed the centre-left of an expanded party, and Martov the centre-right. United, their centrist 
position could have found common ground and maintained a level of parity with their opponents, 
if not held a Social-Democratic majority against Lenin’s far left and Tsereteli’s far right. This 
possibility never gained traction because Martov refused to aid the Bolsheviks with Lenin in their 
ranks. With the two parties remaining divided, the moderates in both organisations struggled for 
supremacy. In essence, the fear of Lenin would in the end cost the Mensheviks and SRs 
credibility and power. 
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The person who was far more astute than his peers and used the general shift to the left to 
his advantage was Lenin. Since May Lenin had wanted to accept Trotsky and his fellow 
Interdistrictites into the party, but that had not happened until the VI Part Congress in early 
August while Trotsky remained in prison.
303
 After Trotsky’s release, he strengthened Lenin’s 
position. T.H. Rigby has correctly argued that Lenin always strove ‘for the minimum winning 
alliance consistent with the maximum commitment to his goals, scorning wide coalitions that 
would confuse objectives and dilute organisational control…’
304
 That was why he needed 
Trotsky, he had to compromise almost nothing.  
Inside the Bolshevik party the balance of forces began to tip towards Lenin. Kamenev 
sensed this and tried to force the hand of the Mensheviks and the SRs on 9 September to be more 
accommodating when he proposed that the composition of the Presidium be based on 
proportionality to represent the entire ‘revolutionary democracy’.
305
 Martov seconded Kamenev’s 
proposal. In an effort to prevent the Bolshevik motion, the SR S.L Vainshtein proposed a 
resolution of confidence in the then current Presidium of Chkheidze, Tsereteli, Skobelev, 
Chernov, V.A. Anisimov, Dan, and Gots.
306
 It failed. Resisting the Bolshevik conciliators proved 
disastrous to their credibility as the Bolsheviks secured a majority in support of Kamenev’s 
resolution and became the Soviet majority.
307
 
Had Kamenev only desired power for his party alone and had not had a sincere belief in a 
socialist democracy, he most certainly would not have strained his efforts to diminish the 
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Bolshevik triumph in the Soviet in favour of a more balanced ‘revolutionary democracy’ 
afterwards. Approved in the Soviet and supported by Kamenev, Tsereteli had proposed a 
conference to be convened to create a new advisory government body to ensure the defence of 
the country.
308
 At the conference Kamenev sought to ingratiate himself with his opponents by 
using the pronoun ‘we’ to include the Bolsheviks in the Menshevik and SR mistake of not seizing 
Soviet power in February,
309
 and even spared Kerensky by insisting that his criticisms of the 
government were ‘not issues of personal trust towards Kerensky…but about trust for the political 
system’.
310
 Astonishingly, since the Bolsheviks were now the dominate party in the Soviet, 
Kamenev then proposed a resolution which would have placed the Bolsheviks in a government 
minority given the Menshevik and SR dominated conference, saying: 
‘The only way out is this: the power must not be a coalition government; the 
power must pass into the hands of the democracy (applause), not to the Soviet of 
Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, but into the hands of the democracy, which is 
quite fully represented here today. The government must be formed here. Here, 




Kamenev was not just accommodating his opponents; he was acting in defiance of Lenin and 
Trotsky’s line, ignoring their supported slogan of ‘All Power to the Soviets’ which would have 
given a Bolshevik majority in a new government. This showed Kamenev’s willingness to 
sacrifice his party for the better socialist good. 
Again, the blame for a failure to form a grand socialist alliance in government came from 
the Mensheviks, who flatly refused to be allies even if they held the majority. Two main reasons 
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held them back. Firstly they feared that Lenin would try the impossible and attempt to implement 
socialism immediately once in power, and secondly, despite the leftward shift of the proletariat 
and their demise in the Soviet, they remained unwilling to abandon the bourgeoisie. Before the 
conference Dan had stubbornly rejected reconciliation, saying ‘Kamenev talked about a new 
programme, but I must declare to you that such a program is not worth a penny if it does now 
unite the entire conscious democracy’, meaning the bourgeoisie.
312
 Then at the conference with 
the same unshakeable rigidness, Tsereteli clung to the idea of a bourgeois coalition despite the 
final vote on the matter rejecting such cooperation 183 to 813 with 80 abstentions.
313
 The 
Mensheviks were afraid of the responsibility of power and the risk of losing it. 
The party divides - Lenin, Trotsky and the moderate Bolsheviks 
With both the general leftward shift and Trotsky’s unabashed support of Lenin’s militant 
line on seizing power and making former socialist allies enemies, Kamenev’s platform of 
conciliation and cooperation began to seriously wane in the party. Party members were tired of 
trying to placate their Menshevik and SR counterparts and wanted action. The Bolshevik debate 
around participation in the pre-parliament marked the turning point. On 21 September the 
Bolshevik CC voted 9 to 8 not to enter the pre-parliament on the grounds that it included Kadets. 
Trotsky’s group, which included Stalin, was in favour of boycotting the pre-parliament. 
Supporting Kamenev, Rykov proposed they attend. Petrograd workers were more militant than 
outside the capital and the Bolshevik CC had long been determining policy based on their views. 
However, due to a large number of Bolsheviks assembled in Petrograd for the Democratic 
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Conference, the far left line was now outnumbered by Bolsheviks from the countryside who 
backed Kamenev. He and Rykov were therefore able to pressure the CC to conduct a party vote 
similar to a party congress. The party voted 77 to 50 for participation.
314
 Despite Trotsky and 
Lenin’s protestations, dialogue with the Mensheviks and SRs was still on the table, but barely. 
Inside the Petrograd Soviet Bolshevik popularity continued and on 25 September the 
Bolsheviks secured an Executive Committee majority in Soviet elections and Trotsky became its 
chair. This was a monumental shift in support of Lenin’s line because without Trotsky it seems 
unlikely that any other Bolshevik could have exceeded Kamenev and Zinoviev’s Soviet influence 
with Lenin remaining in hiding. Yet their importance persisted, and they were able to pass a 
resolution charging the upcoming Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets to peacefully resolve 
the issue of revolutionary power.
315
 
Lenin was furious. Whilst Kamenev, Nogin, Ryazanov, Sokol’nikov, and others clung to 
hopes of socialist cooperation, Lenin wrote on 23 September that workers needed ‘those at the 
top’ of the party to take action, for he had ‘not any kind of doubt that at the “top” of our party 
there are noticeable vacillations that may become ruinous… we must uphold the correct line of 
the party…’ and continued that ‘not all is well with the “parliamentary” leaders of our Party…’
316
 
By use of this word ‘parliamentary’ Lenin was comparing the Kamenev supporting Bolsheviks to 
liberals, drawing battle lines within his own party. Lenin wrote 29 September that it was no 
longer possible ‘to “wait” for the Congress of Soviets’ for that ‘would be complete idiocy, or 
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utter treason,’ and if he did not get his way he would resign from the CC and reserve his right ‘to 
agitate among the rank and file of the party and at the Party Congress.’
317
 
For Kamenev’s political line to hold, the Mensheviks and the SRs had to be willing to 
abandon the bourgeoisie. Despite the popular mood and a growing number of their rank and file 
supporting such a move, the leadership refused. They were oblivious to the fact that their survival 
depended on yielding to public pressure. Their stubbornness gave Lenin a mandate to pursue his 
agenda. At a meeting of the Bolshevik CC on 5 October Kamenev was the only member to vote 
for participation in the pre-parliament, the rest condemned it as a bourgeois institution. It took his 
threat of resignation from the TsIK of the Soviet to force the CC to then reconsider the boycott.  
He and Ryazanov proposed that the party should wait for an issue to develop within the 
new body between themselves and the right before they left in protest. This would serve once 
again to try and win over the Mensheviks, the SRs, and other petty-bourgeois elements by 
making the bourgeoisie the true enemy, but Kamenev could no longer maintain the majority in 
the face of outside Menshevik stubbornness. Trotsky, therefore, supported by a small majority 
won the debate in favour of a boycott
318
 and on 7 October effectively displayed the party’s 
disgust with the Provisional Government and its socialist ministers by walking out of the pre-
parliament in protest.
319
 The Mensheviks failed to see that the Bolshevik boycott of the regime’s 
democratic institutions was tantamount to a complete rejection of political dialogue. Kamenev’s 
year-long policy to bridge the Menshevik and Bolshevik divide was on its last legs. 
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The crux of Kamenev’s disagreement with Lenin and his push for revolution at the secret 
10 October CC meeting came from his belief that a divided ‘revolutionary democracy’ could not 
achieve victory. His opposition stemmed from his Lassallean view on the development of society 
and on the tactical disadvantage of the Bolsheviks acting alone. Supported at the meeting only by 
Zinoviev,
320
 Kamenev argued that there were two tactics emerging; one of conspiracy and one of 
belief in the inevitability of revolution.
321
 Their disagreement was really a continuation of their 
April 1917 dispute, as his calling Lenin’s proposal a ‘conspiracy’ was a masked attack on Lenin 
as being a Jacobin for proposing what Kamenev considered a premature revolution. When he 
wrote to various Bolshevik organizations on 11 October that a revolution staged by the 
Bolsheviks without their socialist allies would ‘push the petty-bourgeoisie into the embrace of 
Miliukov for a long time’, it was because he felt the proletariat had not culturally or politically 
advanced enough to win the peasantry over to their side. The majority had heard this all before 
and spurned it as they had done previously in the year and backed Lenin. 
Kamenev and Zinoviev tried to halt Lenin within the party again at the 16 October CC 
meeting when Lenin and Trotsky failed to outline precisely how they were going to achieve their 
revolutionary aims. Tactically Kamenev and Zinoviev felt that the petty-bourgeois group was so 
large that it would be impossible for the working class alone to overcome the opposing loyal 
forces of Kerensky. To further their strategic disadvantage, they contended that the Bolsheviks 
inability to infiltrate the railroad and telegraph unions too serious to overlook. Further, Kamenev 
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stressed, their relationship with the soldiers was fragile and talk of revolutionary war was enough 
to drive them away from the Bolshevik camp. Trying to forge a compromise, Kamenev urged 
they seize power another way. They argued that the Bolshevik majority in the Soviets was 
enough to outweigh the expected SR majority in the future Constituent Assembly, meaning that 
they could peacefully take power.
322
 Kamenev’s point was rather salient. The Bolsheviks were 
increasingly gaining support. Time was on their side. The numerous failed Bolshevik attempts to 
compromise with the Mensheviks had done much to win over Menshevik supporters now 
disgusted with their own party’s adherence to the bourgeoisie. Kamenev felt this was his last 
chance. He genuinely believed in socialist democracy, and in nearly everything he had done up to 
this point in his life he had searched for compromises to work together with political opponents. 
Yet despite the concerns over their chances of victory, Lenin’s resolution to prepare for 
revolution passed by 20 votes to 6, with 3 abstentions. Zinoviev’s resolution urging the 
postponement of insurrection until the Second Congress of Soviets failed 6 to 15, with 3 
abstentions. Dismayed, Kamenev submitted his resignation to the CC 20 October, accepted on a 
vote of 3 to 5.
323
  
Kamenev pinned his hopes on agitating among the rank and file to change the party’s 
course.
324
 Knowing the provinces far less militant than Petrograd, Kamenev aimed to rally non-
Petrograd Bolshevik delegates arriving for the Second Congress of Soviets to overturn the CC’s 
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decision. This was a viable strategy. Richard Pipes has shown that the majority of Bolsheviks in 
Moscow supported Kamenev and Zinoviev over Lenin and Trotsky.
325
 The Bolsheviks from the 




There was too much at stake for Kamenev to remain solely within the party rank and file. 
His socialist conscience compelled him to do more to thwart what he believed a premature 
revolution. On 18 October in an interview with the editors of Novaya Zhizn’ Kamenev insinuated 
that the Bolsheviks were preparing an uprising to derail his party’s efforts. Lenin responded 
furiously, condemning both Kamenev and Zinoviev as ‘strike-breakers’ and ‘blacklegs’ 
demanding that their ‘treacherous’ behaviour and ‘grave betrayal’ result in their expulsion from 
the party.
327
  This was not just a result of pique but reflected Lenin’s intolerance of dissent. The 
party was not yet completely under Lenin’s sway and the leadership was reluctant to completely 
disregard Kamenev and Zinoviev’s position. Thus on 20 October the CC censured Kamenev and 
Zinoviev, but did not expel them.
328
  
On 18 October Trotsky was forced to announce in the Petrograd Soviet that there was not 
an imminent insurrection planned; a complete lie. Kamenev seized the opportunity and declared 
that he wished ‘to sign his name to Trotsky’s every word.’ This put Trotsky in an awkward 
position as it publically made him appear to be against an uprising.
329
 In a Soviet session on 23 
October the Menshevik-Internationalist I.S. Astrov criticised Trotsky’s tactics and the Bolshevik 
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aspirations to break with the ‘revolutionary democracy’, announcing that ‘the leaders of the 
Bolsheviks want to wash their hands in the blood of soldiers and workers, which will 
undoubtedly spill… Kamenev sits here and confirms the correctness of my information.’
330
 
Clearly Kamenev was sounding out non-party allies against the Bolshevik CC majority. Even on 
the eve of the revolution 24 October, Kamenev was working with Ya.K. Berzin to rally support 
from Left SRs. 
The success of Kamenev’s manoeuvring can be seen in viewing the formation of the 
Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets on 25 October. Alexander Rabinowitch has shown that 
it was the success of the moderates and their belief in a peaceful transition to an all-socialist 
government that prompted Kerensky to shuffle more loyal troops into the capital on the eve of the 
Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets. This made Lenin’s revolution possible due to the 
Bolsheviks capitalising on the fear of Kerensky’s troops. The Military Revolutionary Committee 
seized power quickly to avoid confrontation.
331
 Therefore, without Trotsky and Lenin there 
would have been no Bolshevik revolution, but without Kamenev their justification for taking 
power would have been far less justifiable.  
Although the Bolsheviks had triumphed, the congress itself was willing to find 
compromise a final time. The composition of the Presidium of the Second All-Russian Congress 
was composed of 14 Bolsheviks, 7 Left SRs, 3 Mensheviks, and 1 Menshevik-Internationalist. 
Although the Bolsheviks held the clear majority, those closest to Lenin’s view were 
outnumbered. This was no doubt a strategy to limit Menshevik and SR protest. The bulk of the 
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Kamenev group, Zinoviev, Ryazanov, Nogin, and Rykov represented the Bolsheviks.
332
 Lenin 
and Trotsky were not in the Presidium, and the Bolsheviks put the best and most eager to 
promote socialist democracy at the head of the congress. This revealed that the majority of the 
Bolsheviks still wanted to cooperate with other socialist parties. As he best represented the 
party’s desire for socialist reconciliation, the multi-party congress elected Kamenev chair. 
For reasons similar to their refusal to join Kamenev during the July Days; out of fear of 
failure and of their repugnance to Lenin, the Mensheviks and SRs refused to cooperate and 
walked out in protest claiming that they could not tolerate the fact that the Bolshevik uprising 
was predetermining the congress in advance. Not having changed their position to the Bolsheviks 
in general since Lenin’s early 1917 return, the fact they closed off dialogue with the Bolsheviks 
is of no great surprise. 
The ‘policy of Kamenev has to stop’ 
On 27 October 61 Bolsheviks, 29 Left SRs, 6 Menshevik-Internationalists, and 4 various 
other left socialist parties were elected to the new TsIK of the congress with Kamenev as chair, 
technically making him head of the government ruling Russia and its first president. With a 
decisive Bolshevik majority the congress passed a resolution establishing a provisional 
revolutionary government, known as the Council of People’s Commissars (Sovnarkom). Lenin 
was its chairman, Trotsky headed foreign affairs, and various leading Bolsheviks assumed all 
other posts.  
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Surprising to many observers at the time was that Kamenev and Zinoviev were not part of 
the general makeup. Although Lenin was bitter over their attempt to derail the revolution, this 
explanation alone does not suffice. Kamenev was not without influence or power. Sovnarkom 
was just one executive body competing with the TsIK and the Military Revolutionary Committee 
at the time. The party needed his moderation in a government body with a third of its 
composition being non-Bolshevik. 
If Kamenev’s 1917 ‘Bolshevik Centrism’ and its commitment to compromise were to 
ever have become a lasting feature of a socialist Russia, it was at the outset of revolution when on 
27 October the Union of Railway Workers (Vikzhel) declared that they would strike unless every 
member of the ‘revolutionary democracy’ was represented in a new government, excluding the 
bourgeoisie. Kamenev could not have been more pleased, announcing that he was ‘glad that the 
railwaymen’s union resolution recognizes the fact that the government of the coalition with the 
bourgeoisie has collapsed.’
333
 Kamenev’s policy to hold Social-Democrats together was on the 
verge of being revived from its political graveyard. He therefore used his power within the TsIK 
to open a new dialogue between socialist parties between the 29 and 31 October in the hopes of 
establishing an all-socialist government. Even though it was to be provisional as he still believed 
the Constituent Assembly would establish the framework for the socialist government, it was the 
first step to bringing the ‘revolutionary democracy’ together.  
Lenin was committed to ensuring no coalition take place without complete capitulation to 
their party’s views. In fact, Leonard Shapiro has shown that Lenin wanted to use the coalition 
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talks simply to mask their covert military manoeuvres to keep power.
334
 The general consensus 
among historians, the present author included, is that the three CC appointed negotiators with 
Vikzhel, Kamenev, G.Ya. Sokol’nikov and Ryazanov, had no idea it was a ruse.
335
 Ryazanov and 
Kamenev’s reactions at the meeting certainly proved their sincerity for coalition. During the talks 
the Mensheviks and the SRs insisted that there could only be a coalition government if it 
excluded Lenin and Trotsky. Ryazanov exploded. He understood this was their last chance for 
cooperation. He was in such an agitated state that the SR S. An-skii complained to Kamenev that 
he was unable to speak with him. Kamenev declared ‘we both are the most moderate of our party, 
for our comrades are more left than us. They reject any compromises. We have to fight on two 
fronts’
336
 (emphasis added). As they were not trying to deceive anyone, their continuation of the 
talks signified that Kamenev, Sokol’nikov, and Ryazanov were all prepared to abandon Lenin 
and Trotsky if it meant uniting the ‘revolutionary democracy’. 
Kamenev proved a successful party negotiator. By 31 October a compromise was reached 
that would have given the Bolsheviks half the ministry posts and excluded right-wing parties 
from any future government; the very thing Kamenev had long for advocated. The talks had 
come to an agreement that the new government body was to consist of 100 TsIK members, 75 
members of the Peasants’ Soviet, 100 delegates from the Petrograd and Moscow city Dumas, 15 
members of Vikzhel, and 20 members representatives of the All-Russian Trade Union, all of 
which were to be bound to a policy of pursuing immediate peace and a redistribution of land to 
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the peasantry. This was the ideal working framework in which Kamenev’s ‘Bolshevik Centrism’ 
would have been able to forge compromise among dissent to determine state policy. 
With strong support in the soviets the Bolshevik CC majority saw their strength as a 
political mandate and sided with Lenin to reject coalition on 1 November. First of all, the idea 
that Lenin and Trotsky would not hold prominent positions in the new government did not sit 
well with the leadership. Kamenev had helped ensure that neither would Kerensky, but it was not 
enough. Trotsky and Lenin were immovable. The former insisted the Bolsheviks needed not half, 
but 75 percent of the ministries. This would have made the coalition a farce, not granting the 
opposition enough strength to challenge any Bolshevik policy. A government that was only 50 
percent Bolshevik would have had to make alliances, the very thing Lenin and Trotsky were 
unwilling to do in 1917. Lenin demanded that the ‘policy of Kamenev has to stop’, Vikzhel had 
to be barred from the Soviets, and the party’s attention had to be placed on routing loyal 
Provisional Government troops. He now declared Vikzhel an enemy, branding them as allies of 




Defying his CC, Kamenev utilized his position as chair of the TsIK to continue Vikzhel 
negotiations. Kamenev, Zinoviev, Ryazanov, Rykov, Nogin, and Miliutin remained a strong 
minority within the party pursuing a coalition government and together began voting against 
Bolshevik resolutions in the TsIK. 
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True to form, Lenin cast them as his enemies. He wrote 2 November ‘that every attempt 
to compel our Party to refuse power is treason to the cause of the proletariat’.
338
 Lenin took no 
responsibility and placed sole blame for the failure of a coalition government on the Left SRs, 
whose platform on the peasantry they had accepted wholesale. In response, Kamenev, Rykov, 
Miliutin, Zinoviev, and Nogin resigned from the CC, stating in a signed letter that they could not 
lead the party into its own destruction by refusing any agreement with the other socialist parties. 
The dissenting Bolsheviks joined the chorus of Mensheviks and SRs challenging the Bolshevik 
government’s legitimacy. Lenin issued a rejoinder that ‘only enemies of the people, only from 
enemies of Soviet power can come declarations that this Bolshevik government is not a Soviet 
government.’
339
 The words ‘enemies of the people’, which had not been used to label the 
‘traitors’ of the Second International now blanketed anyone not accepting an all-Bolshevik 
government, including fellow Bolsheviks. Lenin’s monologism within his own party was 
reaching a near dictatorial pitch. The only success Kamenev had was that his joint protest with 
Zinoviev, Rykov, Miliutin, and Nogin resulted in the Bolsheviks inviting the Left SRs to form a 
coalition government. 
The Bolshevik minority proved so resistant that the CC forced Kamenev to resign as chair 
of the TsIK 8 November and installed the Lenin-devoted Stalin to bring the opposition to heel. 
This was one of the first actions in which the Bolshevik CC trammelled democracy in a non-party 
institution. Kamenev had not been appointed chair, he had been elected. The Bolshevik party was 
indeed beginning to substitute itself for the government. Upset with the manoeuvre, the Left SR 
B.F. Malkin stated that Kamenev’s removal was ‘an indication of impermissible pressure on the 
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part of the Bolshevik fraction, and therefore the Left SRs will vote against any other 
candidate.’
340
 Evidence suggests that not only did the Left SRs vote against his removal en bloc, 
but that Bolsheviks who opposed the decision absented themselves from the TsIK meeting in 
solidarity with Kamenev the day the Bolsheviks proposed Sverdlov replace him.
341
 Sverdlov, 
handpicked by Lenin for his strict obedience and ability, was elected chair by a small margin, 19 
votes to 14, and as Charles Duval has well documented, was soon thereafter doing Lenin’s 
bidding by shutting down all public debate in favour of Sovnarkom.
342
  
‘Bolshevik Centrism’ in 1917 
A theoretical duality had existed among the Bolsheviks between the dialogical ‘Old 
Bolsheviks’ adhering to the premise that ‘shades of socialism’ existed and could work together 
under the umbrella of Social-Democracy to achieve collective aims, and the Leninist adherents, 
who believed that only they knew the true Marxist path to revolution and socialism and were 
prepared to make enemies of other socialists proffering alternatives. Kamenev’s line had 
originated from the Bolsheviks of pre-1914, where although acting independently they had never 
considered their fellow socialists ‘enemies’. Lenin’s abrupt turn in 1914 with the war had 
transformed his worldview and how he viewed opponents. Those in disagreement were branded 
‘traitors’ to socialism. Kamenev’s ‘Bolshevik Centrism’ in 1917 was still Bolshevik, but of a 
different time. Rykov, Nogin, Sokol’nikov, Zinoviev, and Miliutin were similar to Kamenev in 
that they had not come to terms with Lenin’s new Bolshevism which shunned politics. As 
Kamenev’s policy continually failed throughout 1917, Lenin’s line grew in supremacy as a direct 
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result of those failings revealing the unwillingness of other parties to cooperate with the 
Bolsheviks. By the close of the year Kamenev’s line was in tatters, as the only compromise he 
had won the whole year was to invite the SRs into a coalition government. 
The primary reason for the failure of Kamenev’s ‘Bolshevik Centrism’ in 1917 was not in 
its own trappings, but in its inability to overcome the negative impact of Lenin’s total 
abandonment of politics. Lenin had used every opportunity to brand the other socialists as 
‘traitors’ or of ‘betraying’ socialism when they disagreed with his views. His actions towards 
other socialists negatively overshadowed Kamenev’s numerous political overtures. There was in 
essence an odd tug of war between messages emanating from the Bolsheviks; one of conciliation 
and the other of flat out animosity, and this confused their opponents. The Mensheviks and the 
SRs therefore missed numerous opportunities to divide the Bolsheviks by supporting the 
Kamenev group. They rebuked him for preventing the June Demonstration, refused to support 
him in the July Days, dismissed his calls to establish a new government in which the Bolsheviks 
would have been a minority, and abandoned his message for continued cooperation after 
Kornilov’s failed coup. 
Kamenev did have some successes in 1917. He had led the Bolsheviks to find a joint 
platform with the Menshevik-Internationalists in March at the All-Russian Conference of Soviets, 
and to come to terms with Vikzhel for an all-socialist government, but these efforts were undone 
by Lenin. The Bolshevik party had changed to be monological, and at the beginning of the 
world’s first socialist government Kamenev found himself an outsider, expelled from the very 




The period of civil war, 1918-1921, saw the consolidation of the Bolshevik system in the 
face of the internal armed opposition of the White forces allied to foreign intervention. The civil 
war saw the inauguration of the first attempt at creating a socialist economy – War Communism. 
This was a period of frenzied debate within the Communist Party – the emergence of the Left 
Communists, the Democratic Centralists and the Workers’ Opposition. With the ending of the 
civil war came the eruption of internal unrest – the peasant revolt on the Volga, the industrial 
strike movement in the winter of 1920-1, and the revolt of the Kronstadt naval base. These events 
placed the very survival of the Soviet regime in question. In this chapter we explore how 
Kamenev responded to these developments, examining his role in shaping the foreign policy of 
the Soviet government and its domestic policies. In a period of extremes the notion of ‘Bolshevik 
Centrism’ was something that was to be severely tested.  
In Hopes of Coalition Abroad 
Alexander Rabinowitch has shown how Lenin unsuccessfully pushed for Kamenev, 
Zinoviev, Ryazanov, and Y. Larin to be ejected from the party for their rebellious 
transgressions,
343
 and although the CC felt Lenin too extreme, Kamenev’s commitment to a 
socialist coalition democracy was close to moving beyond the pale of what defined the 
monological Bolshevik position of the October Revolution. Sensing his own inability to make 
headway from within the party he resigned from the CC on 4 November.
344
 Geoffrey Swain has 
well illustrated that to solidify their hold on power the CC further retaliated against Kamenev and 
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forced him to resign as a contributor to Izvestiya, to leave his post as chair of TsIK, and to 
abdicate his responsibilities in facilitating the Constituent Assembly elections.
345
 Any chance for 
expanding their socialist coalition beyond the acceptance of the Left SRs was so out of tune with 
the leadership that an unencumbered Lenin was able to handily steer the CC to eliminate the 
Bolshevik bureau of the Constituent Assembly altogether in a CC meeting 11 December because 
it held a ‘bourgeois-democratic point of view’. When the Constituent Assembly was closed on 21 
January, Ryazanov and A. Lozovsky were the only Bolsheviks who voted in the TsIK against its 
dispersal.
346
 Kamenev could have capitulated to Lenin as Zinoviev had done to retain his party 
standing, but Kamenev refused to be swept up in the euphoria of revolution and against the 
wishes of the party leadership pressed to broaden socialist cooperation. 
The leadership was not indicative of the party at large outside Petrograd, and with 
Bolshevik representatives from the provinces inside the TsIK there remained one place Kamenev 
had some small amount of authority. One example of his ability to influence decision making 
came when Lenin and Trotsky blundered by having Sovnarkom direct soldiers themselves to 
conduct armistice negotiations. Nothing but chaos followed on the front line as war-weary 
soldiers independently clamoured to broker an agreement.
347
 Both Lenin and Trotsky had 
foolhardily thought that publishing the Tsarist government’s secret treaties alone was enough to 
foment revolution abroad.
348
 Occupying a far more realistic position than the Bolshevik 
leadership, Kamenev was able to cash in his political capital with the Left SRs to challenge 
Lenin’s Sovnarkom from within the TsIK. On 10 November in the Congress of Soviets Kamenev 
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sided with G.I. Chudnovsky and the Left SR M.I. Levin to convince Lenin that a five-man 
committee of three Bolsheviks and two Left SRs should conduct peace negotiations through 
proper diplomatic channels to keep the frontlines from disintegrating.
349
 The TsIK resolved two 
days later to send a delegation to Brest-Litovsk led by Adolf Joffe to negotiate an armistice with 
Germany and Austria.
350
 His Left SR partnership proved his value to the to the party, and 
together with Sokol’nikov and Joffe, he set off with two Left SRs, S.D. Mstislavskii and 
Anastasia Bitsenko to Brest-Litovsk.
351
 
Kamenev was chosen because it was his strategy the CC was trying to implement. 
Whereas Lenin was pressing for genuine peace, Kamenev and the party majority believed that 
through the armistice talks they could talk over the heads of Germany and Austria’s diplomats to 
the proletariat to incite revolution.
352
 Kamenev had made this exact proposal to the Provisional 
Government in March 1917.
353
 
The Bolshevik plan was terribly idealistic. They believed that disseminating propaganda 
was enough to spark revolution. At the armistice talks in Brest-Litovsk on 27 November the 
delegation negotiated an agreement with Major-General Max Hoffman
354
 to allow Soviet 
propaganda to pass through Germany to England and France. The talks themselves were to be 
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propaganda as well. He, L.M. Karakhan,
355
 and Mstislavskii painstakingly fought with Wilhelm 
von Mirbach
356
 and a captain Shmidt over each transcribed word of the soon to be published 
protocols of the meeting. To the overly optimistic delegation a subtle difference in meaning 
meant the fate of world revolution.
357
 However, not all in the TsIK were satisfied. There on 25 
November Stanislaw Lapinski declared that simply ‘making speeches and taking minutes’ was 
not a viable strategy.
358
 Lapinski was right. The Bolsheviks were ill-equipped to try to lead a 
revolution from afar. They needed agitators, organisers, propagandists, and much needed allies 
abroad to facilitate revolution abroad. 
The Bolsheviks ignored Lapinski’s sage criticism and chose to double down on their 
position. That was why Trotsky came to Brest-Litovsk as the People’s Commissar of Foreign 
Affairs 20 December (January 4) shortly after the signing of the 28 day armistice on the Eastern 
Front.
359
 The leadership felt that to stir revolution they simply had to sharpen their message. 
Trotsky did exactly that when he outraged Germany by demanding they pull back their forces, 
and under his bold direction on 12 January Kamenev brazenly insisted that all nations currently 
occupied should hold free and fair elections.
360
 The difference was stark, but revolution was not 
forthcoming. 
The Bolshevik leadership finally snapped out of their revolutionary stupor and showed a 
great sense of practicality. Although Kamenev’s Social-Democratic left-centrist position was 
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currently unable to garner Bolshevik support in Petrograd, Lenin and the CC understood that they 
could utilize his conciliatory political line to call socialists and workers to their banner outside 
Russia where they desperately needed their inter-party politician to raise the flag of revolution. 
They felt their survival depended on worker uprisings abroad. The TsIK thus charged Kamenev 
and Kollontai 13 February to take up foreign assignments. Kamenev was to be Russia’s 
plenipotentiary in France,
361
 first stopping in England. He was an excellent choice. He was the 
most talented Bolshevik regarding inter-party relations, and was well connected with French 
socialists. If his French counterparts could be united and organized under a banner of peace to 
spark unrest, Kamenev was the most capable individual of making it happen. 
The Bolsheviks were looking to expedite revolution utilising left-wing groups abroad, but 
Kamenev had in mind a coalition on a broader scale. This was clearly visible at the Third All-
Russian Congress of Soviets when Kamenev rapturously exclaimed that he ‘had never felt a 
feeling of such deep joy’ as to read in a ‘social-patriotic’ newspaper that there could be no 
successful peace, ‘for on one side is located the representatives of the proletariat, and on the 
other, the representatives of the class interests absolutely opposed to it.’
362
 To him it seemed that 
the ‘social-patriots’ who Lenin had cast aside were returning to the revolutionary fold. This was 
everything he had hoped for, the entire socialist 'revolutionary democracy' against the 
bourgeoisie, his premise of April 1917. Kamenev’s position was justified, but exaggerated. 
Protests had gathered in Berlin and Budapest, and in Vienna strikes over flour rations troubled 
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 but the 20 January announcement in Izvestiya that world revolution had begun was 
certainly premature.
364
 There was no guarantee that protest would culminate in insurrection as it 
had in February 1917 in Russia. On the 24 January the CC approved Trotsky’s proposal to 
declare ‘no peace, no war’ at the peace negotiations in a gamble to spark revolution. 
Kamenev, however, never had the opportunity to test whether his failed domestic political 
line could find success outside Russia in unifying the ‘revolutionary democracy’. Devastated by a 
German advance unfazed by Trotsky’s bold proclamation for ‘no peace, no war’, Soviet Russia 
agreed to a humiliating treaty with Germany. Unfortunately for Kamenev, at the time of the 
peace agreement he was already en route aboard the S.S. Louth, arriving in Aberdeen, Scotland 
on 23 February, and British authorities had no desire to let a man of such great organisational 
capability interfere in their domestic affairs.
365
 
Supporting the Dictatorship of the Proletariat 
Up to this point Kamenev had remained adamant about the necessity for a socialist 
coalition, but his terrible experience abroad severely tempered his idealistic commitment to 
democracy. In England, for example, the British port authorities were hostile and seized 
Kamenev’s stowed propaganda,
366
 Scotland Yard monitored his every move, and at a Communist 
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Club meeting in Soho where either he or Ivan Zalkind
367
 was present, police raided the 
establishment and arrested thirty-seven ‘revolutionaries’.
368
 Most labour rumblings were rather 
mild, but the British government’s persistent reactionary use of police to monitor Kamenev 
exaggerated his belief that labour relations in Britain were volatile. The atmosphere was certainly 
hostile, but had what was enumerated above been all that occurred on his diplomatic mission in 
1918 when he departed 3 March, he would likely have returned to Russia unaffected.
369
  
The decisive change in Kamenev’s outlook came in mid-March. When he was sailing 
from Stockholm to Finland a German navy vessel seized his ship
370
 and eventually transferred 
him to a White Finn fortress in Oulu far to the north and deep in White territory.
371
 Finland’s 
civil government interned the diplomat in hopes of thwarting Soviet intervention.
372
 Prisoners 
there, which included soviet deputies, were often summarily shot or fed rotten fish to ration much 
needed food.
373
 Kamenev later accurately described the camp as a ‘political torture chamber’. 
After months of Stalin negotiating for a prisoner exchange,
374
 on 3 August Kamenev was finally 
freed.
375
 When he returned to Moscow 13 August Kamenev’s political line had dramatically 
changed. Uncharacteristically, Kamenev declared that ‘we and socialists do not have allies, 
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friends, or even neutrality.’
376
 Having witnessed the violent force of counter-revolution, he now 
accepted the rigid Leninist world view that one was either for or against Soviet power.  
Kamenev now condoned practices he had previously shunned. He accepted the All-
Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution, Profiteering and 
Corruption’s (the Cheka) expansion to Moscow and the expulsion of the rebellious SRs
377
 and the 
Mensheviks from the soviets. In a rare moment breaking his usual moderate tone after the 
assassination attempt on Lenin on 6 September, he declared that against the bourgeoisie they 
would conduct a ‘red, ruthless, and organized terror’.
378
 In 1917 Lenin’s insistence on 
abandoning socialist cooperation in favour of securing power against the bourgeoisie had seemed 
drastic to him, but now in 1918 Kamenev hesitatingly admitted to his friend Sukhanov that he 
was prepared for the Bolsheviks to lead alone, saying:   
‘As for myself, I am more and more convinced that Lenin never makes a mistake. 
In the last analysis he is always right. How often has it seemed that he was 
slipping up – either in his prognosis or in his political line! But in the last analysis 
his prognosis and his line were always justified.’
379
 
The political repression he had endured at the hands of the British police and his witnessing the 
cold-blooded execution of fellow socialists in Finland showed Kamenev the full strength and 
seriousness of the bourgeoisie’s desire to eradicate Bolshevism. He now considered that any 
renunciation of the Communist Party
380
 a betrayal of the working class.
381
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Admitting he was wrong was all it took for Lenin to embrace Kamenev and rekindle their 
pre-revolutionary friendship. To safeguard the revolution Lenin had broken with the Left 
Communists to enact policies that went against worker control and a possible commune state by 
supporting the nationalization of industry to prevent German indemnity payments and to support 
workers deposing their bourgeois owners. Now in power, the Lenin of August 1918 threw off his 
April 1917 belief in a decentralising, ever-withering state and yielded to necessity and 
centralisation at the expense of high flung left-wing idealism. Following Lassalle, Kamenev was 
certainly in agreement as he had always believed trade unionism, worker control, and 
syndicalism a hindrance to the labour movement.
382
 Considering the poor state of the economy 





were in favour of some form of centralization. Thus the winds were blowing in the right direction 
for Kamenev’s return.  
There were important differences that separated Kamenev, from Lenin, Trotsky, and 
Bukharin’s views on the use of terror and dictatorship. On terror Lenin had outlined in his 1917 
State and Revolution that repression was a necessity in socialist development to keep the 
bourgeoisie at bay.
385
 Trotsky later parroted the same argument in his 1920 Terrorism or 
Communism.
386
 Neither of them gave any indication that the bourgeoisie could be converted, and 
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Trotsky spoke of utilising bourgeois specialists through ‘compulsory labour’.
387
 Even Bukharin 
came round to Lenin and Trotsky when it came to ideologically justifying terror and execution as 
intrinsic to building socialism. In his 1920 The Economics of the Transition Period, Bukharin 
wrote that ‘...state coercion under the dictatorship of the proletariat is a method of building 
communist society’.
388
 Trotsky argued the same.
389
 Bukharin was convinced that coercion would 
decrease only when the proletariat’s enemies underwent a ‘re-education’ which changed their 
psychology by forcing them into ‘socially useful work’.
390
 Stephen Cohen has tried to downplay 
Bukharin’s endorsement of violent repression as Bukharin’s optimism run wild and that ‘he had 
little taste for cracking skulls’,
391
 but the fact remains that Bukharin, Trotsky, and Lenin at the 
time all advocated violence and terror as institutionally necessary for the development of 
socialism until communism. Bukharin’s 1918 fighting for the legalisation of the Left SRs after 
their resignation from the government was motivated out of a desire to bolster his own political 
line with the Left Communists to continue the war. An ingrained socialist principle for 
democracy was therefore not his guiding light. Bukharin sanctioned coercion and violence for 
ideological ends and therefore Paul Gregory and E.H. Carr are absolutely wrong to suggest that 
Bukharin had a ‘halo of innocence’ in the Civil War.
392
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In terms of decision making, Trotsky saw no use of the democratically elected soviets 
other than as economic organs,
393
 and Charles Duval and T.H. Rigby have shown that Lenin had 
never had any intention of them or the TsIK directing policy. Sovnarkom was to be the primary 
executive body.
394
 Carmen Sirianni has likewise illustrated that any promises Lenin made to the 
party left in 1917 for worker control were quickly abandoned with his ‘State Capitalism’ policy 
as it retained capitalist ownership of industry.
395
 He had not intended to let workers determine 
economic policy either. Schapiro was not too far off the mark by defining 1917 Bolshevism and 
onwards as a ‘technique of action’ to seize and keep power, but this critique must remain limited 
to Lenin and Trotsky.
396
 
It is evident that what greatly distinguished Kamenev from Lenin, Trotsky, and Bukharin 
was that he never made a virtue out of necessity by giving War Communism a socialist 
justification. He specifically wrote that in the civil war he saw the leadership as generals of the 
proletariat, not as leading the country to socialism.
397
 If Kamenev had heard the term ‘War 
Communism’ in 1918 he would have related it to the term he understood well, which was ‘war 
socialism’, the capitalist co-option of labour to provide the foundation for an economic system 
where the state directed all aspects of wartime life – the social, political, and economic.
398
 He 
specifically iterated to his peers that they were absolutely not building socialism; the vast 
majority of their policies were simply to win the war.
399
 He opened his 1920 thesis The 
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Dictatorship of the Proletariat with the argument that the bourgeois government had used 
dictatorship to prosecute the horrific Great War. It was to illustrate how the Soviet government 
was simply copying that wartime model.
400
 Kamenev explicitly outlined that: 
‘The dictatorship of the proletariat is consequently a form of government of the 
State which is most adapted to the carrying on of a war with the bourgeoisie, and 
to guarantee most rapidly the victory of the proletariat in such war.’
401
 
To him the present dictatorship was necessary to overcome armed bourgeois resistance intent on 
the destruction of a proletariat government, but he maintained that socialism could only be 
constructed with the state serving as a positive guiding example to win over opponents through 
successes, not coercion. At the 1919 VIII Party Congress Kamenev explicitly promised that in 
peacetime, ‘from our society will disappear all elements of government coercion and we can pass 
gradually to a true communist society…’
402
 (emphasis added). By not justifying repression he left 
the door open for socialist cooperation in peacetime. 
 With the current mode of the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ acceptable to the leadership 
regardless of the nuances separating them, it was no surprise that Lenin brought Kamenev back 
into the leadership. Instead of the plan to send him to Vienna to assess and assist the workers’ 
movement there, Kamenev was elected into the Moscow Soviet’s Executive Committee 21 
August, and within a month became its chair. So quickly would he re-ascend the political ladder 
through Lenin’s aid that by the March 1919 VIII Party Congress Kamenev was again elected a 
                                                          
400
 Kamenev, The Dictatorship of the Proletariat, p. 3-4.  
401
 Ibid., p. 12. 
402
 Vos’moi vserossiiskii s”ezd sovetov rabochikh krest’yanskikh i krasnoarmeiskikh deputatov, Moscow: 
Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo, 1921, p. 261. 
129 
 
member of the CC.
403
 When Zinoviev’s 22 March proposal to create a Political Bureau 
(Politburo) became a reality, Kamenev was among its five members charged with resolving all 
party matters when the CC was not in session. At the 25 March CC meeting Lenin, Trotsky, 
Stalin, Kamenev and Krestinskii were elected.
404
 
Redefining ‘Bolshevik Centrism’ 
During the civil war Kamenev’s actions were in sync with his words on dictatorship. He 
truly envisioned that after the war there could be a revival and acceptance of democracy. 
Although Lenin and Trotsky no longer considered that the Mensheviks or the SRs denoted 
‘shades of opinion’ within socialism,
405
 Kamenev did, and he struggled to preserve the forces of 
the 1917 ‘revolutionary democracy’. After the White Admiral Aleksander Kolchak’s betrayal of 
the SR Directory in Omsk, a Right SR Ufa delegation under the leadership of V.K. Volskii 
approached the Soviet government in hopes of reconciliation. In need of allies, the Communist 
CC gave way to its conciliatory members to negotiate.
406
 On 10 February 1919 Kamenev led 
Krestinskii and G.V. Chicherin to broker an agreement. In exchange for a signed declaration 
from Volskii giving up their demand for reconvening the dispersed Constituent Assembly and 
stating that only the Soviet government expressed the interests of the whole nation,
407
 the SRs 
were granted the right to their own press. Vladimir Brovkin has argued that the Communists’ 
partial legalisation of the SRs and Mensheviks in early 1919 was due to a ground swell of worker 
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resistance to the Bolshevik suppression of opposition parties,
408
 but this was not the only reason 
for their acceptance. With CC members like Kamenev in power, workers were pushing on an 
open door. 
What made Kamenev backslide on favouring Menshevik legalisation in the TsIK on 10 
February was that the Menshevik Vsegda Vpered published the slogan ‘Down with Civil War!’. 
As the war was the central focus of Bolshevik policy, Kamenev warned that Vsegda Vpered was 
weakening the state.
409
 When they persisted with their slogan the Cheka seized control of the 
defiantly critical Menshevik press. Kamenev could have then abandoned them to their fate, but he 
was so committed to preserving a future socialist democracy that he challenged the right of the 
Cheka to close down the paper and pushed the party to allow them the possibility to appeal the 
decision in the TsIK.
410
 This showed a determination to preserve legality, about which none of 
the other leaders were terribly concerned. Kamenev was worried about the terrible impact of the 
Cheka on the future of the country after the war. He thought the Mensheviks had to be restricted, 
but not completely removed. At the very least, the Cheka had to be answerable to the elected 
TsIK. To salvage relations between the two parties Kamenev put himself between the 
Mensheviks and the CC and won a compromise allowing Mensheviks who supported Soviet 
power the possibility to occupy non-military posts.
411
 
In contrast Lenin regarded any opposition as illegitimate. Even though Communist party 
membership had reached its lowest point of the civil war by the end of 1919, Lenin was 
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unconcerned with Menshevik influence.
412
 From 15-25 February 1920 the Moscow Soviet held 
elections and the Mensheviks Martov and Dan were re-elected. This news came as shock to 
Kamenev, but Lenin advised him not to take the matter seriously and joked in a missive, ‘I think 
you should “wear them out” with practical assignments,’ and in notation, ‘Dan – sanitary 
inspection’ and ‘Martov – control over the canteens’.
413
 Rival political parties were no more than 
a joke to him. Kamenev did not find the opposition a laughing matter and on 6 March he 




Compromising with political opponents had great limitations under the ‘dictatorship of 
the proletariat’ in wartime, but Kamenev’s ‘Bolshevik Centrism’ adhered to its principles by 
trying to restrict what Bolshevik opponents detested most, the Cheka. That was why when he was 
in the Ukraine in May of 1919 and heard Nester Makhno’s heated complaints about wanton 
Cheka abuses he went straight to the party leader. Lenin stubbornly chose to blame individuals 
rather than the institution itself and ordered a purge of the Ukrainian Cheka.
415
 Herein was the 
crux of the Kamenev/Gorky and Lenin/Dzerzhinsky disagreement; it was not a matter of 
personnel. The whole organization was foul and it was destroying every last political connection 
the Bolsheviks had. 
Kamenev’s thoughts again returned to curtailing repression when Martov’s open criticism 
of the Moscow Cheka brought the issue to the fore in the Moscow Soviet on 30 December 
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 Kamenev railed against Martov that ‘it is possible that in the activities of the Cheka 
there were some mistakes, but these mistakes do not give any right to those parties, whose very 
existence is a continuous mistake, to even look in the direction of the Cheka.’
417
 This certainly 
raises a red flag as to the validity of the argument that Kamenev wanted to aid fellow socialists 
and curtail repression. The truth is that such harsh words were an exception for Kamenev and 
highly uncharacteristic. He boldly spoke against his true convictions because he had felt 
betrayed. When Denikin’s forces had approached Moscow in the fall of 1919 he had asked the 
Mensheviks and the Right SRs under Volskii to openly support Soviet power and they had 
refused.
418
 Kamenev’s anger war rather misplaced, as he did not take into account that despite his 
leniency he was still a leader in the party of oppression.  
Disagreement between Kamenev and Dzerzhinsky over speculators highlights Kamenev’s 
idealism about future peacetime socialist construction. In the winter of 1919-20 Moscow was on 
the verge of economic collapse with an acute scarcity of goods and food.
419
 Overwhelmed with 
speculators, Dzerzhinsky reported to Kamenev that Cheka ‘arrests and shootings are leading 
nowhere. Occurrences are growing… the struggle with speculators is like pouring water through 
a sieve.’
420
 Kamenev was right to point out Dzerzhinsky’s political and ideological ineptitude in 
trying to resolve economic difficulties with brutality, complaining that the severe crackdown was 
only driving speculators underground and undermining efforts to alleviate shortages.
421
 Adhering 
to Lassalle, Kamenev told Dzerzhinsky explicitly that the state should not rely on police 
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repression, but had to overcome the problem by proving the state a more beneficial distributer 
than petty-bourgeois speculators.
422
 Kamenev showed his commitment to placing winning the 




During the civil war Kamenev could have washed his hands of his political opponents, 
but instead they remained in Moscow institutions and Menshevik representatives continued on in 
the Moscow Soviet. Under Kamenev’s direction, the Moscow Soviet abolished the raion Cheka 
altogether on 21 February 1920. As the Cheka was by far their biggest grievance, he advocated 
institutionalizing the Cheka by use of revolutionary tribunals to make them accountable to state 
institutions.
424
 Realising the general public was similarly dissatisfied; the CC accepted 
Kamenev’s reform along with limiting the Cheka’s execution powers exclusively to military 
zones, and set Kamenev, Stalin, and Dzerzhinsky on a commission to work out the details.
425
  
A look at those heading the commissions, notably Stalin, Dzerzhinsky, and Sverdlov, was 
proof enough that any reform would be limited. Dzerzhinsky certainly was not going to restrict 
the authority of his own organization, and Stalin and Sverdlov were Lenin’s yes men when it 
came to curtailing political freedom.
426
 Kamenev’s reforms failed to affect change as Lenin 
specifically instructed the commissions not to hinder the Cheka’s efforts in combating counter-
revolutionary forces in any way.
427
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As the Civil War progressed it became clearer and clearer that the complete legalisation 
of opposition parties was remote, but at the outset it had not been a foregone conclusion that the 
Menshevik, Anarchist, or the SR parties were never going to have access to a free press, 
participate openly in elections, or enjoy legal status. Even with repression there were genuine 
attempts spearheaded by Kamenev to accept them back into the Soviet fold in some limited form 
until peacetime. Kamenev occupied the central position between the Bolsheviks and their fellow 
socialist opponents, but considering the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ was critical to Bolshevik 
policy, his position afforded Bolshevik opponents very little. When in late 1920 the Civil War 
was subsiding Kamenev reintroduced the possibility of a multi-party state. In the Moscow Soviet 
he offered anarchists complete legalisation if they agreed to purge their more radical members,
428
 
and together with Bukharin he spoke to Lenin about the legalisation of the Mensheviks and 
SRs.
429
 All of this stemmed from Kamenev’s ‘Bolshevik Centrism’ and his belief that discourse 
with opponents was the only way to ensure stability and progress to socialism, but as will be 
shown, the uprising in Kronstadt silenced Kamenev on Menshevik, Anarchist, and SR 
legalisation forever. 
Kamenev and the British Labour Movement 
Kamenev’s most successful use of his ability to forge centrist positions did not occur 
within his own party, but when he returned to England to negotiate a peace settlement between 
Soviet Russia and Poland in August 1920. The episode is interesting in that it exemplifies how 
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effective he could be as a politician if not constantly confronted with immovable and 
uncompromising men such as Lenin or Trotsky. In a more democratic society where compromise 
was not always considered a blemish on one’s political commitment, Kamenev’s ability helped 
forge the first large-scale labour protest in England in the 20
th
 century.  
Nearly all the Bolsheviks, Kamenev included, felt that part of the reason revolution had 
not spread to Europe was due to a failure of leadership. Twice in 1919 Kamenev had been set to 
leave abroad to help worker organizations and twice his missions had failed to materialize. Now 
in 1920 with the Communists nearing complete victory in the Civil War, he again set his eyes to 
Europe. The opportunity to go abroad arose when England and France pressed Russia to 
conclude a peace with Poland. On 9 July Kamenev wrote to Lenin urging that the delegation sent 
to England should agitate workers to oppose England’s intervention in Soviet Russia.
430
 Lenin 
did not want to cause trouble because he wished to revitalise trade relations with Great Britain
431
 
and rejected Kamenev’s proposal in favour of sending a true trade delegation, headed by Krasin, 
writing to Kamenev that ‘it is not 1918’. However, not everyone had lulled themselves into a 
pessimistic outlook and the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Georgii Chicherin backed 
Kamenev’s proposal and convinced Lenin two days later to have Kamenev head the delegation 
with Krasin and M. Klishko as his deputies, complaining that Krasin was simply a bourgeois 
‘pet’ and would not suffice.
432
 N.N. Krestinskii also favoured Kamenev’s inclusion because he 
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felt the mission was more political than economic, despite looming locomotive purchases.
433
 The 
CC overruled Lenin and accepted the proposal on 16 July. Publically the delegation sought a 
peace agreement and commercial treaties, but unofficially, Kamenev’s delegation desired to 
divide Britain and France and utilise the growing unrest among Britain’s working class to weaken 
the government’s capacity to threaten war.  
Kamenev proved himself a talented diplomat in separating Britain and France. At the start 
Kamenev felt he was going to make little headway because on 3 August the British Prime 
Minister David Lloyd George immediately threatened Kamenev with a British blockade and an 
escalation of support for Wrangel if armistice talks with Poland did not commence at once.
434
 
Lloyd George further rejected Kamenev’s proposal for Poland to demobilize and disarm as a 
precondition for talks.
435
 The course of the negotiations changed when Kamenev conceded the 
precondition in favour of an armistice which would prevent Poland from receiving military aid 
and provide a ten day cessation of hostilities. This agreement aggravated the French Prime 
Minister Alexandre Millerand
436
 who vehemently criticised Lloyd George in Lympne on 8 
August for putting England’s trade in leather and locomotives with Russia above their 
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commitment to restraining Bolshevism.
437
 Even though Lloyd George was a seasoned negotiator, 
Kamenev came out the victor of the negotiations as Lloyd George was prepared to damage 
relations with France and accept terms, exactly what the Soviet government wanted. 
However, with victory over Poland seemingly at hand, Lenin was seized by a newfound 
optimism as he envisioned Polish workers rising up to join the advancing Red Army. He 
therefore wrecked the agreement Kamenev had worked hard to obtain. Kamenev had sent word to 
Moscow to halt the Red Army’s advance, for he had accomplished his objective and ‘forced 
Lloyd George to admit the justice of the terms in opposition to the attitude of France.’
438
 While 
Trotsky also urged peace, Lenin and Stalin
439
 steered the CC to reject the agreement on 9 August. 
They chose to have the CC make a decision based on faith in a Polish working class uprising 
rather than listen to their level-headed colleague. 
Kamenev achieved what British politicians before him had failed to do; he united the 
labour movement. He followed Lassalle’s example and made one central goal their rallying 
platform, the call for peace with Soviet Russia. Stephen White has contended that unity came 
together out of sheer opposition to war,
440
 but this ignores the timing labour relations reached a 
fever pitch with their government and how the leadership in England viewed the situation. In July 
the Trades Union Congress had threatened a general strike to oppose Lloyd George’s government 
sending munitions to Poland, but Kamenev turned the movement to be a proactive political force 
rather than a reactive one. With great resolve Kamenev met personally with key leaders, wrote 
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articles for socialist newspapers, illegally attended rallies,
441
 and ghost edited the socialist Daily 
Herald funded by Russian smuggled diamonds.
442
 His efforts inspired and galvanized rival 
parties to look past their differences. On 3 August Kamenev noted to Chicherin that from the 
Communist A.A. Purcell to Labour’s Arthur Henderson, the British labour movement stood 
united.
443
 Kamenev’s great achievement came at a conference held in the House of Commons on 
9 August where he negotiated an agreement between the Labour Party and the Trades Union 
Council to form a Council of Action (COA),
444
 a body which endeavoured to act beyond 
parliamentary limitations to halt aid to Poland and ensure peace with Soviet Russia.
445
 The COA 
represented over six million workers and over 1,044 delegates participated at its initial 
congress.
446
 Within weeks local COAs had sprung up across the country, with some taking 
protest actions.
447
 Kamenev happily cabled Chicherin that men of ‘all shades of opinion’ were 
meeting with him on behalf of the COA to coordinate.
448
 On 12 August Kamenev optimistically 
cabled home that even the right-wing of the labour movement was ‘magnificent’ and that he 




As the COAs resembled Russia’s early soviets and were in essence the embryo of 
working class self-government, the British government became terribly alarmed. A look at the 
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British leadership’s response proves the significance of Kamenev’s influence. The Lord Privy 
Seal A. Bonar Law placed the blame squarely on Kamenev’s shoulders, writing to the Prime 
Minister that the labour movement’s cohesion had everything to do with ‘Kamenev’s brains 
which seem to be better than any which the Labour extremists possess…’
450
 Sir Basil Thompson 
was likewise stunned at how quickly a usually ‘apathetic’ working class had now become a 
unified labour movement.
451
 Lloyd George’s Home Secretary Edward Shortt feared the Russian 
delegation could cause ‘serious revolutionary disturbances’ in a crisis.
452
 
White maintains that the labour movement began to deteriorate when Britain’s 
intervention plans began to wane as Poland turned back the Soviet army,
453
 but he is wrong 
because it was actually before Poland’s successful counterattack that support began to subside. 
The blame for the labour movement’s cooling to Soviet efforts squarely rests on Lenin. As Lenin 
had dismantled the Vikzhel agreements, so too did he wreck Kamenev’s cooperative gains in 
England. Part of the reason Kamenev had been so successful in uniting the British labour 
movement from right to left was because of the fact Soviet Russia was fighting a defensive war. 
That all changed when at Minsk the Soviet delegation began insisting that a workers’ militia be 
established in Poland. Kamenev considered it a ‘colossal mistake’ and warned Chicherin on 9 
August that the decision was cooling the British labour movement.
454
 The Communists had the 
opportunity to win over the hearts and minds of their fellow socialists abroad with a just peace, 
but Lenin was in a revolutionary fever and saw Polish conquest as the avenue for Soviet Russia 
to link with the German proletariat. Kamenev cabled Chicherin and demanded that the TsIK 
                                                          
450
 Parliamentary Archives BL/101/4/86. 
451
 Richard H. Ullman, The Anglo-Soviet Accord, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973, p. 265. 
452
 Parliamentary Archives Dav/117. 
453
 White, p. 100. 
454
 Parliamentary Archives Dav/117/003720. 
140 
 
should take a stance on the issue in hopes of bypassing Lenin.
455
 The CC’s directive to foment 
unrest and secure peace with Britain, then a reality, had changed. Lenin saw little value in 
Kamenev’s organised COA, responding ‘the fact that we have shaken up the workmen is in itself 
no mean gain.’
456
 Dumbfounded, Kamenev could not understand how worker strikes for political, 
not social, ends warranted such small recognition. He had no choice but to watch England’s 
labour movement disintegrate over infighting as to whether they could support the Soviet Union 
and its expansionist war.  
Unwilling to compromise their position even in defeat, days later in a fit of delusion the 
Politburo instructed Kamenev, ‘it would be well if the workers were to demand now no longer 
peace with Russia, but assistance for Soviet Russia against Poland and Wrangel,’ and for British 
workers to form volunteer detachments.
457
 When Kamenev protested, the Politburo reprimanded 
him.
458




With Soviet Russia no longer a threat to peace in Europe, the British government, long 
annoyed with Kamenev’s intervention in British internal affairs, announced on 2 September their 
intention to expel him from the country. A revolutionary sober Lenin was much relieved that 
Krasin was exempt from the charges and remained to continue trade negotiations. 
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The Centralisation of Power 
Kamenev’s tolerance of dissent and promotion of democratic ideas did not make him 
immune from playing a part in narrowing power to better prosecute the war.
460
 Evan Mawdsley 
has shown that the efforts made by local soviets to implement central directives were essential to 
the Reds success in the Civil War.
461
 To achieve this efficiency meant curtailing local legislative 
power. For example, on 30 November 1918 Kamenev acknowledged the necessity of 
relinquishing the Moscow Soviet’s authority to the newly founded Soviet of Workers’ and 
Peasants’ Defence’s to defend the Soviet republic.
462
 Later when the war effort was strapped for 
grain with forced requisitioning greatly diminishing grain production Kamenev turned to more 
authoritative measures in mid-January 1919.
463
 Panic was causing the localities to withhold food 
provisions, and with cities starving, at a joint meeting of the TsIK of the Moscow Soviet, the All-
Russian Congress of Trade Unions, and in agreement with the CC on 17 January Kamenev 
advanced the idea to decree a government monopoly on grain, sugar, tea, and salt and regulate 
meat, fish, hemp, animal fat, sunflower and flax oil prices. The decree compelled local food 
provision organs to procure the commodities enumerated and at the same time denied the 
localities the right to hinder the transport or the sale of the indicated products in bazaars and 
markets. To ensure compliance, everything was placed under the scrutiny of worker 
inspection.
464
 When Kamenev personally led a team on the authority of the Council of Workers’ 
and Peasants’ Defence on 29 March to the Volga region to sort out grain procurement problems 
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to aid Moscow he aped his previous methods and forced through council directives to override 




Part of Kamenev’s problem was that although he saw himself as a representative of local 
power, he was not able to successfully divorce his Politburo membership from his post as head of 
the Moscow Soviet. When the Supreme Economic Council (VSNKh) and the Moscow Oblast 
Council of the Economy (MOSNKh) were at loggerheads over which organ economically 
directed the capital, Kamenev backed VSNKh. This posed a problem when the Moscow Soviet 
countermanded one of VSNKh’s decrees. In the Moscow Soviet, E.N. Ignatov argued that to 
deprive the Moscow Soviet of its authority would go against the ‘All Power to the Soviets’ 
revolutionary slogan.
466
 Describing it as ‘more practical’ for the war effort, Kamenev proposed 3 
January to turn local city departments into sections of central governing bodies so that issued 
decrees could be implemented without two organization competing against one another. The 
Moscow Soviet rejected his proposal. Like Lenin, he saw the constitution as outdated, formed at 
a time void of war.
467
 Thus he complained to Lenin: 
‘I scold my colleagues every day for their ‘wild Moscow chauvinism’ (dikoe 
Moskovarstvo), and not because they violate the constitution, but because they do not 
want to go beyond its limits for the sake of a greater unity of the centre and localities than 
it is dictated by the directives.’
468
 
The passage reveals the frustration Kamenev faced in driving through policy. He understood 
many party members’ commitment to preserving local power structures, but as a member of the 
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Politburo he had a greater sense of the wartime needs of the Soviet state. This proved a 
disadvantage to local power as Kamenev continually steamrolled central directives through the 
Moscow Soviet out of necessity for the greater whole. However, without soviet leaders enforcing 
top-down directives the situation for the Bolsheviks would have been far more perilous than it 
was already, but Kamenev’s leading the Moscow Soviet to be under the thumb of Sovnarkom 
significantly eroded democracy in the soviets as it set the example for the entire country. 
Compromise 
There is no greater proof as to Kamenev’s intentions to decentralise decision making in 
peacetime than how he lent a sympathetic ear to the Democratic Centralists (the decists). In the 
party emerged a group headed by N. Osinkskii, T.V. Sapronov, and Yu. Maksimovskii, who were 
critical of the party’s ever growing bureaucracy and the ever diminishing role of rank-and-file 
party members having a say in determining party directives. They felt inner-party debate 
essential, despised ‘one-man’ leadership, and desired the soviets play a role in determining the 
country’s future. At the 29 March to 5 April 1920 IX Party Congress Osinskii put forth their 
group’s grievances and further proposed that the authority of Sovnarkom be reduced in favour of 
the TsIK. Clearly he had in mind to undo Sverdlov and Lenin’s subversion of the TsIK to 
Sovnarkom. In many ways for Kamenev the decists were pushing on an open door. Kamenev 
agreed that the commissariats often overtasked the localities unaware of their difficulties.
469
 He 
promised that with the end of the civil war commissariat departments operating outside soviet 
control would have to be brought in line with soviets directly managing local enterprises.
470
 He 
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proposed that soviets would soon be divided into sections according to commissariat, 
incorporating local trade unions and factory committees with consulting votes to strengthen local 
representation.
471
 These were meagre compromises as the soviets would still primarily function 
as administrative organs.  
His biggest concession to the decists was when at a joint meeting of the Executive 
Committee of the Moscow Soviet and the Moscow Committee of the Bolshevik Party on 11 
December he expounded that the state should expand TsIK’s authority by requiring that 
commissariat decisions be discussed and approved by the TsIK before publication.
472
 
Furthermore, the TsIK was to act as an arbitrator to settle commissariat and soviet disputes.
473
 
Albeit it gave the TsIK a more judicial role than legislative, this was a radical turn towards 
granting the democratically elected soviets a way to hold commissariats responsible to the 
localities. Finally, in the party’s Moscow Committee Kamenev outright accepted and put in full 
effect the decist’s desire that opposition figures have a voice in party discussion by allotting them 
time to speak in party cells.
474
 Kamenev had always been lenient with opposition groups, but now 
they could speak much more frequent and candidly. As Jonathan Ares has shown, one of the 
main reasons debates became so open and intense in Moscow was due to Kamenev’s relaxed 
rule. The same could not be said of Zinoviev, whose authoritarian restrictions in Petrograd had 
created heated unrest throughout the civil war.
475
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Kamenev sought compromise with the decists due to his ‘Bolshevik Centrism’. There 
were aspects of the decists Kamenev refused to accept, mainly their call for factory committee 
decisions to be binding on soviet or party organs.
476
 To allow factory committees the ability to 
debate or plan policy smacked of syndicalism. Here the influence of Lassalle is clearly seen as 
Kamenev believed the state’s mission was to unite workers collectively. Endorsing anything that 
would render factories or local committees autonomous went against Lassalle’s unifying goal. 
Out of this principle stemmed Kamenev’s criticism of the trade unionist Tomskii and his belief in 
collegiate management, something the decists also supported. To Kamenev it was not a matter of 
favouring dictatorship, but of ensuring localities never had the opportunity to work against the 
common good. A single director was much more manageable to ensure cooperation between 
localities and in promoting the policies emanating from the country’s central organs. Kamenev’s 




The legislative reforms Kamenev endorsed surrounding the TsIK would have changed the 
working dynamic of soviet administration. Having Sovnarkom decisions debated and approved in 
the TsIK would have in theory put a check on the power of the country’s leading state organ, 
Sovnarkom. Considering the party’s continued domination of the soviets it would likely have 
been no more than a rubber stamp, but in principle it meant that the TsIK could have rejected 
policies it deemed violated the independent operations of the soviets. Kamenev had already 
attempted to exercise the TsIK for this purpose. In the TsIK in January 1918 he influenced 
Sovnarkom to change its direction on how to obtain peace with Germany. Later in 1919 he had 
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tried to oppose the Cheka suppression of the Mensheviks by forcing debate in the TsIK. Although 
his efforts failed, he was not discouraged to attempt to bypass Lenin in 1920 when dealing with 
the labour movement in Great Britain when he thought Lenin’s change of position violated their 
mission objectives. However, that too had come to naught. Considering that at this point in 1920 
Kamenev was pushing to return the country to a multi-party state, his support of the decists in 
regard to the soviets may have led to a drastic change had opposition parties again been fully 
legalised. Given his past history, there is no reason to think that Kamenev’s desire to compromise 
with the decists was anything but sincere. 
Trade Unions, Crisis, and Kronstadt 
In 1917 Kamenev had maintained a centre-left position between the Bolsheviks and the 
Mensheviks, but his horrific experience in Finland had moved him closer to Lenin’s views in 
1918 because he felt the civil war demanded dictatorship to survive. By late 1920, the ebbing of 
civil war convinced him that a multi-party state was possible and that open party discussion was 
now viable. This openness in the Moscow Party led to the lively debate over the future of trade 
unions in Soviet development. 
After Trotsky’s success in saving Russia’s railways from ruin with militarised iron 
discipline, Trotsky desired to strip all trade unions of autonomy in similar fashion so that they 
could function as administrative tools of the state. Later known as the ‘Platform of the Ten’, 
Lenin and Zinoviev were fundamentally against this approach and argued that instead trade 
unions had to be under the tutelage of the party but remain autonomous from the state to serve as 
pressure groups in decision making and inculcate non-party workers with Communist doctrine. 
147 
 
The third contending group jockeying to gain the party majority was the so-called ‘Workers’ 
Opposition’, led by Shlyapnikov and Kollontai. They sought to wrestle trade unions from state 
control through independent elections binding on the party to give them control over the 
economy through a congress of producers. Harkening to the promises of October, workers were 
to regain factory control. 
Kamenev’s ‘Bolshevik Centrism’ again emerged by his welcoming open discussion 
between platforms in Moscow, and when the CC ordered Trotsky to desist from voicing his ideas 
because they were stirring worker protest, Kamenev defended his right to speak and opposed the 
CC decision.
478
 He even went so far as to arrange a meeting between Trotsky and Lenin to 
resolve their differences. However, Trotsky was not willing to listen to either Kamenev or Lenin 
and broke ranks, taking the matter to the party at large. Kamenev had tried to remain neutral in 
hopes of facilitating a compromise agreement, but Trotsky forced him to take a stand. 
At first it appeared that Kamenev was going to support Trotsky.
479
 He was very much in 
favour of having workers wield influence directly through state institutions, and Trotsky’s bold 
proposal was in effect breaking down barriers between the state and trade unions. The reason he 
could not commit to Trotsky’s proposal was because only seven percent of trade unionists were 
Communists.
480
 Kamenev rightly felt that by forcing non-party workers to do the bidding of a 
minority it would push workers away from the party when their goal was to do quite the 
opposite.
481
 His key objection was what permeated throughout all his ideas from past to present - 
coercion was not conducive to socialism. Workers had to be wilfully drawn in to state institutions 
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to ensure a true working class government. Similar to Zinoviev and Lenin, Kamenev was also 
correctly concerned that Trotsky paid too little attention to the peasantry. Put more poignantly, 
Kamenev asserted that Trotsky’s adherents were behaving as though Soviet Russia was already a 
‘Soviet oasis’.
482
 Kamenev’s ‘Bolshevik Centrism’ and Kamenev’s search for compromise thus 
gave ideological ground to Trotsky, but refuted his plan’s implementation as practically 
unfeasible for the time being. 
The Workers’ Opposition protest for greater worker involvement in the state and a move 
away from top-down party appointment definitely meant that Kamenev supported them in spirit, 
but he could never swallow their syndicalism.
483
 As he could not support forcing workers to the 
Communist cause, he likewise could not accept the inverse, forcing the party to adhere to the 
trade unions.
484
 Envisioning the return of the Menshevik party, Kamenev feared trade union 
workers would join their ranks rather than join the Communists and through the backdoor change 
the direction of state policy. Thus, Kamenev’s biggest apprehension over both Trotsky and the 
Workers’ Opposition was that workers had not yet been won over to the party and state, and that 
was why he joined Lenin and Zinoviev’s ‘Platform of the Ten’. Making the trade unions non-
state organs with the expressed intent to win over the masses was the policy he felt best suited 
their present conditions. Most Moscow Communists backed the ‘platform of the ten’, which 
became the clear majority position by 18 January.
485
  
Kamenev’s concern for the peasant masses casts significant doubt on Silvana Malle’s 
contention that the Communists treated the peasantry harshly because in Marxist ideology their 
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needs were subservient to workers.
486
 As seen through Kamenev, part of the Social-Democratic 
roots of Bolshevism came from Lassalle, not Marx, and although Lassalle had felt the peasantry 
too reactionary to play a role in revolution, his vision for the working class as a positive influence 
negated the use of coercion. Kamenev had recognized many times throughout the civil war that 
brute force was not conducive to providing the state with adequate grain supplies. On three 
separate occasions in 1919 he proposed ending forced grain procurement in exchange for limited 
free trade. He proposed it to the TsIK in January in an effort to stave off starvation,
487
 in May to 
increase production in Melitopol’sk, Ukraine,
488
 and in July in the Moscow Soviet to alleviate 
grain shortages.
489
 Although he had limited success with the latter two attempts, they never 
became national policy. According to Isaac Deutscher, Trotsky too had alighted upon free trade 
among the peasantry before turning his mind to forced labour armies,
490
 but unlike with Trotsky, 
with Kamenev there was consistency in his approach to avoid compulsion. Kamenev had rejected 
the Workers’ Opposition partly out of concern for the peasantry. The party could not disregard 
peasant interests. 
However, Kamenev’s pushing for legislative reform, a multi-party state, and endorsing 
the decists call for open debate came to a grinding halt with the 1921 Kronstadt uprising. The 
trade union debate brought disagreements into public view and emboldened protest with the 
Communist government. Workers in Petrograd went on strike, with anarchists and Mensheviks 
gaining popularity from a population disillusioned with unfulfilled Communist promises. 
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Kronstadt sailors desired new and free elections, the legalisation of political parties, the right of 
assembly, and various other civil liberties. So utterly discontented, they rebelled during the 8 
March X Party Congress. In the villages too victimised peasants rebelled against the continuation 
of the brutal grain procurement policy of War Communism.  
An oppressive wind suddenly blew through the party and all tolerance for public dissent 
disappeared, and Kamenev’s total silence on the Kronstadt rebellion is rather telling. Never again 
did he argue for a multi-party state. The event served as the critical event which divorced 
Kamenev from his Social-Democratic leanings, realigning his ‘Bolshevik Centrism’ to exclude 
the possibility of compromise with other socialists. Kamenev was more idealistic concerning 
democracy, but he saw in Kronstadt the potential for the triumph of counterrevolution. At the 
VIII Party Conference in December 1919, Kamenev had praised lively debate and 
disagreements,
491
 and although he would continually tolerate dissent in Moscow to a degree not 
shared by any other leading Communist, he was silent when Lenin capitalised on the mood at the 
X Congress to bolster the party to accept a ban on all factional activity. To quiet worker and 
peasant unrest, Lenin proposed the New Economic Policy (NEP), which allowed peasants the 
possibility to sell grain on a limited free market, and Kamenev came forward as its biggest 
supporter. 
The Demise of Political Dialogue 
When assessing Kamenev’s ‘Bolshevik Centrism’ and his search for compromise 
solutions, the civil war broke his final ties to Social-Democracy. Before 1914 Kamenev had 
sought compromise between Bogdanov and Lenin at a time socialist cooperation was a given 
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under the umbrella of Social-Democracy. After 1914 Lenin began to diverge from Social-
Democracy until the point where his monologism rejected any and all compromise with any non-
Bolshevik not accepting his worldview. In contrast Kamenev continued to espouse a centrist 
position between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks throughout 1917, a position which began 
with a party majority supporting him. Lenin’s line that contended only the Bolsheviks knew the 
true Marxist path eclipsed Kamenev’s with the success of the October Revolution, and at the 
outset of 1918 Kamenev’s support dwindled to the point where his ‘Bolshevik Centrism’ held 
little influence domestically. The practicality of Kamenev’s political line, however, remained 
useful to the leadership desperate to unify socialist forces abroad to protest for peace and 
revolution to aid Russia. However, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk brought his mission to France to 
an abrupt end. 
It was at this point that the civil war and allied intervention forced Kamenev to re-centre 
his political line. His terrible experiences in England and his brutal Finnish internment played a 
decisively critical role in leading the most ardent defender of a socialist coalition government to 
publically endorse dictatorship. However, Kamenev’s vision of dictatorship was temporary. 
Unlike Lenin, Trotsky, or Bukharin, he never justified coercion on socialist principle. The 
‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ was a system he felt necessary to conduct war, but not to build 
socialism. In contrast to Lenin or Trotsky, he envisioned that fellow socialists would again return 
to politics in peacetime. Nevertheless, his acceptance of dictatorship brought him back into Lenin 
and the party’s good graces and his ‘Bolshevik Centrism’ therefore adapted, but he strained to 
stay connected to Social-Democracy by continually fighting to preserve socialist democracy for 
the future. This is evident by his negotiating an agreement between his party and the Right SRs, 
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his desire to legalise the Menshevik party in 1919 and in 1920, his toleration of Mensheviks in 
the Moscow Soviet throughout the civil war, his talks with Makhno, his attempt to legalise the 
Anarchists, and finally his persistent and sincere attempts to curb the excesses of the Cheka 
against Communist opponents. Kamenev truly believed that ‘shades of socialism’ existed and 
should not be stamped out with force. 
Inside the party Kamenev tried his best to find compromise as well. When the Democratic 
Centralists challenged Kamenev on party dissent and the role of the soviets, he fully yielded on 
granting dissenting Bolsheviks more time to speak at party meetings in Moscow. As for the 
soviets, Kamenev had subverted Moscow’s local authority to Sovnarkom directives to wage war 
and acknowledged that the Democratic Centrists had legitimate complaints about the demise of 
soviet institutions in decision making. His greatest concession to them was his vow to revitalise 
them by granting the TsIK legislative approval over Sovnarkom decrees. With Trotsky he too 
tried to broker compromise. During the trade union debates Kamenev conceded the ideological 
merit of Trotsky’s position and tried to bring Lenin and Trotsky to some form of settlement, but 
Trotsky stubbornly refused to negotiate and Kamenev therefore joined Lenin for the practicality 
of his position. 
What is clear is that during the civil war Kamenev’s ‘Bolshevik Centrism’ operated 
within the bounds of the Bolshevik’s prime directive, to ensure military victory. Kamenev’s 
efforts to rein in Cheka abuse and his ability to help unite the entire British labour movement are 
testament to his commitment to find common ground. Yet Kamenev’s inability to effectively 
combat his leading peers’ desire to make a socialist virtue of terror meant that what he did 
contribute to repression had lasting repercussions. When the Kronstadt sailors revolted, the fear 
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of counterrevolution solidified Lenin’s 1917 political line that the Bolsheviks should rule 
unmolested by compromise or conciliation. Even Kamenev, the party’s leading advocate for a 





War Communism was abandoned in 1921 in the face of widespread unrest – the 
Kronstadt revolt, the peasant uprising in Tambov province, and the wave of industrial 
disturbances worried the Communist leadership. The New Economic Policy ended the policy of 
forced grain requisitioning, replacing it with a tax in kind, which in time became a monetary tax. 
Lenin promoted the need for a smychka (alliance) between the proletariat and the peasantry. The 
State monopoly of industry was eased and private shops, cafes, bars and night clubs re-opened. 
NEP was seen as a retreat into capitalism and was widely resented by party activists, whilst the 
adjustment to the new reality caused great strains especially amongst the industrial working class. 
The period of 1921 to 1924 saw efforts to consolidate the NEP economy. But this was associated 
with a tightening of the party dictatorship, and the strengthening of discipline within the party. As 
Kamenev was the leader of the Moscow Party Organisation (MPO) and the Moscow Soviet he 
was caught up in the detailed management of the capital and its economy. His work in this period 
sheds light on how far he espoused a centrist Bolshevik position, how he viewed the NEP, how 
he saw the party-state and its relations with the different classes in society, and how he sought to 
reconcile conflicts of interests. It also shows how he positioned himself within the party in the 
struggle regarding the operation of NEP both in terms of its practicalities and in terms of its 
general principles.   
NEP and the ‘Dictatorship of the Party’ 
With Kronstadt ensuring that Soviet Russia would remain a one-party state with the SRs 
and the Mensheviks outlawed, their publications closed and their leaders driven into exile, or in 
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the case of the SRs put on trial, Kamenev’s ‘Bolshevik Centrism’ essentially narrowed, as 
Kamenev now only aspired to maintain cohesion within his own party. With the Communists 
ruling alone, ‘the shades of socialism’ Kamenev had hitherto believed necessary to be heard no 
longer had a voice, and for the rest of his life he would try to square the circle of what he knew 
was a mistake – the dictatorship of a single party.
492
 To overcome it he attempted to follow 
Lassalle’s views on merging the state with society, and given the nature of the party dictatorship 
this had drastic consequences which shall be subsequently explored. 
Kamenev unreservedly backed Lenin at the March X Party Congress to support NEP for 
its concession to the peasantry. Not only did it become the party’s core programme and thus a 
key feature of his ‘Bolshevik Centrism’, but Kamenev felt that NEP had within its framework the 
possibility to rectify the loss of political agency to the different strata of society under Soviet 
rule. He did not say it explicitly until the beginning of 1923, but Kamenev saw the regime as the 
‘dictatorship of the party’ and not the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’. As he defined the terms in 
early 1923, the ‘dictatorship of the party’ sought to form better relations between the peasantry 
and the working class in their relation to the party-state as he contended the party, not the 
proletariat, ruled Soviet Russia. He had twice warned the party before the revolution that without 
popular support the Bolsheviks were acting as Jacobins, and his vision of the state as a 
‘dictatorship of the party’ was a natural extension of that idea. As for the ‘dictatorship of the 
proletariat’, he vaguely redefined the term from his civil war definition from a system of 
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government by which the proletariat waged war, to now being a term describing genuine 
proletarian rule, only achievable if world revolution succeeded.
493
 
His view of the Soviet state as a ‘dictatorship of the party’ was dramatically different than 
that of Trotsky, Lenin, and Bukharin. Paresh Chattopadnyay convincingly argues that these three 
men all shared the same ingrained idea that by simply controlling the state apparatus they had in 
effect established a proletarian state, but Marx never suggested that the state ownership of 
production equated to socialist development. Chattopadnyay accurately accords Marx’s state as 
one by which workers operated in a ‘union of free individuals’ in a system void of commodity 
production and wage relations in a type of individual labour exchange, nothing similar to what 
Trotsky, Bukharin, or Lenin adhered.
494
 The commonality that Chattopadnyay has described 
between them is vastly important when evaluating Kamenev’s post-civil war policies. Kamenev 
was the only leading figure who rightly understood that the Soviet Union under the dictatorship 
of the Communist party was by definition not a working class state in Marxist terms. 
From Lenin’s perspective the NEP was akin to his early 1918 ‘state capitalism’ policies, 
believing it a stage of socialist development directed under proletarian dictatorship. From 
Taylorism to Fordism, accepting this concept of the state gave him great latitude in pursuing all 
kinds of capitalist measures to increase worker productivity, agriculture, the economy, and to 
bolster Soviet power. Combined with his call for concessions to the peasantry, his policies jarred 
the party left. Bukharin shall be discussed next chapter, but as for Trotsky, he endorsed NEP as a 
tactical retreat. In this sense the peasantry was viewed as alien to the state. 
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Kamenev’s ‘dictatorship of the party’ approach to NEP was holistic, as it understood the 
realities of Soviet Russia and took a balanced approach to both the peasantry and the proletariat. 
Unlike Lenin who felt the state already acted in the interests of the proletariat, Kamenev felt they 
needed to gain the ‘trust’ of workers as well as the peasantry. In the framework of the NEP 
Kamenev devised programs to bridge the divide between the working class and the state. For 
example, to address a petition from the Mensheviks Kamenev spearheaded a campaign to 
revitalise the Moscow Soviet by including more non-party members. He even persuaded Lenin to 
expand the role of soviet non-party representatives by incorporating 18 non-party representatives 
into the executive committee on 14 May.
495
 However, this was largely cosmetic as real state 
power rested with Sovnarkom and not the soviets. 
By understanding Kamenev’s position that the state was in fact a ‘dictatorship of the 
party’, it is easy to see why he was so adamant about tolerating dissent. Opponents to the party 
and its NEP had to be won over. Kamenev therefore did not take the X Party Congress ban on 
factions too seriously. G. Ya. Belen’kii recalled that ‘in the Moscow Party Organisation I never 
saw any repression,’
496
 and Ryazanov explained that because the lenient Kamenev maintained an 
open dialogue with dissenters he had the ‘unbounded affection and endless respect from all 
members of the Moscow Party Organisation’.
497
 Wanting to gain peasant trust, it is no wonder 
that in 1922 Left SRs still remained in the Moscow Soviet!
498
 Kamenev’s leniency displeased his 
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colleagues. Zinoviev, who ran Petrograd as his fief, complained that Kamenev allowed too many 
opposition groups the possibility to speak their views.
499
 
The difference in stance taken by Lenin and Kamenev regarding the state and the 
proletariat was reflected in one of Kamenev’s biggest policies which bore a striking similarity to 
the ‘collectivism’ which Bogdanov espoused as the leader of Proletkult. Unlike Lenin who was 
committed to capitalist wage relations, Kamenev and Bogdanov believed that rooting out 
individualism among workers was essential to building a proletarian collective identity.
500
 
Kamenev devised such a plan when the drought-ridden Volga region in August left Moscow’s 
grain supply short 50 percent the previous months volume,
501
 a sum only able to provide for half 
its state-employed workers.
502
 To solve the problem Kamenev proposed that Moscow’s largest 
plants and factories should move from individual ration payments to collective ones. If plants or 
factories could reach production goals with fewer workers, then each worker would receive a 
larger percentage of the plant’s share and increase productivity. He hoped these favourable salary 
conditions would raise worker loyalty to the state as both worker and state industry improved 
simultaneously.
503
 The downside of this plan was of course the sacking of non-essential workers, 
and his disregard for them would certainly haunt him later when the unemployed joined the left 
opposition in 1923 in protest, but Kamenev understood that the party could not win over 
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everyone to the state with one policy. It was a gradual process. His plan was accepted on 1 July at 
the III Moscow Guberni Congress of Soviets, with the CC approving it on 8 August.
504
 
Notwithstanding Bogdanov and Kamenev’s common desire to change worker psychology 
through non-capitalist means, there was to be no alignment of forces between them as had been 
in pre-revolutionary days. Kamenev never endorsed Bogdanov’s Proletkult because it was 
specifically created as a non-governmental organisation. Kamenev wanted the state to become the 
vehicle for the spreading of proletarian culture because if the proletariat’s collectivism became 
ingrained within the state apparatus, Kamenev hoped it would unify the whole of society, the 
peasantry, workers, and intellectuals. He therefore fundamentally disagreed with Bogdanov’s 
approach. Zenovia Sochor chalks the party’s discord with Bogdanov’s Proletkult up to Lenin’s 
principles and the party’s desire to maintain control.
505
 Kamenev proves there was an additional 
ideological disagreement preventing cooperation. 
One main problem with Kamenev’s vision was that the brutal and repressive measures of 
War Communism had greatly eroded trust between the party and the masses. Therefore, as he had 
expressed during the civil war, Kamenev pressed Communists to repudiate any notion that War 
Communism had anything to do with socialism. He denounced War Communism as a system of 
economic ‘anarchy’, and criticised forced requisitioning as an ‘act of banditry’.
506
 He also struck 
at the party left agitating for egalitarian principles in resistance to NEP, labelling their policy to 
be ‘for demagogues and anarchists’.
507
 Protecting peasant interests, he called the party left 
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utopian for trying to implement socialism immediately, declaring openly and ardently that 
communism could not be built in one country.
508
  
This did not mean that Kamenev was adverse to the misgivings of the party left. His 
desire for party balance and centrism forced him to publically state NEP was a ‘manoeuvre’, 
something he did not believe. In a telling letter to Lenin he made it clear it was not ‘manoeuvre’ 
at all. Writing about the difficulties he had in the VTsIK, he declared: 
‘It is embarrassing to say out loud that all these measures are not serious and only 
a trial. We can say it between ourselves, to members of the rank and file and 
others, but today in the presidium it was difficult to carry it through because I did 
not have the right to completely tell them the motives, and they demanded to 
know if these are “manoeuvres” or if they are real. It is even more embarrassing to 
say that these are just manoeuvres in public decrees’
509
 (emphasis in the original). 
Left-wing party members remained hopeful that Lenin’s utopian April Theses would prove the 
party’s maximalist policy, but Kamenev was more of a realist and understood that in a 
predominantly peasant country the best course was to build a socialist foundation which aimed to 
unite the peasantry and the working class to the party and state in anticipation of future 
revolutions abroad. 
The Bourgeois-Communist Alliance 
What further separated Trotsky, Stalin, Lenin, and Zinoviev from Kamenev was how he 
wished to resolve class conflict. Kamenev adhered to what Lassalle wrote on morality in a 
working class state, ‘that its interest is the interest of the entire human race,’ aspiring in mass 
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unison to create a union between all aspects of society, not to destroy class differences.
510
 It was 
to be a gradual process in which proletarian morality enveloped all, not a perpetual conflict in 
which the working class stamped out its rivals. Nothing exemplifies this Lassallean characteristic 
more in Kamenev than when he led the effort to befriend the bourgeoisie to alleviate the terrible 
famine gripping the Volga region. 
During the summer of 1921 between 60-70 million puds of grain from the Volga region 
had been lost due to drought induced crop failure.
511
 The country desperately needed to import 
grain to cover the shortfall. Gorky and Kamenev put forward a plan deeply resented by the party 
rank and file to forge an alliance with the bourgeoisie to get foreign aid.
512
 Despite party 
backlash, on 29 June the Politburo approved the establishment of the All-Russian Famine Relief 
Committee (VKPG), assigning Kamenev as its chair and Rykov his deputy.
513
 Kamenev’s sincere 
desire to aid the starving and promise of no retaliation won over the Kadet E.D. Kuskova to work 
with the Communists on 3 July.
514
 Other Communist moderates joined the committee, namely 
A.I. Sviderskii, Lunacharsky, and P. Smidovich. Kuskova brought with her former Kadet party 
members, zemstvo leaders, and Duma deputies. A bourgeois-Communist alliance was born.
515
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Kamenev proved that some form of limited political cooperation with the bourgeoisie was 
possible. During its brief two month existence it secured over 350 million rubles of foreign aid.
516
 
Further, the agreement it made with Herbert Hoover of the American Relief Administration 
(ARA) on 1 August fed a million children a day.
517
 Although the bourgeoisie had no influence 
domestically as the VTsIK’s ‘Pomgol’ (pomoshch’ golodayushchim - ‘Famine Relief’) directed 
the distribution of the acquired aid, it was a positive first step of cooperation.
518 
Roger Pethybridge has shown that Lenin portrayed an image of tolerance as a ruse to get 
temporary foreign aid,
519
 but he failed to adequately assess Kamenev’s motives. To Kamenev the 
alliance was not a subterfuge. In Izvestiya on 4 August Kamenev put his Communist reputation 
on the line and publically defended the bourgeois VKPG members.
520
 Kamenev was a 
Communist who truly believed there were issues where even class enemies could find common 
ground, but Lenin’s line easily triumphed over Kamenev’s when Kuskova and her supporters 
requested their members be allowed to travel abroad to secure further aid. The party feared some 
form of intrigue against the state and under Lenin’s direction the Politburo voted on 18 August to 
deny their request.
521
 On 26 August Dzerzhinsky and I.S. Unshlikht pressed Lenin to take further 
action and arrest the committee members.
522
 Speaking on behalf of the moderate camp, Krasin 
and Chicherin advised Lenin to allow VKPG members go abroad to boost the country’s image 
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 but Lenin had no mind to allow any political concessions, and when he heard 
news that one of VKPG’s members had given an anti-Soviet speech, he had his excuse to close 
VKPG immediately and arrested the committee’s non-communists.
524
 With Kamenev and 
Gorky’s attempt to create a Communist–bourgeois alliance a failure, the recourse to repress the 
bourgeoisie became common practice. 
A ‘party which does not have the masses behind them will always resort to terror’ 
In the search for a solution to grain shortages the views of Lenin and Kamenev diverged 
sharply. At the end of 1921 when the worst of the peasant hardships was abating, Kamenev was 
eager to find a solution to prevent future suffering. Dying peasants were certainly not going to 
see the state as their own. The Commissar of Finance, Sokol’nikov, proposed to allow foreigners 
a role in the export trade in exchange for much needed food provisions. Lenin vehemently 
opposed the idea as a complete abrogation of the state’s monopoly on foreign trade. Writing to 
Kamenev on 3 March 1922, Lenin declared that ‘it is the greatest mistake to think that NEP put 
an end to terror. We shall return to terror, and to economic terror.’
525
 Lenin continued that with 
threat of violence the bourgeoisie would trade more honestly, and that terror and arrests within 
the Foreign Trade Commissariat would provide such a motivation. Stalin and Bukharin had been 
prepared to back Sokol’nikov’s plan, but when Trotsky allied with Lenin in mid-December 1922, 
followed shortly by Zinoviev, the CC majority backed the party leader.
526
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Historians such as Robert Conquest have quoted Lenin’s line above about terror to 
illustrate Lenin’s unbending resistance to any attempt to diminish Communist authority,
527
 but 
what he and other historians have failed to analyse was the significance of to whom Lenin was 
writing. This letter was not to Trotsky, Stalin, or Bukharin, but to Kamenev. Kamenev was 
pursuing alternatives to coercion and Lenin was critical of any compromise. 
Kamenev would not let the matter rest. He was determined to curb what Lenin, Zinoviev, 
and Trotsky relied on most to maintain Communist supremacy and what their opponents most 
detested, the Cheka. On 1 July at the III Moscow Guberni Congress of Soviets, Kamenev 
complained that they were stuck in a vicious circle, and that a ‘party which does not have the 
masses behind them will always resort to terror…’
528
 To escape the cycle of violence Kamenev 
urged that if instead of coercion the Communists improved the economic position of the masses, 
support for the party would follow.
529
 Of course, similar to Lenin Kamenev felt that strong 
authority was essential to keep the threat of white guard counter-revolution at bay, but it was out 
of necessity, not as a matter of policy. He was ready to move beyond just holding power, and 
clearly following Lassalle more than Marx, felt that with the continual use of terror they would 
never reach socialism.  
Kamenev was seriously committed to the idea that the party had to win round opponents, 
not simply repress them. He therefore helped imprisoned intellectuals, and was so esteemed by 
non-party intellectuals that he was often approached by the Union of Writers and House of 
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Litterateurs to save them from Cheka persecution.
530
 Kamenev found an ally in the Commissar of 
Justice D.I. Kurskii and together on 1 December 1921 they had Fedor Dan and other prominent 
Mensheviks released from prison.
531
 Kamenev also successfully lobbied Lenin to allow 
Alexander Blok to go abroad for medical treatment.
532
 Lunacharsky and Gorky were among 
Kamenev’s close allies, but Bukharin had deserted their camp. 
Kamenev’s solution to Cheka arbitrariness was ‘socialist legality’, a phrase he used to 
describe the new Soviet legal system by which every organisation, including the Cheka, was to 
be subjected. By ending the Cheka’s independence, Kamenev hoped to develop ‘trust’ with the 
masses. There were others who wanted the same thing, such as Kurskii, and the chair of the 
Revolutionary Tribunal, N.V. Krylenko. Together they pressed Lenin to place the Cheka under 
the purview of the Commissariat of Justice, where revolutionary tribunals would decide 
punishment under the branch of the Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD). The Cheka would 
remain responsible for apprehending those engaging in political crimes, spying, and banditry, but 
were to do nothing more.
533
 Believing that such a change would make the Politburo and 
Sovnarkom more responsible for the Cheka’s irregularities, Lenin responded to Kamenev on 29 
November 1921, writing that now ‘I am closer to you than to Dzerzhinsky,’
534
 The Politburo then 
appointed Kamenev, Kurskii, Dzerzhinsky, and later Stalin, to a commission which dissolved the 
                                                          
530
 Finkel p. 96. 
531
 A.N. Artizov, et al., eds., “Ochistim Rossiyu nadol’go…”: Repressii protiv inakomyslyashchikh, Konetz 1921 – 
nachalo 1923 g., Moscow: Izdatel’stvo “Materik”, 2008, p. 19. 
532
 Istochnik: document russkoi istorii, no. 2, 1995, p. 40. 
533
 Artizov, p. 521. 
534
 Ibid., p. 19. 
166 
 
Cheka into the NKVD to become the State Political Administration (GPU), where on paper its 
authority was greatly reduced.
535
 
However, Lenin’s commitment was hardly sincere. What seemed a great success 
considering Kamenev’s four year struggle in restricting the Cheka in favour of a proper legal 
criminal code proved inadequate. Having the GPU and the NKVD headed simultaneously by one 
man, Dzerzhinsky, did nothing to provide effective GPU oversight. Lenin was committed to 
terror to defeat opponents; it was his best political weapon, and in private he pushed the deputy 
chairman of the GPU, I.S.Unshlikht to ignore the reform and to continue to carry out executions 
of arrested bandits and retain his Cheka personnel. Lenin also mandated Kurskii to incorporate 
‘terror’ into the civil code.
536
 Kamenev and Lenin were trying to forge a socialist state, but with 
vastly different means to the same end; one utilising terror, the other aspiring some form of 
‘socialist legality’. 
Kamenev’s pursuit of bridging the gap between the masses, the party, and the state did 
have a darker side. After the adoption of a new legal code, the CC wanted to illustrate the change 
by prosecuting the Central Committee of the Socialist Revolutionaries in the Supreme Tribunal 
for acts of terrorism they had committed in 1918. Julie A. Cassiday has shown that the main 
purpose of the SR show trial was to connect the masses directly with the legal proceedings in an 
effort to display both the legality of the new system and foster a positive connection between the 
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state and the populous.
537
 Kamenev felt it a worthy cause and began to work with Stalin and 
Dzerzhinsky 28 December 1921 to ascertain the opportune moment in which to stage the trial.
538
 
When in August 1922 the SR leader, A.R. Gotz, refused to recant his determination to overturn 
Bolshevik power in exchange for freedom, the sentence was death. Lenin pressed for the verdict 
to be carried out, but Kamenev led the majority to keep the sentence in abeyance as a warning to 
SRs remaining in Soviet Russia that the sentence could be carried out if they tried to move 
against the state.
539
 As the trial’s purpose was to tout the new legal code to legitimise ‘socialist 
legality’, Kamenev had never wanted the SR leaders’ execution. In 1921 he had commuted 
Moscow clergy prison sentences in exchange for declarations of loyalty,
540
 and there is no reason 
to believe he did not now desire the same for the SRs. However, when the SRs refused to endorse 
the state Kamenev could not support a change of course because it would have shown the state’s 
arbitrary rule, the very opposite of what Kamenev wanted. He was trapped in a position of his 
own making and the minimum he could do was to persuade his peers to postpone execution.  
To truly understand the difference between Kamenev and his peers on state repression, it 
is best to compare him to his Politburo colleagues. His counterpart Zinoviev in Petrograd 
spearheaded the anti-Soviet intellectual campaign at the August XII Party Conference, had a 
heavy hand in dealing with dissenting opinions in Petrograd, and continuously supported Lenin’s 
call for terror. Stalin’s brutal repression of the Mensheviks in Georgia in 1921 showed that he too 
favoured violence to achieve political ends. Like Lenin, Stalin had little regard for ‘socialist 
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legality’. When CC member I.A. Zelinkski’s brother came into conflict with authorities, Stalin 
oversaw his execution without court approval. He coldly conveyed to Zinoviev, ‘It was necessary 
to shoot him without a trial, in order for there to be no noise.’
541
 Trotsky’s commitment to 
violence for political ends outweighed even Stalin’s at the time. He had a record for ordering 
mass shootings in the civil war, publically spoke about the need to repress intellectuals in peace 
time, and pursued a merciless repression policy against the church.  
There is not a single document to be found with Kamenev’s signature ever calling for the 
death of anyone. In June 1922 he served on a commission with Unshlikht and Kurskii to deport 
suspected doctors, professors, and other ‘anti-Soviet intelligentsia’, but that was a far cry from 
murder.
542
 Kamenev greatest fault was his complicity in remaining in the party despite the 
repressive measures to which he objected, but that is why his views can still be considered 
Bolshevik. For better or worse it was his party, and he tried to lead it away from repression, but 
his peers were determined to rule through force. 
The State and the Party – Kamenev and Stalin 
Kamenev’s remarkable ability to simultaneously manage multiple state functions earned 
him the confidence of Lenin, who asked Kamenev to effectively become the new link between 
the Politburo and Sovnarkom. Kamenev had been helping Lenin draw up the country’s legal 
framework ever since he had penned the NEP legislation.
543
 He had become so valuable that 
Lenin wrote to Kamenev on 26 October 1921 that he thought that ‘it would be better to put you 
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 This was a direct affront to Rykov and A.D. Tsyurupa, who were 
Lenin’s official deputy chairs in Sovnarkom and STO, but Lenin saw fit to include Kamenev 
because they lacked Kamenev’s administrative abilities. In fact, Lenin complained after returning 
from his illness at the XI Party Congress 27 March 1922, that ‘when I had to leave it turned out 
that two wheels do not work in tune and Kamenev had to triple his workload in order to uphold 
these connections.’
545
 Lenin thus selected Kamenev to be in charge of government affairs.
546
 For 
the party, he chose Stalin, who Zinoviev and Kamenev had the CC appoint its General Secretary 
on 3 April 1922. Thus by the end of 1922 Kamenev and Stalin were in effect the heads of the 
state and party. 
T.H. Rigby has maintained that Kamenev essentially shared state leadership with Rykov, 
but Rigby is wrong.
547
 Although Kamenev did not become an official deputy chair of Sovnarkom 
until 6 July 1923, he had in fact already assumed the post alongside Lenin as early as late 1921. 
Eleven days after his Sovnarkom appointment, Kamenev also became a member of STO, and in 
1924, its chair. The fact that STO was an all-union post, one which set economic policies for the 
entire Soviet Union and not just Russia, meant that Rykov was more restricted in setting policy 
and therefore played a junior role to Kamenev. Stalin’s secretary, Boris Bazhanov, duly noted 
Kamenev’s supremacy over Rykov at the time.
548
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Rigby correctly noted that although the Politburo set general policy, Lenin had tried to 
ensure that Sovnarkom, not the Politburo, directed state affairs. The party was not supposed to be 
bogged down with day-to-day administration. It distributed power, but the party itself did not 
wield it through the Politburo. Kamenev had great leeway in managing the Soviet economy 
through STO and Sovnarkom. He further had great influence as head of the MPO and the 
Moscow Soviet. Zhores Medvedev has argued that in party matters he even had more influence 
than Stalin, but this is an exaggeration.
549
 
Other leading Communists did not wield as much authority as Stalin or Kamenev. 
Bukharin was the chief editor of Pravda, but he commanded no official posts. Like Trotsky, he 
had party influence, but Bukharin had even less authority than his counterpart for being outside 
the state apparatus altogether. He was a theorist, not a leader.  
Trotsky had a powerful position as the People's Commissar for Military and Naval 
Affairs, but it was limited. For example, Kamenev’s position directing the economy in STO 
touched every aspect of Soviet life, including the military, and as the General Secretary, Stalin 
determined the party make-up throughout the entire system. Trotsky had input on general policy 
through his Politburo post, but Kamenev had this in addition to his all-union authority and his 
rule of Moscow. The military’s primary purpose was to protect the Soviet state from foreign 
aggression. Steven Kotkin has shown that historians have overestimated Trotsky’s influence 
based on Lenin’s 24 December 1922 ‘Letter to the Congress’. The letter indicated that Trotsky 
was of such prominence that a party rupture between him and Stalin could occur if not 
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 but new evidence indicates that the letter was most likely a forgery.
551
 This casts 
serious doubt as to the reach of Trotsky’s influence. 
As for Zinoviev, he was the symbol of the international proletariat as head of the 
Comintern, but in terms of domestic policy his influence was limited to Petrograd and his 
Politburo position. Zinoviev followed Kamenev’s lead. Molotov recalled, Zinoviev: 
‘…sang Kamenev’s tune, so to speak… Zinoviev was cowardly; Kamenev had 
character. He actually guided Zinoviev. But Zinoviev was considered superior to 
Kamenev, who was merely his assistant or advisor. Zinoviev was the chief. Not a 
theoretician but a politician.’
552
 
Zinoviev therefore never had a chance to fill Lenin’s shoes. Kamenev and Stalin thus sharply 
stood out as a duumvirate overseeing the state and party. 
The Unity of State and Society 
By the end of 1922 and the beginning of 1923 the countryside was still reeling from the 
famine and industrial output was still far below its pre-war levels. Party support had diminished 
among the working class and the party had made few inroads with the peasantry.
553
 In fact, the 
vast majority of the population remained bereft of political agency, a consequence of Lenin’s 
institutionalised abrogation of politics. 
At the March 1923 X Moscow Guberni Party Conference Kamenev first publicly 
expressed his thoughts concerning the ‘dictatorship of the party’, long before Zinoviev mentioned 
                                                          
550
 George Fyson, Lenin’s Final Fight: Speeches and Writings, 1922-1923, New York: Pathfinder, 1995, p. 182. 
551
 Kotkin, chapter 11. 
552
 Chuev and Resis, p. 105. 
553





 Kamenev’s statement was not motivated by dissatisfaction with how Stalin was 
using the Secretariat to impede intra-party democracy, but rather because he felt the state, not the 
party, should be the vehicle for socialist transformation. He therefore advocated the 
amalgamation of the party and state to reach the masses, and as will be shown, this played a 
critical factor in aiding Stalin’s rise to power. 
Kamenev outlined at the April 1923 XII Party Congress that the party needed to use state 
institutions as a kind of sounding-board for policy directives to establish an indirect dialogue. He 
felt that the working class viewed themselves and their government as two distinctly different 
entities, and if the non-party workers would not come to the party, the party would have to come 
to them through state institutions.
555
 The implication was that the party would become more 
diversified in its approach to decision making, taking into account the peasantry and differing 
worker views to form a more comprehensive organisation and conduct policy which would gain 
the trust the state needed to create a broader sense of community. 
Since various groups were denied the ability to represent their views politically, Kamenev 
was rather naïve to believe that the party would be able to act benevolently and truly listen to 
grievances. There was no institutional check to prevent the party from simply dictating directives 
by a show of force in the face of resistance. The party was certainly not going to allow workers or 
peasants the right to determine policy.  
That ship had already sailed when the leadership rejected the part of Lenin’s 1922 plan to 
have 75-100 workers and peasants read all documents and determine the agenda of the Politburo 
                                                          
554
 RGASPI 323/2/20/100. 
555
 RGASPI 223/2/20/106. 
173 
 
in a reorganised Central Control Commission (CCC).
556
 At the II Congress of the Communist 
Party of Georgia 14 March, Kamenev had endorsed Lenin’s idea that ‘the leadership of the CC’ 
would be held accountable to the CCC, but he obviously backpedalled when his peers rejected 
the idea.
557
 While the CCC did combine with the state’s Commissariat of the Workers’ and 
Peasants’ Inspectorate (Rabkrin) in hopes of maintaining an ideological hold over state organs, it 
never had any power over the Politburo. Therefore a true dialogue was not on the agenda. 
This therefore raises the question as to whether Kamenev remained an adherent of 
Lassalle. Lassalle had indicated that the proletarian state came first and then it worked to win 
over opponents. For Kamenev to admit that the country was a ‘dictatorship of the party’ and then 
espouse that the state should win over both workers and the peasantry disregarded the Lassallean 
belief that proletarian culture was the impetus for breaking down divisions between classes. 
Kamenev was constrained under the one-party dictatorship and was adapting Lassalle’s concept 
of the state to the current situation. He envisioned that the party could serve as a temporary 
replacement for genuine proletarian values and bring the masses to accept the state as their own. 
This was why Kamenev was the only Politburo member who contemplated worker and peasant 
supervision of the CC and outright supported Lenin’s desire to combine the CCC and Rabkrin to 
ensure state adherence to party principles from the very beginning. His long-term goal was to 
merge the party, the people, and the state into one governing body. 
One of the main ways Kamenev hoped to win over the peasantry through ‘state 
capitalism’ was to modify its tax code and reform the country’s monetary system. His Marxist 
                                                          
556
 E.A. Rees, State Control in Soviet Russia: The Rise and Fall of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspectorate, 1920-
34, Birmingham: Macmillan Press, 1987, p. 46-47. 
557
 Lev Kamenev, Ocherednye zadachi kompartii Gruzii: doklad pervom zasedanii 11-go s”ezda kompartii Gruzii 14 
Marta 1923, Tiflis: Izdatel’stvo krasnaya kniga, 1923, p. 37. 
174 
 
thinking was simple, improve the economic condition of the working class and the peasantry and 
gain their support - economics determined politics.
558
 The Commissar of Finance, Sokol’nikov, 
together with Kamenev and Kalinin asserted that the brunt of taxes should fall on the slim 
stratum of bourgeois traders, not peasants or workers.
559
 The state had to tax the peasants less 
than under the Tsar, or else they would not gain their support, and so the three proffered to 
decrease the peasant tax by a third. With the desire to continue the change in currency from the 
near worthless sovznak (soviet currency) to the chervonets (rubles based on gold), which 
Kamenev had initiated through Sovnarkom on 11 October 1922, Kamenev and Sokol’nikov now 
advanced they end the ‘tax-in-kind’ altogether and move to a ‘monetary tax’, permanently ending 
the requisitioning of grain and providing peasants with a rationally progressive unified direct tax 
which would reduce peasant confusion and resentment over having to pay three different kinds of 
taxes.
560
 The danger of a single tax was that soviet institutions could not make new taxes to bail 
out fiscally inept ones, but the benefits of gaining peasant trust and a desire to raise demand for 
the new chervonets and increase its circulation outweighed their concerns. 
There were those in the party who did not share Kamenev’s vision of the ‘dictatorship of 
the party’ under NEP. To the party at large the Soviet system was considered a proletarian state 
in every sense of the word. No one spoke out against Kamenev at the XII Party Congress more 
on this issue than Y. Larin. Since February of 1921 he had been denouncing NEP as a ‘policy of 
coalition’ akin to Kerensky’s bourgeois-socialist ministry in 1917.
561
 At the XII Party Congress 
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he charged Kamenev’s direction as a ‘peasant deviation’, worried their misguided direction 
would alienate the proletariat. Disgruntled workers, either unemployed or disheartened, were 
beginning to join the ‘Workers’ Truth’, a left-minded proletarian group which demanded worker 
needs trump peasant concerns.
562
 From conferences to congresses, Kamenev tried to draw the 
left’s attention to the pre-1917 Bolshevism which had desired to work with the peasantry.
563
 
However, the left had no desire to accept the ‘other’, the peasantry, as having any right to 
determine state direction. Larin, for example, wanted to increase, not decrease, the tax on the 
struggling peasantry by a startling 20 percent. 
Kamenev also faced opposition from Krasin and N. Osinski, both of whom found fault 
with increasing party influence within the state apparatus through the merging of the CCC and 
Rabkrin into the CCC-Rabkrin. From the party right, Krasin complained that effective planning 
was best left to well-trained economists and bourgeois specialists.
564
 The former Democratic 
Centralist, N. Osinskii, wished to place decision making in the hands of the VTsIK and the 
soviets, not the party. He argued that local institutions had greater cohesion in comparison with 
the departmentalised central organs. 
With the aid of Zinoviev and Sokol’nikov, again Kamenev’s ‘Bolshevik Centrism’ came 
to the fore as he tried to find a centrist platform. As had become typical of Kamenev, he made 
some concessions, but this time only to Krasin and Larin. His concession to Larin was rather 
minimal as it was simply not to yield completely to Krasin’s policy demands, but he conceded 
Krasin’s point that the CC should not interfere with the practical daily work of the commissariats 
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and that their decisions should be reviewed in corresponding economic organs, but felt that 
Krasin’s call for division in policy making was inadvisable; uncontrolled economic organs would 
allow bourgeois specialists to direct policy.
565
 As for Osinskii’s group Kamenev spared no words 
in denouncing it as a ‘revision of Leninism’ and a ‘Menshevik-liquidationist view’ for their 
Democratic Centralist desire to ‘be emancipated from the leadership of the party’.
566
 His 
unwillingness to relinquish authority to more democratic organs was terribly irregular for 
Kamenev, but his belief that the state was under the ‘dictatorship of the party’ explains why he 
was so averse to Osinskii. A democratic state that was not intrinsically proletarian would not 
move towards socialism.  
It is critical to note that both Osinskii and Krasin were urging a delineation of duties 
between the state and the party, and that it was Kamenev who led the debate to reject their 
proposals to instead solidify the connection between the party and state. Kamenev’s desire to 
bridge the gap between the state and society by means of ceding government authority to the 
party is paramount in understanding the demise of Sovnarkom as a decision-making body. T.H. 
Rigby has attributed Lenin’s illness and departure from the government as the main cause of 
Sovnarkom’s decline, and Roger Pethybridge has illustrated the drive of the party to curb the 
problems (tax collecting, administering justice, peasant influence in the soviets, etc…) in the 
localities and their inability to cope with administering NEP as the cause for centralisation along 
party lines. Robert Service points to the bottom-up demand for efficiency as well as Stalin’s 
heavy-handedness in the Secretariat in shifting power into the hands of the party.
567
 Yet the 
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critical factor presented in this chapter which must be taken into account equally to the ones 
enumerated above was that the very person Lenin selected to oversee state institutions voluntarily 
began to relinquish its authority to the party on theoretical principle. Out of a hope to connect the 
party to the masses by combining the state and party, Kamenev drove power right into Stalin’s 
hands by spurning Osinkii and Krasin’s wish to divorce the party from state decision making. 
Kamenev’s error was that was he focusing most of his attention on working with 
Sokol’nikov to win the ‘trust’ of the peasantry and was not mindful of how Stalin was managing 
the party. Kamenev’s great achievement at the XII Party Congress was that the congress 
approved his and Sokol’nikov’s plan to continue the usage of the gold backed currency to 
stabilise the economy against a continuously depreciating sovznak, and in the resolution on the 
‘Basic Position of the Financial Programme’, the party supported Kamenev and Sokol’nikov’s 
call for an end to the ‘tax-in-kind’. On 10 May both the VTsIK and Sovnarkom decreed the 
single agricultural tax into law. 
Against Trotsky 
Nothing puts the concept of Kamenev’s ‘Bolshevik Centrism’ to the test more than when 
he worked together with Stalin and Zinoviev in the so-called ‘troika’ to defeat Trotsky. Valentina 
Vilkova explains Kamenev’s actions as motivated by an ambition for power.
568
 Chris Ward 
believes that Kamenev and Zinoviev ‘followed no clearly identifiable political line’,
569
 whilst 
Stephen Kotkin explains Kamenev’s actions as those of an ‘inveterate intriguer’.
570
 These 
interpretations show a lack of knowledge of Kamenev’s goals and ideas and grossly misrepresent 
                                                          
568
 Valentina Vilkova, The Struggle for Power: Russia in 1923, New York: Prometheus Books, 1996, p. 18. 
569
 Ward, p. 32. 
570
 Kotkin, chapter 11. 
178 
 
him. E.H. Carr depicted Kamenev more accurately, writing that he ‘was a man of sincerely held 
beliefs, which were remarkably free from any admixture whether of personal ambition or of 
political calculation.’
571
 The truth was that Kamenev acted as he did because his centrist NEP 
position clashed with both Trotsky’s super-industrialisation proposals and his refusal to work 
collectively.  
Trotsky and Preobrazhensky’s alternative to Kamenev and Sokol’nikov’s ‘finance 
dictatorship’ was ‘Primitive Socialist Accumulation’, an industrialisation program in which the 
peasant was treated as a colony, whereby the state would take the revenue from agricultural 
exports to finance rapid industrialisation. In this scenario, workers would also be called to 
sacrifice, for the state would strip them of part of their wages for the monumental 
industrialisation drive. Trotsky believed that that the path to socialism mandated a significant 
increase in labour productivity, whatever the immediate social cost.
572
 To carry out this 
undertaking, Trotsky envisioned that the State Planning Committee (Gosplan) would serve as the 
legislative economic planning organ to lead, direct, and plan the economy.
573
 
There was thus a clash of ideas. The kind of exploitation Trotsky proposed was going to 
destroy any ‘trust’ the masses had in the government, but Trotsky was confident of his policy 
because he viewed the Soviet Union as a proletarian state. Kamenev completely and utterly 
disagreed, and with his desire to bring the masses into a feeling of common community through 
state enterprise that neither favoured peasant over worker or worker over peasant, he fought 
against him. Kamenev and Sokol’nikov's NEP centrist plan to gain the trust of both workers and 
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the peasantry by increasing their living standard was the complete opposite of Trotsky’s plan of 
exploitive industrialisation. Furthermore, Trotsky’s Gosplan relied on bourgeois specialists for 
making economic projections. In a proletarian state, such an entity would be held in check by the 
populous itself. In a non-proletarian state, the specialists would direct the economy to capitalism. 
That was why the party’s role in overseeing the state’s economic institutions, which Trotsky was 
so keen to avoid, was so valuable to Kamenev. The state was not proletarian and thus could not 
allow the bourgeoisie to plan economic development. 
The clash of the two men’s views began when Trotsky challenged Kamenev and 
Sokol’nikov over their desire to liberalize the monopoly on foreign trade in December 1922. 
Despite the terrible famine crisis, Trotsky and Lenin were adamant in opposing any relaxation of 
the foreign trade monopoly out of fear that bourgeois private traders would accrue wealth 
originally intended for the state.
574
 Even allied with Zinoviev, Sokol’nikov, and Stalin, Kamenev 
was unable to overcome Trotsky, mainly due to Lenin’s support. 
Trotsky then went on the offensive, demanding that Gosplan supersede STO. He directly 
attacked Kamenev’s position by maintaining that STO was incapable of directing cross 
departmental affairs as it was more a regulatory organ than an administrative one since in STO 
each commissariat focused on their own affairs. If STO were to lead at all, Trotsky proposed that 
due to the volume of work Kamenev should either choose to be the chair of the Moscow Soviet 
or a deputy in Sovnarkom, but not both.
575
 Such a move would have removed Kamenev’s role in 
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directing state policy, if not ended it altogether. This would have also severed the Politburo-
Sovnarkom link, separating economic planning and party decision making, exactly what Trotsky 
desired. 
It is important to note that the initial response of Trotsky’s Politburo opponents was 
conciliatory. Stalin proposed on 6 January 1923 that Trotsky become a deputy of STO. This 
would have enabled Trotsky to work alongside Kamenev in determining policy, but Trotsky 
rejected the post. Kamenev also tried to appease Trotsky by heeding his critique of STO. The CC 
agreed to reorganise STO on 4 July so that department deputies participated in STO affairs to 
collectively solve economic problems with a ‘single directing organ’ as Trotsky desired. Despite 
the concession, Trotsky remained adamant.
576
 It was his way, or no way. 
If this had been a single event, Kamenev would have respected Trotsky’s tenacity as he 
had so many of his opponents, but Trotsky had a whole history with Kamenev in rejecting 
compromise. In 1912 Kamenev and his brother-in-law had a falling out working on the Vienna 
Pravda together when Trotsky had refused to adhere to the CC’s line.
577
 In October 1917 Trotsky 
and Lenin had jointly wrecked the Kamenev-led Vikzhel talks for a multi-party state. During the 
1920 trade union debates Kamenev had brokered a meeting between Lenin and Trotsky to find 
compromise, but Trotsky had rejected it and insisted on taking the issue straight to the rank and 
file. On 11 April 1922 Lenin had proposed making Trotsky his deputy in Sovnarkom alongside 
Kamenev, but Trotsky had refused.
578
 Not giving up, Lenin proposed on 2 September 1922 to 
                                                          
576
 RGASPI 17/2/100/3. 
577
 See Chapter 1. 
578
 Deutscher, The Prophet Unarmed, p.34-35. 
181 
 
have Trotsky head Sovnarkom and Kamenev STO. Even though this would have restricted 
Kamenev’s authority, Kamenev agreed.
579
 Trotsky, again, did not.
580
 
With Trotsky continually pressing to undermine Kamenev’s STO authority without even 
the slightest interest in compromise, Kamenev reluctantly allied with the man who most detested 
Trotsky – Stalin. The two were on amicable terms, and from among the Politburo Kamenev felt 
close to Stalin in a way that was second only to Zinoviev.
581
 They had formed bonds in pre-
revolutionary days working in Georgia and while living in exile together in Achinsk. As acting 
chair of the Politburo, Kamenev collaborated with Stalin and Kiubyshev in preparing the 
Politburo’s agenda and thought he was a man with whom he could work.
582
 Zinoviev was 
worried about keeping Trotsky in check and therefore followed Kamenev’s lead, forming a 
‘troika’ with Kamenev and Stalin in early 1923. 
Yet none of this would have mattered if Stalin and Kamenev had not agreed on the 
present course of NEP and the role of the party, and this is where understanding Kamenev and his 
premise that the country was under a ‘dictatorship of the party’ is crucial. Kamenev supported the 
idea to expand the role of the party to safeguard against deviation. In a non-proletarian state 
where political dialogue was not possible, the ‘dictatorship of the party’ was the only thing 
holding the system together, and that meant elevating the importance of the party in state affairs. 
It was therefore out of theoretical understanding that he aligned with Stalin; it was not simply 
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political. For his part, Stalin was more than willing to aggrandise the decision-making role of the 
party in the state apparatus to benefit his position. 
Kamenev’s alliance with Stalin to ensure the future dominance of the ‘dictatorship of the 
party’ in state affairs was what brought the dispute with Trotsky to an impasse at the September 
23-25 CC plenum. At the meeting the majority decided to expand Trotsky’s Revolutionary 
Military Council (RMC) to include more Communists. The decision was made without Trotsky, 
and he perceived it to be a step to diminish his influence. Although this was a consequence of the 
action, the primary goal was to expand party influence into all spheres of the state to maintain 
ideological control. The process had already begun with economic organs, and now the military, 
which retained numerous former Tsarist officers, was next. 
Trotsky incorrectly assessed the move to be politically motivated against him personally 
and went on the offensive against the leadership, raising issues over the economy to put forward 
his repeatedly denied proposals for a state-regulated economy under Gosplan. He was of course 
being rather opportunistic. The economic policy of relying on pseudo-market forces had come 
into difficulty, creating the so-called ‘scissors crisis’. With a monopoly on industrial products, 
trusts had brazenly demanded high prices for their goods. Simultaneously, peasants were flooding 
the market with their grain to capitalise on the new ‘monetary tax’ and had caused its value to 
plummet. Peasants then refused to sell their grain and turned to subsistence farming. To make 
matters worse, with the austerity measures of cutting off government capital to failing industries 
and Kamenev’s own Moscow Soviet tightening its fiscal belt under his direction, the summer of 
1923 saw worker strikes in both Petrograd and Moscow as wages were still 80% of pre-war 
levels. Industrial output was at a meager 35% of pre-war levels. Terrible working conditions were 
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the norm, a million were unemployed, and poor housing persisted. Many workers joined the anti-
Communist Party ‘Workers’ Truth’ and the ‘Workers’ Group’, demanding a change in economic 
policy along a more proletarian line. By October, the ‘scissors crisis’ was at its peak, and on 8 
October Trotsky sent a letter to СС members criticizing the leadership’s economic policy and 
proposed Gosplan save the country by focusing on heavy industrialisation. 
Trotsky’s greatest mistake on 8 October was to attack the ‘troika’ as if they were one 
cohesive unit. In his letter he assailed Kamenev’s economic policy, Zinoviev’s role in the failed 
German revolution, and Stalin’s Secretariat.
583
 Had Trotsky struck out against Stalin and not 
Zinoviev and Kamenev, he may have had allies, for at the October CC plenum Kamenev was 
trying to figure out a way to reduce Stalin’s authority, but could not find the moment to act.
584
 
Kamenev was well aware that by increasing the party’s significance in state functions that 
Stalin’s prominence in decision-making was rising. This troubled him, but Trotsky’s assault on 
the leadership took precedence. Had Trotsky moved only on the Secretariat Kamenev would have 
played his role as the great party conciliator and leveraged Stalin and Trotsky against each other 
to maintain balance. 
Trotsky’s manoeuvre at a time of crisis won him the support of the party left. A coalition 
of various opposition members under the ‘platform of the 46’ echoed Trotsky’s attack on 15 
October, followed by former Democratic Centralists and Workers’ Opposition members uniting 
in protest. Exasperated with Trotsky’s refusal to compromise, Bukharin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, 
Kalinin, Kamenev, Molotov, Rykov, Stalin and Tomskii rallied against him.  
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Kamenev’s tolerant leadership was crucial for Trotsky to get a foothold in MPO. 
Nowhere else in the entire Soviet Union did the party face such upheaval as in Moscow, and that 
was because of Kamenev. In fact, Zinoviev had been so agitated at Kamenev’s refusal to clamp 
down on dissent as mandated by the X Party Congress ban on factions that in a letter on 21 
February 1922 he warned Kamenev that his toleration for a ‘booming’ ‘free press’ was giving 
rise to a left opposition.
585
 In defiance to the party factional ban, Kamenev openly explained that 
opposition platforms were useful because they addressed legitimate social concerns and the party 
could steal their ideas without having to acknowledge any mistakes.
586
 Had Kamenev been the 
‘inveterate intriguer’ that Kotkin claims him to be, the left opposition in Moscow would have 
been as ineffectual as it was nearly everywhere else, but in Moscow the left opposition seized a 
third of the city’s party cells.
587
  
Further evidence against the argument that Kamenev was a supreme ‘intriguer’ was that 
the leadership was willing to compromise. Even though it invited criticism, on 7 November 
Zinoviev promised more party democracy.
588
 Then, on 5 December Kamenev and Stalin 
acquiesced to allow Trotsky to take control of Gosplan.
589
 Trotsky chose to throw the 
compromise back in Kamenev and Stalin’s face by publishing in Pravda on 11 December his 
New Course, in which he used the CC decision on open discussion to unleash an attack on the 
Bolshevik ‘old guard’. He called the apparatus of the party itself a faction and called for new 
leadership. 
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Kamenev clung to the ‘old guard’ because he understood that the party was divided into 
three major groups: workers, peasants, and intellectuals, further diversified by nationality and 
distance. In December 1923 Kamenev declared that due to this stratification the party was unable 
to function without the ‘cement’ of the old guard, because if the old Bolsheviks were unseated, 
the party would splinter into competing groups.
590
 This thought of his was rather flawed. 
Considering that there were so many competing views within the party prior to 1917, there was 
no way to guarantee cohesion even among old party members. For example, Pyatakov had joined 
the party in 1912 and was in 1923 aiding Trotsky. 
Despite intense debate, with Trotsky’s absence in the party due to illness and the Moscow 
Committee remaining in the majority’s hands, the opposition failed to take the XIII Party 
Conference 16-19 January. Coupled with Lenin’s death on 21 January, the victors solidified their 
hold on the state and party. It was at this time Kamenev officially became the chair of STO on 30 
January.
591
 As the unofficial head of state, Kamenev delivered the opening address and economic 
report at the II All-Union Congress of Soviets on 1 February.
592
 
What had ultimately ensured Trotsky’s failure was not ‘intrigue’, but the success of 
Kamenev and Sokol’nikov’s economic policies. Kamenev was able to boast at the XIII Party 
Congress 23-31 May that the economy was improving. In 1923 59% of the tax on the agricultural 
sector had been taken in monetary value, and with such progress the tax-in-kind was abolished 
altogether. The circulation of the chervonets increased dramatically without devaluing, from just 
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3% circulation in January 1923 to 67.6% in May 1924.
593
 The government did not have to print 
any of its devalued sovznak and on 7 March STO had introduced a new stable soviet currency to 
replace it.
594
 The government no longer permitted the printing of additional currency to offset 
budget shortfalls.
595
 The state had acquired a positive trade balance and saw a dramatic increase 
of funds, from 475 million rubles to 786 million.
596
 By the May XIII Party Congress the 
‘scissors’ were nearly closed, the country had its first stable currency, and Trotsky’s pessimistic 
forecast that the NEP’s current direction based on finance would deepen the economic crisis 
proved false. 
Trotsky could have let sleeping dogs lie, but instead he again went on the offensive. In 
October of 1924 Trotsky published his collected works where his preface entitled, ‘The Lessons 
of October’, equated Zinoviev’s actions in opposing the October Revolution and Kamenev’s 
defiance to Lenin’s April Theses to the failed revolution in Germany. The rank and file which had 
little knowledge of Zinoviev and Kamenev’s vote against the October Revolution were now 
enlightened to the two’s perceived treacherous transgression. This provoked Kamenev to retaliate 
against Trotsky. With Trotsky’s persistent attempts to discredit them, Kamenev and Zinoviev 
went tit for tat with Trotsky in drudging up past perceived mistakes to fit present circumstances. 
On the 18 November Kamenev spoke before the Moscow Committee with his report ‘Leninism 
or Trotskyism?’, which later found publication in the anti-Trotsky 1925 collection of articles For 
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 In his article Kamenev enumerated all of Trotsky’s pre-1917 non-Bolshevik 
behaviour, recounting his Menshevism and his numerous disagreements with Lenin, presenting 
Trotsky as a rightist Menshevik.
598
 Stalin’s ‘Errors of Trotskyism’ mirrored Kamenev’s earlier 
criticisms, denouncing Trotsky’s ‘permanent revolution’ for ignoring the peasantry. 
This event earned Kamenev the reputation of an ‘intriguer’. Intrigue it was because he 
planned the assault against Trotsky behind closed doors and collaborated with Stalin and 
Zinoviev to stonewall Trotsky at Politburo meetings with a united front by predetermining their 
joint position in advance,
599
 but characteristic of his entire life to label him an ‘inveterate 
intriguer’, it most certainly was not. All the evidence leading up to this episode shows that 
Kamenev was a man of compromise and had made numerous attempts to accommodate Trotsky. 
Raising the bogey of Trotsky’s ‘Menshevism’ and dubbing it ‘Trotskyism’ may have been as 
dirty a trick as Trotsky reminding the party of Kamenev and Zinoviev’s misgivings about the 
October Revolution, but the essence of the conflict had meaning well beyond a simple struggle 
for power. Adam Ulam contends that when Kamenev and Zinoviev proposed on 4 January 1925 
to remove Trotsky from the Politburo and to dismiss him from his post as chair of the RMC, 
Kamenev was acting for reasons of ‘power’ and out of ‘vindictiveness’.
600
 This is a gross 
exaggeration. Kamenev was prompted to such an action out of defence. Trotsky had demanded 
Kamenev leave his post as head of the Moscow Soviet or as head of STO and then later had 
relentlessly assailed him and his views in hopes of casting him out of the leadership forever. 
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Assigning Kamenev’s motivation to be out of ‘power’ and ‘vindictiveness’ and seeing Trotsky as 
somehow the victim is an unfair double standard. 
Stalin had a far more radical solution to contain Trotsky, and following his lead the 
majority rejected Zinoviev’s proposal to exclude him from the Politburo. Stalin outlined his 
thinking to E.I. Kviring on 15 January in a letter, explaining that ‘the majority think that by 
leaving Trotsky in the CC, Trotsky will be less dangerous in the Politburo than outside it... 
Personally, I side with the opinion of the majority.’
601
 Under CC guidance the VTsIK removed 
him from his post as Commissar of the Military and Navy on 26 January 1925, replacing him 
with M.V. Frunze. Stalin and the majority understood that by removing Trotsky from his posts 
and by outnumbering him 6 to 1 in the Politburo, Trotsky was absolutely finished. Herein lay the 
significant difference between Kamenev and Zinoviev and Stalin. Kamenev had wanted to 
maintain the integrity of the theoretical line and the continuation of ‘state capitalism’ under NEP 
in its current state by ejecting Trotsky from the Politburo, but he did not have a problem with 
Trotsky continuing on in his position as the Commissar of War, as the head of the entire armed 
forces of the country. At a Politburo meeting 18 March 1926 Kamenev recounted the affair: 
‘…and we said that until the congress Trotsky cannot be a member of the 
Politburo. Immediately we removed him from his post as chair of the 
Revolutionary Military Council together… We had then not a dispute with Trotsky 
on a soviet line, but on a party line, and from this party argument you made 
conclusions on the soviet line, moving towards his removal from his soviet post. 
We thought that it was wrong’
602
 (emphasis in the original). 
Leaving Trotsky as the Commissar of War showed that despite their ideological disagreements, 
Kamenev was willing to call him an ally in the Soviet sphere. True, the party would limit his 
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influence by reviewing his work, but in essence, Kamenev trusted him. For his part, Stalin acted 
ruthlessly, desiring to incapacitate Trotsky permanently, depriving him of any real influence in 
the state and by narrowing his party role to the Politburo where outnumbered his opinions could 
be easily ignored. Of great significance, Stalin’s group had also usurped VTsIK and Sovnarkom 
decision making in removing Trotsky from his commissariat post. Kamenev was therefore far 
more moderate and that was because his ‘Bolshevik Centrism’ left the door open for some form 
of conciliation. He had afforded his defeated opponent the possibility to continue on as War 
Commissar, as disagreement did not make one ‘dangerous’ to the Soviet state. 
Yet Kamenev had only himself to blame for aiding Stalin in expanding the role of the 
party into state affairs and giving him the authority to act as he did. Although Kamenev had 
realized that by moving to completely join the party to the state apparatus the General Secretary 
would become even further entrenched, Trotsky’s continued barrage against him had made 
putting a check on Stalin’s accumulation of power impossible for the time being. 
A New Understanding 
The argument that Kamenev acted against Trotsky without a clear political or theoretical 
line is no longer tenable. Kamenev understood what his peers had not, that the country was under 
a ‘dictatorship of the party’ and not a ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’. They were not building 
socialism, but safeguarding the state awaiting world revolution. Kamenev aspired to strengthen 
the role of the party over the state to reach the non-party populous to create a common 
community and to ensure that NEP concessions did not set the country adrift to capitalism. To 
reach his goal he forged an alliance with bourgeois elements, tried to end the arbitrary rule of the 
190 
 
Cheka, developed a new collective wage system for workers, and together with Sokol’nikov 
championed ruble reform to uplift the peasantry. Everything he did in this period was to gain the 
‘trust’ of the masses. Yet, there was a terrible downside. By employing all his party and state 
positions to reach his goal of unifying state, party, and society, he essentially handed Stalin 
complete control over the country without a fight. 
The charge that Kamenev was an ‘inveterate intriguer’ cannot be sustained. Within the 
MPO he was known for his toleration, and his willingness to hear out differing views allowed for 
the growth of a left opposition. In the dispute with Trotsky, Trotsky alone was irreconcilable. The 
leadership tried numerous times to appease him, but they were all in vain. Kamenev resorted to 
intrigue against Trotsky by establishing ‘Trotskyism’ only when Trotsky had employed the same 
method against him over his October 1917 errors, but this was not Kamenev’s usual approach to 
resolving differences. It was an exception, and proving Kamenev’s ‘Bolshevik Centrism’ 
survived the struggle Kamenev was prepared to work alongside Trotsky as an ally by letting him 






With the ending of the ‘scissors crisis’, the abating of the famine crisis, the stabilisation of 
the currency, the growth of industry and workers’ wages nearing pre-war levels, the years 1924-
1925 marked the first time the Communists had the opportunity to govern without a looming 
crisis. Stalin boldly proclaimed that the country could build ‘socialism in one country’, and 
Bukharin pushed forward with his rightist policies to extend NEP into the countryside in an effort 
to further stimulate economic growth. The Communist left which had been defeated protested 
Bukharin’s policies, but with Trotsky side-lined in the Politburo they were left without a voice. 
The ruling ‘troika’ of Zinoviev, Kamenev and Stalin dissolved and the party’s factions solidified, 
rigidly demarcating party left and right. Stalin used the Secretariat to stamp out debate in favour 
of Bukharin, but there remained numerous workers and party members disillusioned with NEP’s 
capitalist elements. In these circumstances Kamenev struggled for a centrist position between the 
party left, and the party right, and in this outlined his own specific course through which NEP 
could be developed. 
Kamenev, Stalin, and ‘Socialism in one country’ 
For reasons that can only be explained by his desire to maintain unity, Kamenev’s support 
of the ‘troika’ was critical to its continuance. Zinoviev, for example, was uneasy with Stalin’s 
tightening grip over the party as Stalin had abused his power over the Georgian affair. The 
compromise solution that Kamenev had brokered in Tbilisi in March 1923 to allow opposition 
Georgian party members to retain their central committee seats in exchange for supporting 
Georgia merging into the Transcaucasus Republic was systematically undone when Stalin 
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violated the agreement by ejecting the dissenting members from the Georgian Central 
Committee. Stalin had also begun to make decisions without Politburo sanction, and he was 
intruding into the Comintern, which was Zinoviev’s own preserve. Stalin had backed Radek to 
override Zinoviev, Bukharin, Klara Zetkin, H. Brandler, and the German CC in the controversy 
surrounding German fascism.
603
 The alarming expansion of Stalin’s political reach prompted 
Zinoviev on holiday in Kislovodsk in July and August of 1923 to discuss with Bukharin, G.E. 
Evdokimov, M.M. Lashevich, Frunze, Voroshilov, and Ordzhonikidze the possibility to 
reorganise the Secretariat so that Stalin would have to share in decision making. 
There is nothing more telling to Kamenev’s commitment to collective leadership than the 
fact that he sided with Stalin on the matter against his long-time friend Zinoviev. It is true that 
Kamenev felt that Zinoviev and Bukharin exaggerated Stalin’s power,
604
 but at the core of 
Kamenev’s decision to back Stalin was his belief that a move to politicise the Secretariat would 
liquidate the Politburo and deprive the CC of its authority.
605
 Finding common ground in the CC 
to keep the party united against a leftward swing was more important than checking Stalin’s 
ambitions or in empowering a significantly narrower leading organ with command. 
Kamenev was in fact worried about Stalin’s growing authority and wanted to act.
 606
 He 
had shared his thoughts with Bukharin, who now angrily wrote to Kamenev that he had to be ‘a 
bit more courageous’ in expressing his views.
607
 On 30 July Zinoviev pleaded to Kamenev that 
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he had ‘no small influence’ and that he was ‘allowing Stalin to mock us.’ In anguish Zinoviev 
continued that:
 
‘In all the platforms they talk about a “troika”, believing that in it I am not the 
least significant. In practice there is not any kind of troika, but a dictatorship of 
Stalin. Ilich was a thousand times right. Either there will be a serious way out, or a 
period of struggle is inevitable. Well, it is not new for you. You yourself have told 
me about it numerous times. What surprised me was that Voroshilov, Frunze and 
Sergo think almost the same thing. Write please, and tell me what you 




Kamenev was thus the reason the ‘troika’ remained unified against Trotsky. Zinoviev wanted to 
act and Kamenev rebuffed him, and it saved the power and influence of Stalin’s Secretariat. 
When Stalin went to Kislovodsk in August, the two sides agreed to include Bukharin, Zinoviev, 
and Trotsky in the Orgburo, but their inclusion into the organisation on 25 September changed 
nothing. What the whole episode reveals is the sincerity of Kamenev’s convictions against 
Trotsky’s unfettered leftist policies. He assailed Trotsky due to his policies, not the man. If power 
had been all that was important, Kamenev would have taken the opportunity to support Bukharin 
and Zinoviev, but he had not. 
Kamenev clearly underestimated Stalin and mistakenly thought him as simply a ‘firing 
pin’ of policy, incapable of establishing his own path.
609
 Stalin was to Kamenev, ‘just a small 
town politician’.
610
 With this logic Kamenev turned a blind eye to Stalin’s secretarial bullying as 
he felt Stalin’s support of his position would hold party unity against Trotsky’s leftist party 
unbalancing. In January 1924 at a party meeting in Moscow where Kamenev was chair, Sapronov 
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clearly demonstrated that secretarial ‘recommendations’ to regional and local party posts were 
becoming dictated appointments and that those appointed secretaries settled ‘squabbles’ by 
denying those in opposition the possibility to speak and would break up dissention by reassigning 
them outside their own Guberniia.
611
 Earlier when Sapronov had directly confronted Kamenev 
about secretarial abuse in Tula on 6 December 1923, Kamenev had denied any knowledge of 
it.
612
 He claimed he was more concerned with the tumultuous summer strikes than the 
‘independence of the Secretariat.’
613
 Trotsky was pressing his attack on the leadership and if 
Kamenev moved against Stalin then the party left could take advantage. Kamenev decided that 
Trotsky was the greater of the two emerging dangers to the party. 
In fact, Kamenev was so worried about the party destabilising in their dispute with 
Trotsky that at the 23-31 May 1924 XIII Party Conference, he again, together with Zinoviev 
saved Stalin’s position. In Lenin’s purported dictation ‘Letter to the Congress’ before his death, 
out of concern for Stalin’s abuse of power the party leader had called for the removal of Stalin 
from his post as General Secretary. Kamenev and Zinoviev could have changed the history of the 
Soviet Union and pushed to remove him, but instead, out of fear of the party dividing they 
protected him. 
The real turning point in their relations was when Stalin proclaimed that the Soviet Union 
could build ‘socialism in one country’. It was true that Stalin said that the ‘final victory’ of 
socialism was not possible without international revolution, but Stalin’s idea of ‘final victory’ 
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was only necessary as a guarantee ‘against intervention and... also against restoration…’.
614
 The 
existence of complete socialism in one country was thus dependent only on international 
revolution to prevent a capitalist assault. The reason it opened a rift between Kamenev and Stalin 
was because this challenged the current NEP course which sought to accrue capital and import, 
rather than develop domestically, industrial equipment. Stalin failed to answer how the country 
could develop ‘socialism in one country’ when it was so dependent on international trade. 
Historians, such as E.H. Carr and Stephen Kotkin, have misunderstood Kamenev as an 
initial supporter of ‘socialism in one country’. Kamenev at the X Party Congress in early 1920 
stated clearly that socialism in one country was impossible.
615
 However, in ‘Leninism or 
Trotskyism’ Kamenev stated that Trotsky’s theory of ‘permanent revolution’ defied Bolshevism 
because it rendered the country ‘absolutely dependent upon the immediate revolution of the 
West’, and here Carr and Kotkin contend that with such a statement Kamenev was endorsing 
‘socialism in one country’.
616
 A close reading of the text reveals that Kamenev’s point was to 
show how Trotsky and the Bolsheviks differed over the role of the peasantry. In Trotsky’s view, 
the peasantry was revolutionary inert as they were inherently petty-bourgeois. From Kamenev’s 
perspective, and mainstream Bolsheviks, they could be allies. Kamenev was therefore justifying 
NEP cooperation with the peasantry, not advocating socialism in isolation. He even alluded to 
War Communism by stating that if the party had accepted the theory of ‘permanent revolution’ 
and found itself without proletarian help from the West, in this scenario the peasantry would be 
an internal enemy and to build a proletarian state the Soviet Union would have to overcome ‘the 
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economic backwardness of the country by force, with the aid of military commands.’
617
 Kamenev 
was pointing out that NEP disproved Trotsky’s theory because the Soviet government was able to 
move on the path to socialism together with the peasantry beyond War Communism, despite the 
absence of international revolution. He made no claim that the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ 
was achievable solely in Russia. 
Erik Van Ree is also in error in calling Kamenev’s position as one advocating ‘incomplete 
socialism’ in one country, meaning that Kamenev saw ‘socialism in one country’ as a path for 
which to strive.
618
 Van Ree argues that the party leaders had formed a consensus believing that 
by capturing the state apparatus, taking control of industry, and by ending the privatisation of 
land, they had in fact created a proletarian state. This was not Kamenev’s position. To him the 
country was stuck in a ‘dictatorship of the party’. The country had not yet even reached the 
beginning of socialism.  
Therefore, the only way to understand Kamenev’s difficulties with Stalin is by 
understanding the ideological reasons. There were numerous times Kamenev could have moved 
against the future dictator, but had avoided doing so because he felt Stalin was manageable as 
long as he was in ideological agreement. Kamenev’s disdain for Stalin’s ‘socialism in one 
country’ was sincere. In fact, the discussion over theoretical principle became so heated between 
Kamenev, Zinoviev, and Stalin that G.K. Orzhanikidze wrote to K.E. Voroshilov on 12 March 
that ‘that both sides are prepared for mutual annihilation’.
619
 Paul Gregory has shown that when 
Kamenev chaired Politburo meetings under the ‘troika’ leadership, meetings were rather 
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‘congenial’. Kamenev balanced debate, questioning, and oral presentations before everyone came 
to a decision.
620




Stalin, however, would not have his theory challenged and resolved to shake the two 
loose. He therefore was the first to break ranks from the ‘troika’. At a meeting discussing the 
results of the XIII Party Congress to party secretaries on 17 June 1924, Stalin slammed Zinoviev 
for his statement that within Soviet Russia existed a ‘dictatorship of the party’ over a 
‘dictatorship of the proletariat’. As noted in the previous chapter, this view originated from 
Kamenev. Zinoviev was simply repeating a concept Kamenev had formulated more than a whole 
year before any disagreements with Stalin had begun. It was not concocted to discredit Stalin. 
Stalin was therefore trying to distance himself from the extremely unpopular notion that the 
country was in fact not a proletarian state. Stalin, not Kamenev and Zinoviev, deliberately tried to 
make their disagreement public when in the press Stalin said that Kamenev had called Russia a 
country of ‘Nepmen’, rather than a ‘NEP Russia’, showing Kamenev’s ‘usual disregard for 
questions of theory’.
622
 Stalin’s baiting Kamenev was obvious, and Kamenev successfully parried 
his attack by writing to the editor of Pravda on 1 July, explaining that the quote about a country 
of ‘Nepmen’ had been a misprinted quote of Lenin, impossible to be Kamenev’s opinion as they 
were meant to be Lenin’s exact words.
623
 Stalin broke from Kamenev and Zinoviev, not the other 
way round, and thus Robert McNeal is wrong to argue that Stalin had no idea his ‘socialism in 
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one country’ would cause discord with Kamenev and Zinoviev.
624
 Stalin knew precisely that by 
arguing for ‘socialism in one country’ he was challenging Kamenev and Zinoviev’s 
understanding of NEP and the international worker’s movement. Fearful of a prolonged peace 
among Western powers, Kotkin is right to contend that Stalin was developing a policy in 
accordance with the international situation,
625
 but Stalin could have chosen to continue NEP’s 
‘state capitalism’ policy and simply ‘waited’ for revolution abroad to proceed to socialism on a 
secure industrial base. That was what Kamenev and Zinoviev were prepared to do, and that was 
the current NEP course until Stalin proffered his ‘socialism in one country’, promising near 
utopian feats in a country dependent on the world market. 
Kamenev, Bukharin, and ‘State Capitalism’ 
The improvement in both agriculture and industry throughout 1924 and early 1925 
provoked an unchecked optimism for NEP in Bukharin. As opposed to Preobrazhensky who 
wanted to exploit the peasantry to fund industrialisation, Bukharin advocated expanding NEP by 
relaxing the administrative barriers which kept peasants and traders from accruing capital. The 
increased revenue of the peasantry, combined with the income from capitalist traders, the so-
called NEPmen, would fuel the nation’s industrial drive by hinging success on consumer 
consumption. Stephen Cohen has championed Bukharin’s model as the evolutionary alternative 
to Stalin’s later break-neck speed industrialisation and forced collectivisation campaigns as it 
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sought to develop both the economy and the social relations between the peasantry and the 
working class in equilibrium.
626
  
 Cohen’s account completely ignores the fact that Kamenev and Sokol’nikov were already 
steering a centrist path of moderation on their ‘state capitalism’ model which developed the 
country through taxation and finance reforms. The economy was improving before Bukharin took 
command alongside Stalin. R.W. Davies has indicated that for 1924-1925, the nation’s economic 
growth was outpacing the party’s expectations.
627
 By the end of 1925, workers’ wages had nearly 
reached pre-war levels,
628
 and industry and agriculture were collectively at 91% of pre-war 
levels.
629
 The country had a positive trade balance, had successfully moved from a tax-in-kind to 
a monetary tax on the peasantry, and Sokol’nikov’s currency reform had become so successful 
that the chernovetz traded internationally.
630
 NEP did not need Bukharin’s ideas to be successful. 
Bukharin’s growing influence owed much more to politics than to his economic ideas. 
There were two main reasons for Bukharin’s ascendency over Kamenev. First, Kamenev’s 
reputation had become irrevocably soiled over Zinoviev and his failed attempt to expel Trotsky 
from the Politburo in January 1925. The party blamed them for disrupting party unity,
631
 and 
some, such as the students at Sverdlov University, even called for the two to be arrested.
632
 
Kamenev’s entire history of conciliation was forgotten. Even though Stalin questioned many of 
Bukharin’s views, when Kamenev and Zinoviev began to press him on his ‘socialism in one 
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country’ the General Secretary truly acted as the ‘firing pin’ of Bukharin’s policies and steered 
the party away from Kamenev and Sokol’nikov’s economic views. Simultaneously, as the editor 
of Pravda, Bukharin trumpeted his own policies in the press. As Rykov and Tomskii were 
followers of Bukharin, the Politburo majority outnumbered Kamenev and Zinoviev 4 to 2, with 
Trotsky abstaining. Had Stalin not divorced himself from the ‘troika’, there would have been a 3 
to 3 balance, with Trotsky a deciding vote. Needless to say, with Stalin backing Bukharin, the 25 
April 1925 XIV Party Conference optimistically accepted Bukharin’s policies. It was out of a 
power struggle and not failed economic policies that Bukharin came to prominence.  
Why did Kamenev not embrace Bukharin’s plan to expand NEP? The problem rested in 
what Kamenev considered Bukharin’s oversimplification of the peasant question. Bukharin 
maintained that the middle peasantry dominated the village landscape and that the party need not 
overly concern itself with the poor peasant or rich kulak.
633
 He even contended that the middle-
peasant was not bourgeois.
634
 Neglecting class differentiation invoked a fear in Kamenev that 
such a kulak-enabling policy would prove divisive and push the middle and poor peasantry away 
from the government. 
Kamenev was certainly not wrong. Alan Ball has shown that the moment Bukharin’s 
policies came into effect NEPmen were invigorated in Moscow by Bukharin’s tax reducing 
policies and leniency.
635
 Bukharin’s policies meant an expansion of capitalist elements, plain and 
simple. Arguing that economic development needed to occur in equilibrium never sufficiently 
answered the question as to how increasing the wealth of well-to-do peasants and NEPmen was 
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going to win the peasantry over to socialism. It was a divisive policy. Bukharin’s choice to ignore 
the goods famine as endemic to the Soviet system meant he was unconcerned with the fact that 
consumer consumption far outstripped industrial capacity. Raising peasant income was only 
going to exacerbate difficulties. His left critics were rightly worried that their vision for a planned 
economy would slip away.  
What is absolutely crucial to understand was that Bukharin sought to overcome these 
contradictions by asserting that they were living under the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’. In this 
view the state could afford peasants and NEPmen to grow because in the future the same state 
would ‘turn the rudder’ and direct the capitalist gains down a socialist path.
636
 As Kamenev 
considered the country to be under the ‘dictatorship of the party’ and not the proletariat, he feared 
that the means Bukharin was employing would never lead to socialist ends. Once down a 
capitalist path with little restraint, the non-proletarian ship of state would set a course to the 
restoration of capitalism. Kamenev was so committed to finding a way to peacefully co-opt the 




The left opposition had fought Kamenev at a time of economic hardship during the 
‘scissor’s crisis’ and after a devastating famine. It says a lot that in a time of growth Bukharin’s 
platform provoked the party left far more than Kamenev’s policies ever did. This was in part due 
to Bukharin’s comments in April’s Bolshevik where he urged peasants, ‘enrich yourselves, 
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 This threw caution to the wind with a lopsided policy favourable to the 
peasantry and the NEPmen at the expense of the proletariat. Kamenev’s fiscal policy to tax 
NEPmen and kulaks at high rates to fund the state was being undone, and a flourishing of private 
traders jarred working class sensibilities. 
Bukharin also shocked the left by revising Communist agrarian principles. He proclaimed 
that cooperatives, not collective farming, would develop socialism.
639
 This flew in the face of 
pre-revolution Bolshevik policy that the state would gradually consolidate cooperatives into 
collective farms.
640
 An article in Zarya Vostok 16 July illustrated leftist frustration when the 
author complained that the party was ‘obsessed with “practical” matters’ to the detriment of 
‘revolutionary idealism’.
641
 At the 23-25 July CC plenum of the Communist Party of Ukraine, 
G.I. Petrovskii warned that the communist organizations in the countryside were too ‘weak’ to 
cope with ‘these NEP tendencies’. 
Kamenev’s centrist NEP was vastly different than Bukharin’s rightist NEP due to their 
interpretation of Lenin and what ‘state capitalism’ actually meant. Kamenev relied on the Lenin 
of 1918 and 1921, whereas Bukharin found support from Lenin’s 1923 article ‘On cooperatives’. 
In 1918 Lenin had written that ‘state-capitalism’ was a transitional stage to socialism,
642
 and in 
1921 at the introduction of NEP he iterated that the state had formed ‘...a bloc, a union of the 
Soviet, i.e., proletarian, state power with state capitalism against the small-proprietor (patriarchal 
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 This provided Kamenev with the framework that by heavily 
taxing the prosperous of society they would gradually root out the petty-bourgeoisie, NEPmen, 
and kulaks on a policy dictated by finance. However, in Lenin’s mind these elements would not 
simply disappear. Lenin argued that state power and ‘state capitalism’ would channel them 
through cooperatives to transform their small individual enterprises into larger associations 
capable of increased production. Once large enough, the state would take over. 
Bukharin railed against this interpretation. He maintained in an issue of Bolshevik that in 
1921 Lenin had called for concessions via ‘state capitalism’ to form a bloc with capitalists in 
order to overcome the petty-bourgeoisie. Then in ‘on cooperatives’ in 1923 Bukharin insisted that 
Lenin shifted his position in support of a union with the peasantry through cooperatives to 
remove the remnants of private capital in general, both small and large.
644
 ‘State capitalism’ in 
this scenario was simply a maneuver, a phrase for concession policy, and that in 1923 Lenin was 
calling for an alliance with the peasantry different from 1921. 
Bukharin was mistaken. In both of Lenin’s 1921 and 1923 articles he advocated an 
alliance with the peasantry, with his latter article complementing the former. Lenin was not 
advocating a change in NEP, he was reiterating his position on advancing the cooperatives as a 
means to change peasant attitudes and ‘culture’. Lenin declared that a ‘practical goal’ of NEP 
was concessions, but he was speaking about the introduction of NEP as a ‘pure type’ of ‘state 
capitalism’. Later he argued that a new ‘state capitalism’ of a more socialist type would raise the 
cultural level of the peasantry. How it would function was unclear, but this indicates that Lenin 
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saw ‘state capitalism’ as a means of progressing towards socialism and not simply a manoeuvre, 
and this confutes Bukharin’s views on Lenin’s final words. There was nothing in Lenin’s article 
calling for a new course.
645
 
Again, Kamenev’s position derived from his understanding of the state. By the XIV Party 
Congress the so-called ‘platform of the four’, Kamenev, Zinoviev, Krupskaya, and Sokol’nikov 
challenged Bukharin on his revision of Lenin’s ideas. One of their main points was that ‘state 
capitalism’ was in fact capitalistic and not socialist. At an STO meeting on 7 July 1925 
Sokol’nikov explained that the nationalization of industry had been done to increase the funds of 
the state treasury, nothing more.
646
 Not even state ownership of industry was considered a 
socialist directive to the four and this provoked the Bukharin group. Similar to Lenin, Bukharin 
simply wrote off exploitive capitalist wage relations that the state employed. Bukharin thought, 
rather simplistically, that ‘there cannot be capitalism without capitalists’.
647
 
When Bukharin declared that the Soviet Union had ‘socialist state industry’ and was not 
‘state capitalist’, it conveyed how much Bukharin and the leadership had departed from Marx. 
The four accurately responded to Bukharin that if it was socialist then it was ‘a disservice to the 
cause of genuine socialist construction.’
648
 To a reproachful audience at the XIV Party Congress 
Sokol’nikov and Kamenev persisted in illuminating the leadership’s flagrant ideological error by 
stating that the only thing socialist about industry in theory was that it was owned by the state. 
The proletariat ‘works for socialism,’ Kamenev said, but to the idea that the party should tell 
them they were working in ‘socialist conditions’ and that factories were ‘socialist in the complete 
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sense of the word, it will not be the truth, but an embellishment of the truth.’
649
 Nevertheless, due 
to Kamenev’s remarkable ‘Bolshevik Centrism’, he searched for compromise, proposing the 
congress not call their stage of development ‘state-capitalist’ or ‘socialist’, but a ‘transition’ 
period.
650
 The congress was deaf to his proposal because there were few who wanted to be told 
that they were still laying socialism’s foundation. Further, if the congress had accepted the four’s 
definition of ‘state capitalism’, the party would have had to backpedal on Bukharin’s policies of 
deepening NEP.  
Instead, the party pushed forward with Bukharin’s revisionist ideas away from a 
‘dictatorship of finance’ to expanding NEP in the countryside. By understanding Bukharin’s view 
of the state it is possible to understand why he thought his course would maintain social and 
economic equilibrium and that in the future they could ‘turn the rudder’, but Kamenev was right, 
they did not have a proletarian state by Marxist or Lassallean definition. Bukharin’s misguided 
policies were tipping the balance of social relations in favour of the peasantry and towards 
capitalism. 
 ‘Slow Down Comrades!’ – Kamenev and the Left 





 and others that Kamenev and the four were 
adopting a leftist line must be challenged. Firstly, the four’s defence of an economic model which 
had the purpose of accumulating wealth for the state in a system they themselves believed was 
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capitalistic in no way accommodated the left’s desire for economic planning, rapid 
industrialization, or a focus on the working class at the peasant’s expense. Furthermore, 
Sokol’nikov, whose ideas on which the ‘platform of the four’ was founded, advocated investment 
in agriculture to spur industrial development, not the other way round.
653
 Zinoviev parroted 
Sokol’nikov, advocating that the proceeds from agriculture and agricultural exports should be 
used to import more advanced industrial equipment. The Soviet Union was too industrially 
backwards to rely on its own industry.
654
 
 However, to evaluate directly the charge of Kamenev’s leftism, it is best to examine his 
actions in what was his primary occupation, economic forecasting in STO. In STO in December 
1923, a time all historians are agreed that Kamenev was certainly not considered to be advocating 
a leftist line, Kamenev complained that trusts were indiscriminately and recklessly seeking to 
plan on the greatest means for the best possible results, a typical leftist maximalist approach. 
Kamenev fought against this ‘monopoly psychology’.
655
 For example, when a representative 
from Baku approached Sovnarkom for a 70 million ruble loan, Kamenev refused him because the 
Baku official had promised to boost oil production six-fold, a total impossibility.
656
 As will be 
shown, Kamenev never strayed from resisting this leftist impulse and advocated industrialization 
at a moderate pace. 
A superficial reading of events within STO might suggest that Kamenev backed highly 
unrealistic industrial targets. With an excellent grain harvest in 1925 it was assumed that the year 
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would yield very profitable exports for much needed industrial imports, and Gosplan (which was 
under STO authority) optimistically forecasted a potential procurement of 780 million puds in 
order to project higher industrial targets.
657
 However, by October government grain procurement 
had reached only 80-85% of its goal. The state had initially paid for grain at a higher rate than its 
world market value and when financially overextended procurement agencies reduced prices the 
peasants refused to sell.
658
 The hope to export 380 million puds was now impossible and 
industrial investment would have to be curtailed. Kamenev was not to blame for the high grain 
targets in June and July because he had been on holiday.
659
  
At the 10 October CC meeting and in the Politburo on 26 October Pyatikov (a staunch 
leftist) and Rykov proclaimed the situation a ‘crisis’. Kamenev tried to reassure his peers that 
there was no need to panic and that industrial development would simply need to ‘slow down’. 
Of course this phrase did nothing to temper Dzerzhinsky who adamantly endorsed greater 
industrial production as the head of the Supreme Council of the National Economy, Vesenkha. 
Understanding economics far better, Kamenev tried to explain that ‘the peasantry is withholding 
grain and forcing us not to go forward as quickly as we had planned, but we are going forward, 
not backward, and we won’t stand still, and as such there is no crisis.’
660
 Kamenev backed 
Sokol’nikov in making extensive financial cuts to the loan swamped industrial sector in order to 
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keep inflation in check.
661
 They correctly saw that an escalation of loans and inflation would 
damper industrial output, but Dzerzhinsky was so riled he called Sokol’nikov’s financial 
proposals ‘anti-soviet’.
662
 Kamenev agreed with Dzerzhinsky on the principle that investment in 
industry and increased industrial production were essential for building socialism, but added: 
‘How can we conduct the kind of policy Witte discussed: we ourselves cannot eat, but we 
export?’
663
 Maintaining peasant trust to the state was critical, and Kamenev concluded that if the 
peasantry ‘does not want to go in the straight line that we prescribed and zigzags, then we will 
also zigzag and manoeuvre correctly.’
664
 Kamenev remained a Sokol’nikov supporter, believing 
that investment in agriculture would provide greater dividends than funnelling money into 
industrialization for economic growth. He was therefore not supporting leftist maximalist causes.  
The ‘platform of the four’ was not directed at opportunistically adopting leftist 
programmes solely for political advantage. This is confirmed by the way in which the four 
organised their opposition. The resolution adopted by the XII Leningrad Party Conference, under 
the influence of Zinoviev, specifically stated that there was no possible alliance with either 
Trotsky or the Workers’ Opposition. If the Workers’ Opposition wanted to challenge the 
leadership they would have to abandon their platform and unite with the Leningraders.
665
 This 
did not occur because the ‘platform of the four’ contained no pure leftist policies. The four’s 
position was that it was a middle road and they certainly encouraged left support, but seeing 
‘state capitalism’ as the platform’s model, it failed to bring the Workers’ Opposition to their 
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banner. The only thing truly leftist about their platform was their warning of NEP excesses, and 
this of course won over some workers, but this opened them up for unwarranted charges of 
leftism and pseudo-Trotskyism from their opponents without the benefit of leftist aid. 
A Lassallean Centrist NEP Alternative 
Searching for the middle path, Kamenev tried to unite the party left and right with a 
Lassallean inspired idea to both reduce the influence of the peasantry in the party and curtail left 
party idealism, and if successful, the result of his proposal would tackle that long-enduring 
problem Russia faced in failing to organically connect state government with its apprehensive 
populace. In the existing record Kamenev did not explicitly cite Lassalle, but that does not rule 
him out as the source of his inspiration. Indeed, as will be shown, his plan bore a striking 
similarity to Lassalle’s 1862 proposal of developing working class culture through ‘individual 
association’. At the XIV Party Congress, Krupskaya specifically mentioned Lassalle in 
explaining the ‘platform of the four’s’ desire to raise working class culture.
666
 It is also important 
to note that Kamenev did not need to openly refer to Lassalle, as the audience to whom he was 
speaking understood the connection. Bukharin, for example, was not at a loss later in 1926 to 
explicitly invoke Lassalle’s name to attack Kamenev’s views despite Kamenev not having made 
a specific reference to the founder of Social-Democracy.
667
 
Kamenev believed that the party’s aim should be to implement policy that would lead the 
peasantry to view the government as their own. From the beginning of 1924 to the end of 1925, 
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700,000 new workers entered Soviet industry from the countryside.
668
 With their continued 
penetration into the working class Kamenev proposed on 4 September 1925 in the Moscow 
Committee that the one way to bring the peasantry into the fold was through profit sharing. He 
maintained that peasant-cum-workers saw themselves as no more than ‘hired labour’, 
disconnected from the state. As workers’ wages were nearing pre-war levels, Kamenev seized the 
initiative to try and change wage relations and advance proletarian culture. 
Unlike his factory provisions policy of 1921 which focused only on collective gains, 
Kamenev proposed that the new workers’ psychology required that profits from factories be 
doled out not only on a collective basis, but on an individual one.
669
 He elaborated that if a 
factory yielded a profitable return of 1,000 rubles, 500-700 rubles would go to the worker, and 
the remainder would be kept collectively by the factory to improve working conditions and 
develop housing. Thus the workers would bond collectively while simultaneously forging 
individual loyalty to the state.
670
 
At first glance his plan appears a compromise with capitalist individualism, but in fact it 
was quite the opposite as the inspiration for his idea emanated from the socialist path espoused by 
Lassalle in 1862, who at that time maintained that ‘individual association’ was the key to uniting 
a working class mired in local collective association. Lassalle contended that organising workers 
by factory served to only marginally benefit small industry worker societies with no all-
encompassing class gains.
671
 In similar fashion and at length as head of STO and against the left, 
Kamenev had struggled with industries operating for their own profits at the expense of the 
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collective. Profit sharing on an individual level would not only forge a relationship between the 
state and the petty-bourgeois peasant, it would erode the spirit of left-wing syndicalism by 
making it so that workers would believe that they were ‘not only a member of the party’ or ‘a 
citizen, but would feel that they were an element of production’, part of a global whole.
672
 
Associations based at the factory level would diminish in exchange for a working class culture 
where by means of individual gains solidarity between workers from all sectors of the economy 
would emerge tempered through a patron state, making the state itself the vehicle for working 
class unity, not workers’ groups themselves. As Lassalle had hoped in 1860s Germany to defeat 
the ideas of Schultze Delitzsch, and no doubt as Kamenev had hoped to overcome the left, profit 
sharing on an individual level had the potential to change the psychology of left-minded workers 
to such a degree that they would voluntarily labour in common interest through a state 
benefactor.  
Lassalle argued that under capitalism workers understood that they were linked globally 
in production, but were unable to grasp that if they were part of the same tree of production they 
should reap its rewards equally.
673
 Kamenev’s profit sharing scheme was to finally resolve what 
Lassalle believed essential, to raise the psychology of the proletariat to end chaos in distribution. 
With workers tied to the state through positive incentives the Communist worry of being an 
isolated proletarian government surrounded by a sea of petty-bourgeois peasants would gradually 
recede as Kamenev’s policy would merge both worker left and peasant right. Unlike Bukharin’s 
policy which ignored class differentiation in favour of unfettered peasant consumerism to fuel 
industrialisation, in the footsteps of Lassalle Kamenev saw the state as the necessary vehicle for 
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social transformation and socialist development. This reasoning explains Kamenev’s aversion to 
worker control and anarcho-syndicalist tendencies because those ideas disrupt national 
community. The state was to serve as a great equalizer through ‘solidarity’.
674
 
The assertion that Kamenev in 1924-1925 was moving to the party left is simply untrue. 
Trotsky and Preobrazhensky’s ‘primitive socialist accumulation’ had nothing in common with his 
position. Kamenev was neither advocating radically increased industrialisation or to exploit the 
peasantry as a colony to fund industrial development. Peasants could be co-opted into supporting 
the state and through taxation on the most affluent in society the state could gradually accumulate 
capital. It was definitely not a leftist platform. It was a centrist policy, an extension of the NEP he 
and Sokol’nikov had championed prior to 1925. However, his idea meant that both Bukharin’s 
group and the left had to compromise, but neither side budged. On 6 November Stalin led the CC 
and Politburo to ultimately reject the proposal.
675
  
The idea that individual profit sharing could further a socialist psychology was lost on 
Kamenev’s peers due to their notion that the Soviet Union was in fact an already established 
proletarian state. For example, N.A. Uglanov and L.M. Kaganovich could not see past the fact 
that there would be some degree of inequality between workers.
676
 The two completely missed 
the point that Kamenev’s objective was to first connect the worker to the state with the purpose 
of settling inequality later. V.I. Polonskii argued that the policy would have split the working 
class because state controlled industries had no profits to share with the workers they 
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 Polonskii had no problem funneling industrial proceeds into state coffers because 
despite employing capitalist wage relations, funding the ‘proletarian’ state was not exploiting the 
working class. Molotov stated quite plainly that the government could not bring workers closer 
because they were already building socialism together in unison.
678
 With Kamenev’s minority 
view that the state was a ‘dictatorship of the party’, he was the only one among the leadership 
searching for a way to bridge the divide between the state and workers and to unite the party left 
and right with a programme to both economically improve the lot of workers and peasants. 
Thus Kamenev was not aligned with Stalin on ‘socialism in one country’, with Bukharin’s 
NEP reforms, or with the party left. His centrist policy maintained its internationalist 
commitment and favoured moderate industrial growth by means of economically and culturally 
uplifting the peasantry and the working class through new wage relations. Yet, inheriting Lenin’s 
monologism, the maximalist left and the revisionist right rejected the compromise and led the 
party and state into a ‘crisis of centrism’. 
Kamenev and STO against Stalin 
There were three main obstacles to Kamenev overcoming his opponents. The first was his 
credibility. His near pristine reputation for toleration had become irrevocably soiled over 
Zinoviev and his failed attempt to expel Trotsky from the Politburo in January 1925. By the end 
of February both the CC and CCC of the Ukrainian Communist Party had written a letter to the 
CC blaming Kamenev and Zinoviev for disrupting party unity.
679
 The second reason was that of 
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the 400,000 party members in early 1924, a staggering 80% had entered after the February 
revolution.
680
 The rank and file had little to no knowledge of Kamenev’s pre-revolutionary 
primacy in the party, and thanks to Trotsky, what they did know was that he had opposed the 
October Revolution.
681
 The last, but certainly not the least obstructive to his ability to lead was 
Stalin’s Secretariat which controlled party personnel, cell discussion, and was predominantly 
loyal to its General Secretary. Once Stalin had successfully replaced Kamenev’s most trusted and 
influential secretary, I.A. Zelenskii, with the Bukharin loyal N.A. Uglanov, Kamenev’s relaxed 
hold over the MPO fell like dominoes to his dictatorial presence.
682
  
Unlike Zinoviev, Stalin, and Bukharin, Kamenev had very little means at his disposal. 
Kamenev’s influence in the MPO had been waning for some time as he was preoccupied with the 
running of STO, Sovnarkom, and chairing the Politburo. He was not a micro manager and did not 
hold tight control over his organisations as Stalin and Zinoviev did. He was more democratic, and 
although he had a small following and supporters from those from within MPO as well as from 
without, such as G. Ya. Belen’kii, Ryazanov, Zelenskii, and Yu.V. Lomonosov,
683
 none of them 
were schemers, vindictive, or uncompromising, and in the case of Ryazanov and Lomonosov, the 
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two had fallen out with the party leadership after years of disagreement.
684
 There were also those 
who favoured Kamenev’s position, but were unwilling to support his platform. The head of the 
Commissariat of Agriculture (NKZem) V.M. Smirnov, Gosplan’s head Tsyurupa, and head of the 
Commissariat of Foreign Trade Krasin all had similar views on the economic course proffered by 
Sokol’nikov, but past disputes with Kamenev left them silent in the controversy.
685
 Dzerzhinsky, 
who had long worked with Kamenev in STO, was initially sympathetic as well, but more an 
ideologue industrialiser than an economist, he quickly deserted Kamenev over his ‘slow down’ 
policy and subsequently remained one of Kamenev’s most vehement critics until his sudden 
death in 1926. 
Thus, what remained at Kamenev’s disposal was his STO post and his long-time ally and 
friend, Zinoviev, whose stern and tight control brought with him the Leningrad Party 
Organisation and Leningrad workers to their cause. The two had been able to influence 
Krupskaya, who personally disdained Bukharin’s policies and was eager to preserve party unity. 
She was convinced Kamenev and Zinoviev’s path was the middle course. Together they joined 
Sokol’nikov, whose practical economic ideas were the basis for Kamenev’s theoretical 
orientation. 
Kamenev and Sokol’nikov tried to warn the Stalin-Bukharin majority of Bukharin’s 
divisive policies by challenging the majority where they were weakest, in economics. Using the 
28 July statistics provided by the Central Statistical Administration (TsSU) headed by P.I. Popov 
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in his 28 August Pravda article ‘Our Achievements, Difficulties, and Prospects’, Kamenev 
illustrated that 4% of peasant households produced 30% of the USSR’s grain with 14% holding 
61% of it.
686
 At the CC meeting 8 October he emphasized that those same households purchased 
19.3% of the country’s industrial goods.
687
 Thus, even though the middle and poor peasant were 
still consuming the bulk of industrial production, the top 4% had increased consumption by 140% 
from the previous year. The middle and poor peasant had increased their consumption by 50% 
and 20% respectively. What Kamenev and Sokol’nikov economically spelled out was that an 
expansion of NEP into the village was a disastrous kulak enabling policy, bound to instigate class 
conflict. According to Kamenev and Sokol’nikov’s predictions, 40% of the peasant population 
would have to buy grain the coming year. 
The demise of Kamenev’s position came not from his views being defeated in party 
debate as Trotsky’s had been within the MPO, but from Stalin’s shrewdly crafted subterfuge. At 
first Stalin denied Kamenev a role in determining the Politburo’s agenda, but that was not enough 
because as head of STO Kamenev dominated Politburo discussions.
688
 Then, as R.W. Davies has 
shown, together with Rykov Stalin soon after backed data manipulated by Rabkrin to refute 
Popov’s findings.
689
 This had been relatively easy for them to accomplish as Kuibyshev, a Stalin 
loyalist, was head of Rabkrin-CCC. It was also a surprising move because Rabkrin was now 
acting as a statistical bureau and an economic organ rather than its original design to act as an 
oversight committee. The underhanded attack on Kamenev continued, as Pravda under 
Bukharin’s leadership denounced Popov and the TsSU and denied him any rebuttal, something 
                                                          
686
 RGASPI 323/2/97/59. 
687
 RGASPI 17/2/197/66. 
688
 Bazhanov, p. 140. 
689
 R.W. Davies, ‘Grain, Class, and Politics’, in The Lost Politburo Transcripts, eds., Paul R. Gregory and Norman 
Naimark, Yale University Press: New Haven, 2008, p. 196-197. 
217 
 
Trotsky had been allowed.
690
 Stalin then attacked TsSU for its lack of ‘objectivity’ in collecting 
data, an absolutely absurd position. As Davies points out, denying statistical agencies the right to 
draw social conclusions showed Stalin’s feebleness in understanding the purpose and complexity 
of statistical gathering.
691
 With Rykov and Kuibyshev backing Stalin from Sovnarkom and 
Rabkrin, the Politburo removed Popov from his post. Only Kamenev voted to save him. 
Here again the uncompromising Stalin appeared. As Stalin had dealt with Trotsky by 
limiting his authority exclusively to the Politburo where he would perpetually be outnumbered, 
he wanted Kamenev’s rival authority ended permanently. In routine measure on 28 October STO 
decreed that NKVTorg, the Commissariat of Foreign Trade (NKVneshtorg), and the TsSU 
recalculate the size of the overall grain harvest and its cash crops and use those figures to draw up 
new plans for the grain collection campaign and grain export. When Kamenev appeared at the 2 
November Politburo meeting with figures, he was surprisingly charged by the General Secretary, 
the chair of Sovnarkom, and the head of the CCC with overstepping STO’s authority. Stalin, 
Rykov, and Kuibyshev maintained that with the Politburo soon set to discuss the ‘import-export-
currency’ plans, STO had pre-empted Politburo directives and placed it in ‘a silly position’.
692
 
This, however, had hitherto been common practice. Kamenev planned STO meetings months in 
advance to ensure the attendance of representatives from the localities and its meetings had never 
before needed Politburo approval to proceed. Furthermore, members of the CC attended STO 
meetings and so did commissariat representatives, providing ample opportunity for input. To 
overcome Kamenev, Stalin fundamentally changed the function of state and party when he 
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insisted the Politburo must act ‘not parallel with STO, but through STO’. This was a complete 




Kamenev saw all too clearly what was happening. Kuibyshev on 15 October proposed a 
Politburo commission together with Rykov, Kamenev, Sokol’nikov, and Stalin to eliminate STO 
altogether and pass its responsibilities to Sovnarkom. This would have enabled Rykov to direct 
the economy instead of Kamenev. Though Stalin denied Kamenev’s accusation that he and 
Kuibyshev were working in tandem to deliberately undermine him as ‘funny’, there was most 
certainly intriguing afoot. Kamenev declared: 
‘It’s absolutely a political step and my reaction can only be one way. I must 
request that the chair of STO be purged… It will not shake the central foundation 
of the republic… Comrade Lenin placed me at this post, and if you want to play a 
petty game around it, do it, only without me.’
694
  
Kamenev was right; nearly two months later Ya. E. Rudzutak admitted the maneuver, explaining 
that ‘several members’ of the Politburo had demanded a special conference to consider economic 
questions in an effort to force direct Politburo participation in economic decisions.
695
 The ‘special 
conference’ had enabled Stalin and Kuibyshev to enter STO and begin to outvote Kamenev. 
Although Tomskii prevented the Politburo from accepting Kamenev’s resignation and 
Dzerzhinsky questioned the move to tarnish STO, the vote to change STO’s decision from a 
decree to a preliminary report for Politburo consideration was accepted 3 to 2. Bukharin and 
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Rykov had sided with Stalin against Zinoviev’s proposal, which had excluded any mention of it 
being preliminary.  
Stalin, Rykov, Bukharin, and Kuibyshev thus ensured STO’s dependence on the leading 
party organ, forever changing the working dynamic of the Soviet system by aggrandizing the 
Politburo’s power. Not only was Kamenev’s leading role in the economy at an end and his sphere 
of influence gone, but his attempted assault upon Stalin had ended with the Politburo now having 
the power to arbitrarily control the day-to-day operations of state institutions, something under 
Lenin’s leadership had been outside Politburo purview. Lenin’s intention for Kamenev to direct 
the state and Stalin the party had not been simply semantic, but Kamenev’s drive to have the 
party act as an oversight committee for economic organs had resulted in his own political demise 
by empowering Stalin’s party machine. Although he could not have possibly envisioned that a 
Stalin controlled Rabkrin-CCC would doctor statistics to challenge his authority, he had been 
terribly naïve to think that Rabkrin would have remained above party infighting. 
Even with Stalin’s scheming and Kamenev’s misguided efforts to embed the CCC into 
the state apparatus, Kamenev was not adequately prepared to challenge Stalin. STO had been 
Kamenev’s political weapon against Stalin and Bukharin, but he had wielded it not as a leading 
director, but as an arbitrator. No doubt a reflection of Kamenev’s managerial leadership style, 
welcoming compromise and collective decision making, STO was often too bogged down with 
inter-commissariat disputes to provide effective leadership. Kamenev did not typically drive 
policy, but instead heard arguments, sought common ground, and then made a decision. A 
testament to his desire for collective leadership, on 8 February 1924 Dzerzhinsky had complained 





 but that was not how Kamenev ran STO. Under Lenin’s 
management STO had run with firm control and its authority had eclipsed the Politburo in 
economic matters.
697
 With Kamenev STO’s effectiveness in uniform decision making 
deteriorated in the face of collegial management.
 
 
Zinoviev was more cunning and better equipped, and he was the only reason there 
remained any hope of success. Yet at the same time he was the platform’s greatest hindrance. It 
was no secret that Zinoviev had great ambitions for leadership. In fact, due to Zinoviev’s 
reputation, Dzerzhinsky was able to blame Kamenev and Zinoviev for needlessly endangering 
the party in pursuit of power, and in a CC meeting leading up to the congress he called them 
‘Kronstadty’.
698
 Yet without Zinoviev, the platform’s numbers at the congress would have been 
far more dismal than the paltry sum they had with the Leningrad delegation. 
The XIV Party Congress and the ‘Crisis of Centrism’ 
Stalin and Bukharin led a fight against the ‘platform of the four’ which was new to how 
factions had treated each other in the past. Trotsky, for example, had been able to print his views 
in Pravda and Kamenev’s MPO had tolerated debate irrespective of the X Party Congress ban on 
factions. Now, however, no debate was allowed. Stalin repressed all those opposed to him. 
Kamenev had been so displeased with how Stalin sacked a secretary opposition supporter, S.S. 
Zakharov, that he questioned Uglanov, ‘who would open their mouths after what happened? It is 
an atmosphere of decay. I cannot support it.’
699
 When the ‘platform’ of the four had first 
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presented their views in a secret report on 19 September to the CC summarizing the year’s 
disagreements in a platform, the first act of Bukharin, Kuibyshev, Rudzudtak, Dzerzhinsky, 
Molotov, Stalin, Kalinin, Rykov, and Tomskii in the CC was to condemn it. The CC majority 
criticized Zinoviev’s book Philosophy of an Epoch as an attack on the leadership for its allusions 
to future failures, labeling it the central foundation for the new ‘faction’. The evidence against 
Kamenev was thin, but nevertheless they accused him of factionalism because he had delivered 
an economic report to the Moscow Committee on 4 September which had not fully endorsed their 
policy.
700
 Things escalated when on 4 October Kamenev, Zinoviev, Sokol’nikov and Krupskaya 
wrote a rebuttal entitled, ‘Our Answer to the Ten’, in which they refused to restrict their 
criticism. The ‘ten’ then assailed them with similar words the party had used to discredit the 
Mensheviks. Yet they were not former Mensheviks as Trotsky had been, but old Bolsheviks. 
Such an attack had not been party norm. At the XIV Moscow Guberniia Party Conference 8 
December the ‘ten’ charged the opposition with ‘defeatism’, ‘Akselrodism’, ‘pessimism’, 
‘liquidationism’, and that they were in a ‘panic before the kulak’. With Leningrad as his domain 
and no other avenue open, Zinoviev used Leningradskaya Pravda to challenge Stalin and 
Bukharin’s majority. 
For a brief moment it appeared that an open conflict at the next party congress might be 
avoided. In compromising fashion to both Stalin and Bukharin, Kamenev began emphasizing that 
they ‘were building socialism’.
701
 Even in Leningrad where the ‘Leningrad Opposition’ had their 
greatest numerical strength, the phrase ‘state capitalism’ was struck from their platform.
702
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Sensing possible rapprochement, Kalinin, Stalin, Bukharin, Rykov, Rudzutak, Tomskii, Molotov, 
and Dzerzhinsky appealed to the Leningrad organization on 15 December. They asked the 
opposition not to challenge any member of the Politburo aside from Trotsky, and in exchange 
they were prepared to accept the inclusion of some Leningraders into the Secretariat, allow one to 
join Pravda’s editorial staff, and would ‘soften’ the Moscow conference’s scathing attack on the 
‘platform of the four’.
703
 However, a deal could not be reached. There was nothing in the 
overture that showed any degree of ideological compromise concerning the peasantry, or any 
possibility for the traditional open party debate before a congress to return.
704
 The opposition had 
taken a step forward, but Stalin and Bukharin refused a middle road. Further, none of the harsh 
accusations levied at Zinoviev, Krupskaya, Sokol’nikov, and Kamenev were recanted.
705
 For all 
these reasons, they categorically rejected the proposal. 
At the 18-31 December XIV Party Congress Kamenev, Zinoviev, Sokol’nikov, and 
Krupskaya each had a role in presenting the four’s platform: Zinoviev warned on the kulak 
deviation, Krupskaya spoke against the repression of the party minority, Sokol’nikov tried to 
prove the merits of ‘state capitalism’ and to refute the existence of ‘socialist industry’ in the 
Soviet Union, and with impeccable courage Kamenev called for Stalin’s removal as General 
Secretary.  
What was most important about Kamenev’s attack on Stalin was his comment that 
‘comrade Stalin is incapable of fulfilling the role of unifier of the Bolshevik leadership’.
706
 His 
line has often been quoted, but historians have never bothered to delve deeper into understanding 
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the context in which he used the ‘unifier’ remark beyond some superficial account that it was out 
of jealousy, for power, or the false claim that he was advocating a leftist position. As the 
argument has been made clear in this chapter, Kamenev saw that the party was deviating to 
Bukharin’s revision of Lenin’s ideas and in turn this action was spurring contempt from the party 
left. Isaac Deutscher has well illustrated that at no time prior had there been such rigid 
factionalism within the party.
707
 The divide between the two sides was widening, and with 
Kamenev’s Lassallean centrist alternative summarily dismissed and the ‘platform of the four’ in 
the minority, Kamenev felt it was the duty of the General Secretary, of Stalin, to find a 
compromise, not to dig in and favour one side over the other. Kamenev specifically stated that he 
was surprised that Stalin had disagreed with Bukharin’s ‘enrich yourselves’ slogan, but was 
doing nothing to offset it.
708
 Under Kamenev’s leadership in 1923-1924 the Politburo had at least 
tried to reach a compromise with Trotsky. Even after he was defeated, the leadership endorsed 
the ‘Lenin Enrolment’,
709
 in part because they believed it would promote worker democracy and 
appease Trotsky supporters.
710
 Stalin was proposing nothing of the kind now, and that was why 
Kamenev complained that the Secretariat had ‘united policy and organization and is in reality 
predetermining policy’.
711
 Before, in the dispute with Trotsky and with the ‘anonymous platform’ 
of the XII Party Congress, Kamenev had felt that his position and Stalin’s was the middle road. 
Now, in 1925, Stalin was not offering any centrist position or conciliation. There was in fact, a 
‘crisis of centrism’. 
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Testament to that crisis, the congress refused to even entertain the idea of compromise. 
Since Lenin had never chaired either the Politburo or the Secretariat Sokol’nikov proposed that 
Stalin should not, but could if the Secretariat became an executive organ of the CC.
712
 The 
majority protested, believing that such a move would vest all power in the Politburo. More 
concerned with his authority than party unity, Stalin deflected the suggestion and enflamed the 
ire of the delegates by painting Kamenev and Zinoviev as plotters and schemers, accusing them 
of having demanded ‘blood’ in asking for Trotsky’s removal from the party and outlined that the 
beginning of the ‘first stage of the opposition’ had been at the ‘cave conference’ in Kislovodsk 
where they had aimed to ‘politicise’ the Secretariat.
713
 Not surprisingly, Stalin omitted the fact 
that Kamenev had been against the idea and had been his ally.
714
 Moreover, Stalin’s narrative 
made it appear that he was above the fray, taken by surprise. 
Supporters of Stalin were quick to rally to his defence and ensured the platform’s utter 
defeat. Kamenev, Zinoviev, and Sokol’nikov were heckled and jeered during their speeches. 
Kamenev, Krupskaya, and Sokol’nikov’s call for open discussion was easily dashed due to their 
alignment with Zinoviev, who was well known for stifling debate himself. Indeed, A.I. Mikoyan 
aptly pointed out at the congress that ‘when there is a majority on the side of Zinoviev he is for 
iron discipline, for submission. When he is not in the majority, even for a moment, he is 
against.’
715
 Tomskii heralded Stalin as the lynchpin of the CC’s collective leadership.
716
 A.A. 
Andreev called Kamenev and Zinoviev’s oppression a ‘fairy tale’
717
 and Yaroslavskii declared 
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that it was time for Kamenev and Zinoviev’s spheres of influence to come to an end.
718
 M.M. 




Hoping to stave off severe political consequences, Kamenev proposed a resolution calling 
for the complete freedom of intra-party discussion and asked there be no reprisals for voicing 
disagreement.
720
 Save the Leningrad delegates, in the footsteps of Lenin the Stalin-Bukharin 
group maintained their monological position and rejected his resolution 559 to 65. Uglanov’s 
resolution upholding the slanderous Moscow Party Conference declaration passed with the same 
results. So demoralized and ‘feeling ill’, Kamenev could not attend the congress the final day.
721
 
A New Interpretation 
What has been established is that there was a centrist economic model based on ‘state 
capitalism’ that Sokol’nikov and Kamenev championed from late 1922 to 1925 that overcame the 
‘scissors crisis’ and was proving capable of progressively improving the economy.
722
 Stalin was 
well aware that his ‘socialism in one country’ would upend the theoretical orientation of their 
economic model and he, not Kamenev or Zinoviev, was the first to break from the ‘troika’. 
‘Socialism in one country’ challenged Kamenev and Zinoviev’s understating of NEP’s 
‘dictatorship of the party’ by delineating NEP as a socialist constructing policy under the 
guidance of a ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ in isolation, something incompatible with their 
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vision of NEP which believed the country was not capable of industrial autarky. Furthermore, 
using capitalist models of production would not lead to socialism. 
Stalin’s ideological falling-out with Kamenev and Zinoviev’s policies enabled Bukharin 
to hijack Kamenev and Sokol’nikov’s NEP course. Bukharin was therefore not the champion of 
NEP, but a revisionist, destabilizing the centrist model in place to uplift NEPmen, kulaks, and the 
middle peasants with little consideration for the working class because accepting ‘socialism in 
one country’ while simultaneously viewing the state as ‘proletarian’ meant that Bukharin, similar 
to Lenin and Stalin, incorrectly felt that capitalist models of production in the Soviet state were 
not exploitative. Increasing the wealth of the state was synonymous with improving the working 
class, and with this logic Bukharin overcame his contradictions of expanding elements of 
capitalism. 
Bukharin’s policies antagonized many in the party and prompted Kamenev through his 
‘Bolshevik Centrism’ to promote a centrist, not leftist, policy in hopes of maintaining unity 
between the maximalist left and the revisionist right. Indeed, his Lassallean idea for profit sharing 
not only addressed leftist ideals on uplifting the working class, but proposed a path which would 
spread proletarian culture via a new system of wage relations to allow peasants to join in 
solidarity on the path to socialism. Kamenev’s desire to hold the party together coalesced into the 
‘platform of the four’, where together with Sokol’nikov, Zinoviev, and Krupskaya they tried to 
convince the majority to return to NEP’s original centrist ‘state capitalism’ economic platform. 
Historians who have hitherto looked at the ‘platform of the four’ as a leftist push or as an aimless 
policy are quite wrong, and the analysis presented in this chapter is the only one in all of the 
227 
 
historical literature which demonstrates that Kamenev had a definitive political and ideological 
line. 
Stalin’s heavy-handedness, illustrated from how he resolved the Georgian affair to how 
he wrestled the MPO and STO from Kamenev’s hands through subterfuge and intrigue, created a 
‘crisis of centrism’. Rigid factionalism, an inherited characteristic of Lenin’s monologism, 
became the norm. Stalin may have moved away from, and even disagreed with some of 
Bukharin’s policies, but his decision to break from the ‘troika’ and resort to repressing intra-party 
debate and stamping out discourse was not a ‘unifying’ tactic. Shiela Fitzpatrick’s contention that 
Stalin and his supporters were on the ‘defensive’ to preserve unity simply ignores that Stalin 
himself was perpetuating a party deviation by his breaking from the NEP policies of 1922-
1925.
723
 Only by understanding ‘socialism in one country’ as a policy deviation in conjunction 
with Kamenev and the ‘platform of the four’s’ policies search for a centrist position is it possible 
for the first time to fully understand Kamenev’s charge at the XIV Party Congress that Stalin was 
not a party ‘unifier’ and had to be removed from his post.  
Finally, in order to overcome Kamenev, Stalin used his leverage in the Politburo and 
secretarial influence in the party to subject STO’s day-to-day operations to Politburo authority, a 
practice which did not occur under Lenin and utterly changed the working dynamics of the Soviet 
system. Stalin also transformed Kamenev’s tolerant MPO into his personal dictatorship. Force 
and coercion, not Kamenev’s method of discourse, had become the methods of resolving intra-
party disputes.  
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The decisive defeat of the ‘platform of the four’ was interpreted by Bukharin and Stalin as 
a mandate to ignore their critics and press forward with their own economic and foreign policies. 
As the tenth anniversary of the October Revolution approached, many workers and left-minded 
party members became ever more disillusioned with the prospects of the Soviet state as 
Bukharin’s policies of extending NEP strengthened the capitalist elements in the economy. With 
the upturn of the economy from 1925, the party majority was seized by a great optimism. 
However, after 1926 that optimism began to wane as industrial output and investment slowed. 
Kamenev, Trotsky, and Zinoviev united to provide alternative leadership and to advocate a new 
course. After the XIV Party Congress Kamenev’s authority significantly diminished. He retained 
at his disposal his position as head of NKTorg, his candidate Politburo member status, and his 
organizational experience to exert his influence in trying to shape the country’s policies to adhere 
to a more centrist position. His actions bring to the fore the difficulty of a compromise position in 
a country accustomed to party dictatorship under the leadership of a man whose stubborn 
monological position harkened to the days of Lenin’s inflexibility after the outbreak of the First 
World War. 
The ‘Second Party’ within the Party 
Yuri Fel’shtinskii has characterised the United Opposition as the capitulation of the party 
‘rightists’ Kamenev and Zinoviev to Trotsky and the party left.
724
 He casts Zinoviev and 
Kamenev as opportunists, believing that their adoption of left-wing views was nothing more than 
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a concerted effort to cling to power. This echoes the view historians have regarding the actions of 
Kamenev and Zinoviev in 1925. But, as we have described, their actions in 1925 were not a shift 
to the left but rather the continuation of a centrist position in opposition to Stalin and Bukharin’s 
revisionism. In 1926-7 they allied with Trotsky to continue that effort on a compromise position 
with the party left.  
There were two distinct stages of the 1926-7 opposition. The first was what Isaac 
Deutscher has described. As Trotsky, Kamenev, and Zinoviev rejected formal independence, the 
opposition acted as a second party within the party.
725
 Their Workers’ Opposition supporters 
were against this position and desired a complete break. It is the argument of this chapter that 
there was in fact a second stage. By 1927 the three men were no longer in disagreement with 
their supporters. They were in fact moving towards an independent separate party. The change in 
their position came primarily due to Stalin and his supporters’ relentless denunciations. 
Motivated by necessity and a lack of a viable alternative, their new outlook marked a definitive 
change in opposition activity that has not yet been fully explored.  
After the XIV Party Congress it was clear that the leadership had no desire to mend the 
divide with the defeated ‘platform of the four’. Zinoviev’s compromise solution to expand the 
Politburo’s composition to ten members to include more opposition figures such as Sokol’nikov 
to broker compromise on major decisions was summarily dismissed.
726
 Creating further 
antagonism, Stalin and Bukharin not only led the CC to reject Zinoviev’s request on the 1 
January 1926, they demoted Kamenev to a candidate member of the Politburo.
727
 Then on 11 
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January the Politburo removed Kamenev from his chairmanship of STO and then stripped it of 
any future independence by merging it with Sovnarkom under Rykov’s leadership. This 
completed the intrigue against Kamenev that Stalin and Kuibyshev had set into motion in 
October 1925.
728
 The Politburo then expelled Kamenev from Sovnarkom and from his post as 
head of the Institute of Lenin. Stalin and Bukharin loyalists, Rudzutak, Tsyurupa, and Kuibyshev 
became Rykov’s deputies. The defiant Sokol’nikov was demoted from Commissar of Finance to 
deputy chair of Gosplan under Rykov’s watchful eye. Meanwhile Stalin dispatched an obedient 
commission to Leningrad which garnered workers to unseat Zinoviev as chair of the Leningrad 
Soviet. He subsequently lost control over Leningradskya Pravda as well. He remained in the 
Politburo, but he was dead weight alongside Trotsky. Stalin, Tomskii, Voroshilov, Kalinin, 
Bukharin, Rykov, and Molotov commanded the majority. 
Certainly the severity of the punishments raised the idea of a potential ‘second party’ in 
the minds of Zinoviev and Kamenev, but they had always been party loyalists and were not going 
to desert over lost authority. It was therefore the leadership’s continued invectives which set them 
on the path to a ‘second party’. Through provocation and denunciation Lenin had from 1917 
onwards forced his non-Bolshevik opponents to become actual enemies. Bukharin and Stalin 
created their enemies in the same way. The harsh language found in the Moscow Party resolution 
was not recanted or softened. Having gained total control of Leningradskaya Pravda the party 
majority chastised the opposition ceaselessly without an opportunity for rebuttal.
729
 Molotov later 
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relished, ‘day after day for a whole week we skinned the Zinovievites alive, surely for a week 
and a half, no less.’
730
  Stalin personally tarnished Kamenev and Zinoviev’s names by drudging 
up Lenin’s 1917 demand to expel them from the party.
731
 Under Bukharin’s direction, the journal 
Bolshevik then rehashed Kamenev’s opposition to Lenin in April 1917.
732
 The attacks were so 
relentless that over six months later at the 14-15 July CC Plenum Kamenev was still trying to 
defend himself, saying: 
‘…You accused us at the XIV Congress as people not believing in socialism. 
People not believing in socialism are not socialists… At that time from party cell 
to party cell went that shameless slander, and we submitted to the decision of the 
congress to be silent… you cannot shut our mouths and not give us the possibility 
to fight with that most disgraceful slander that the chair of the Comintern is not a 
socialist, that Kamenev is not a socialist… You put us in such a position that we 
are forced to violate your rule in order to justify ourselves.’
733
 
Despite their remonstrations to move beyond the conflict there was no avenue for the opposition 
to make amends as they were constantly derided. 
It should therefore be no surprise that when the Politburo appointed Kamenev as 
Commissar of Trade (NKTorg) against his will that he used the institution to challenge the 
Stalin/Bukharin line as he had no other recourse to defend himself against the bombardment of 
denunciations. He began by alarming the CC on 19 July that although both industry and 
agriculture had improved since 1925, a 10-15% growth rate in industry for the coming year 
would require that the state export twice the amount of grain. Agriculture was outpacing industry 
at such a pace that any decline in grain export for any reason, whether it was drought or 
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decreased international demand, would in fact retard industrial development.
734
 Kamenev’s 
remarkable insight proved true as this was precisely what occurred in 1928.
735
 Kamenev well 
understood a point lost on Bukharin, that increasing the wealth of the NEPmen and the peasantry 
without first adequately addressing the inefficiencies of industry was only going to exacerbate 
goods shortages. Private traders had amassed nearly 400 million rubles in profit, and that number 
was only growing.
736
 Half of all retail trade was still in private hands. Bourgeois practices were 
outstripping socialist growth.
737
 Bukharin had yet to develop a feasible policy on how to win the 
peasantry over to socialism. It was a serious failing in Bukharin’s position that he could not see 
that increasing their capital was certainly not going to foster socialist ideals. John Salter has 
shown that only in mid-1927 did Bukharin begin to take the growing economic power of the 
kulaks and NEPmen seriously enough to backpedal on his position.
738
 
Instead of finding compromise with Kamenev’s NKTorg, the Stalin and Bukharin 
majority continued to follow their own line. Flying in the face of the statistical data collected, as 
the new head of STO Rykov proclaimed in a resolution in a 6 April CC meeting that true socialist 
construction was underway. This was contrary to the findings of Kamenev’s NKTorg and quickly 
roused the former opposition, especially when Rykov frankly admitted that workers would have 
to suffer a reduction in wages in order to maintain industrial growth. Kamenev denounced the 
new policy as ‘industrialization at the expense of the working class’.
739
 Again, he felt workers’ 
wages should be safeguarded to win over the proletariat to the state and that increasing industrial 
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output at a social cost was imprudent and damaging to advancing proletarian culture. He 
therefore proposed that they instead base worker wages on the more stable chernovetz. Such a 
move would have allowed worker wages to remain constant against the inflating ruble. However, 
holding fast to Bukharin’s questionable economic programme, the majority rejected the sound 
proposal.  
Alienated by the denunciations and at odds over policy, the ‘United Opposition’ of 1926-
1927 only came into being through Kamenev’s determination. Unlike his peers he understood the 
delicate manoeuvring necessary to unite groups of differing views. His attempt to influence the 
British working class in 1920, his talent at the Vikzhel negotiations in 1917, and his ability to 
have held a ‘troika’ together with Zinoviev and Stalin, was testament to his ability. In 1925 he 
had tried with the ‘platform of the four’ to find a centrist position from within the party, but had 
failed.
740
 In 1926, however, Stalin and Bukharin majority’s ceaseless persecution and harassment 
of the former opposition forced him to alter his unifying approach. The Bukharin revisionist right 
was at present stubbornly irreconcilable and Kamenev therefore had no choice but to leave it out 
of the equation in forming new opposition directives. He therefore had to make an ally of his 
former opponent, Trotsky. 
Deutscher maintains that Trotsky was the first to show a willingness to cooperate by 
backing Kamenev’s amendments to Rykov’s STO report of 6 April, but that is wrong.
741
 The first 
initiative really came from Pyatikov, who from the party left joined Zinoviev and Sokol’nikov in 
supporting Kamenev in the CC. Then in the CC on 9 April Trotsky abstained on Kamenev’s 
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proposal. It was a half effort as Trotsky was too proud to make the first concession. Therefore, 
the real moment that signified conciliation was when Kamenev voted for Trotsky’s resolution.
742
 
This vote finally bridged their longstanding divide. Kamenev thus became the coordinator of the 
‘United Opposition’, and he held Zinoviev and Trotsky together as he had done previously in 
forging the Stalin and Zinoviev alliance. 
Why ally with Trotsky? On the one had it was tactical. Kamenev had explicitly told 
Zinoviev that they needed to ‘have a platform against all questions’ (emphasis in the original).
743
 
This was a great departure from Kamenev’s typical practice of trying to search for a single 
common cause to unite opposing groups,
744
 but Kamenev had come to realize the futility of 
compromise with the immoveable Bukharin and Stalin. A single point platform was not going to 
win over the party majority, and he understood that allying with Trotsky would bring with him 
his left-wing supporters and sharpen their differences with the Stalin and Bukharin line. 
 His agreement with Trotsky was not a sign of opportunism. To hold such a contention 
completely disregards Kamenev’s long established and consistent advocacy of centrist positions. 
He needed the left-wing support of Trotsky to counterbalance the rightist policy of Bukharin, but 
a close reading of the United Opposition’s platform reveals that Kamenev remained committed to 
                                                          
742
 RGASPI 17/2/210/63. 
743
 RGASPI 323/2/27/89. 
744
 To list a few examples where Kamenev tried to unite opposition groups around a single cause: Kamenev had tried 
to rally the faction to boycott the Duma in 1907 for the ‘police order’ to the ballot box, had aspired to unite Social-
Democracy in 1917 on the slogan of an ‘all-socialist government’, had effectively united the British labour 
movement in 1920 by focusing specifically on preventing a British war with Soviet Russia, had brought together the 
bourgeoisie and socialists over famine relief by focusing exclusively on alleviating the suffering, and had attempted 
to unite forces  in 1925 by centralizing worry on the kulak danger. 
235 
 
his previous policies of 1925. In a note passed to Zinoviev in his own hand, Kamenev explicitly 
noted that the United Opposition was a ‘middle path’.
745
 
It is easy to see why historians have traditionally viewed the ‘United Opposition’ as a 
leftist organisation. There was much in their platform calling for specific improvements for the 
proletariat as a class, addressing worker unemployment, wages, housing, and various other social 
ills. Furthermore, aligning with Trotsky meant accepting his left-wing constituents from 1923, 
who aimed to promote industry and to raise workers’ livelihoods even if it meant neglecting 
peasant and agriculture. In fact, former members of the Workers’ Opposition came to the 
opposition’s banner in hopes of once again raising that platform. 
However, it is of great significance and has been long overlooked that the United 
Opposition also retained the 1925 centrist policies of the ‘platform of the four’. Sokol’nikov and 
Kamenev’s pre-1925 fiscal policy which demanded the tax burden fall on the country’s capitalist 
elements was left unabridged. As in 1925, ‘socialism in one country’ was denounced in favour of 
the country’s dependence on the international market to export agricultural products to finance 
the importation of technical machinery necessary for industrialization. Trotsky had opposed this 
‘dictatorship of finance’ in 1923, and yet it was not discarded in 1926. Moreover, the United 
Opposition did not espouse the typical leftist call for rapid industrialisation. Kamenev’s 1925 
‘slow down’ slogan which shunned overly optimistic projections and urged caution in 
development remained central. The opposition’s future 1927 pamphlet stated that there was no 
policy that could decide everything in ‘one stroke’, and that the Soviet Union could not ‘leap 
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over’ periods of development.
746
 Although not said explicitly in fear of losing support, this was a 
call for a continuation of ‘state capitalism’, not a deferment to Trotsky’s 1923 course of 
‘primitive socialist accumulation’. Further, Kamenev’s warning of the kulak danger was central 
to the platform. Trotsky’s arrogant declaration that  Kamenev and Zinoviev had in fact adopted 
left-wing policies wholesale and simply mouthed his position is egregiously misleading.
747
 The 
United Opposition was a ‘middle path’ between the party left and centre. Together the opposition 
voiced what they had all said before separately, that the party needed to raise the wages of the 
working class, introduce progressive taxes, end indirect taxation, promote democratic centralism, 
resist bureaucratism, and curtail unfettered kulak growth. 
The union of left and centre was a difficult marriage. Trotsky’s supporters thought the 
alliance frail and that Zinoviev would ‘sneak away’,
748
 but the former ‘platform of the four’ had 
misgivings as well. Kamenev, for example, contemplated abandoning Trotsky and the left out of 
disagreement.
749
 It was clear to him though that compromise was necessary and that the party left 
was giving as much ground to the policies of the 1925 ‘platform of the four’ as they were to 
them. 
The one area where no compromise was necessary was on foreign policy. Whereas 
Trotsky had been silent on Stalin’s ‘socialism in one country’ until 1926 when he joined 
Kamenev and Zinoviev,
750
  the two former members of the ‘platform of the four’ had not, and 
their platform from 1926-1927 was an extension of their 1925 refutation of Stalin’s policies. This 
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was clearly visible at the 3 June and 14-21 July Politburo and CC meetings when Zinoviev and 
Trotsky lambasted the Politburo majority’s stance concerning the General Strike in Great 
Britain.
751
 At issue was Bukharin and Stalin’s abandonment of revolutionary workers. The 
Comintern endorsed Trade Union Congress (TUC) in Great Britain had called a general coal 
miners’ strike, but they had buckled under military force on 12 May, telling workers to return to 
work. However, left-minded miners persisted with the strike without TUC support. Stalin and 
Bukharin’s majority refused to break off relations with the TUC through the Anglo-Russian 
Committee, leaving striking workers in the lurch. As head of the Comintern Zinoviev argued that 
the Soviet trade unions should unite with the workers directly and abandon the TUC. The 
opposition understood that Stalin and Bukharin’s 1925 domestic policies which had promoted 
self-sufficiency had influenced the country to neglect the working class movement abroad. 
Disagreeing on so many points with the majority, the United Opposition had in essence 
established a ‘second party’ within the party. Stalin and Bukharin’s supporters certainly 
understood this fact themselves. The Stalin-loyal Mikoyan expressed their differences best when 
he noted that Kamenev had become a ‘completely foreign person’ to the party.
752
  
The Demise of the 1926 ‘United Opposition’ 
The United Opposition failed for a number of reasons. The party majority saw no reason 
to compromise and saw dialogue as weakness. At nearly every party function the Stalin and 
Bukharin adherents raised Kamenev and Zinoviev’s past disputes with Trotsky to delegitimize 
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their collaboration. Kamenev had every reason to hold the high ground in demanding intra-party 
democracy and compromise, but Zinoviev and Trotsky’s past undemocratic behavior 
overshadowed Kamenev’s entire history of working with opponents and his words appeared 
hypocritical. 
Stalin’s personal role was also significant in the defeat of the United Opposition. Planning 
its demise, he had warned Kamenev that ‘the alliance with Trotsky will destroy you all’.
753
 Under 
Stalin’s guidance the Secretariat began to whip party cells into officially removing Kamenev 
from his last post as chair of the Moscow Soviet. Stalin’s secretarial influence in stifling the 
discussion of Kamenev’s party role in Moscow was so obvious that on 29 March the CCC 
confirmed to Kamenev that the Secretariat had clandestinely held Moscow meetings to ensure 
that none of Kamenev’s supporters had the opportunity to speak on his behalf.
754
 Unlike the 
Stalin directed drive to dislodge Zinoviev in Leningrad which had been conducted rather 
openly,
755
 Stalin had to resort to intrigue with Kamenev because the party at large held him in 
higher regard than Trotsky or Zinoviev. Zinoviev, for example, was expelled from the Politburo 
in a CC vote 204 to 18. Kamenev lost his Moscow post primarily because Stalin made it 
impossible for him to defend his position. On 22 April 1926 in the Politburo, Kamenev declared 
that he had lost his authority solely because he did not wish to ‘unquestionably follow Stalin’.
756
 
That did not mean that the party majority did not eagerly follow Stalin’s lead. Rykov, for 
example, as head of Sovnarkom essentially ejected Kamenev from NKTorg. Rykov and the 
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Politburo had begun to insist that NKTorg had to subject itself to Politburo purview, something 
that had not been the case when Lenin had headed Sovnarkom. Further, despite Kamenev only 
having led the commissariat for just over four months, Rudzutak and Rykov unfairly heaped 
blame on NKTorg for high grain and industrial good prices. The ruthlessness to which the 
majority vigorously attacked the opposition during one CC meeting was so intense that 
Dzerzhinsky boiled over with rage, had a heart attack shortly after, and died. Not wishing to see 
the same charade unfold whereby the Politburo would micromanage NKTorg to undermine his 
authority as they had done to remove him from STO, Kamenev resigned on 25 July.
757
  
Nothing exemplifies the reality of a ‘second party’ within the party more than how the 
‘United Opposition’ was brought to terms. The Secretariat was swift in expelling opposition party 
members. The opposition pleaded to the Politburo to end reprisals and in exchange they promised 
to halt factional activity and submit to party discipline, agreeing only to take up ‘legal’ means of 
opposition. On 8 and 11 October, Kamenev negotiated with the Politburo. He asked for an 
‘armistice’, a shocking word which acknowledged that the two sides were in an ideological state 
of war. The opposition was willing to surrender, and accepted the dictated terms drawn up by 
Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomskii, at the 23 October СС plenum. This did not satisfy the vindictive 
Stalin who chose instead to ramp up the conflict by labelling the opposition a ‘deviation’. Before 
in the party there had existed ‘factions’ and ‘oppositions’, but now under Stalin’s leadership 
differences of opinion were branded incompatible ‘deviations’ with the party line. The leadership 
now defined what the true ‘Leninist’ path was and was not. The Stalin and Bukharin majority 
thus affected the very divide that Stalin now accused the opposition of creating. There was to be 
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no peace.  The CC forced Zinoviev to resign his post as head of the Comintern, and appointed 
Bukharin in his stead.
758
 Then, the CC put Kamenev, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Sokol’nikov, I.T. 
Smilga, Pyatikov, G.E. Evdokimov, and Nikolaeva on warning for their oppositional activity,
759
 
and at the 26 October to 3 November the XV Party Conference expelled Trotsky and Kamenev 
from the Politburo. 
Making a Party Enemy 
It was not enough for Stalin that he had persuaded the party to view the opposition as 
moving outside the party; he wanted the man who had boldly asked for his removal to become a 
party enemy.
760
 Kamenev retained the respect of many party figures of the establishment, such as 
Mikoyan, who admired Kamenev for his toleration of dissenting opinion.
761
 Stalin therefore 
cunningly sought to discredit Kamenev by making it appear that he had been a Tsarist 
sympathizer. At the 14 December meeting of the Comintern Stalin drudged up Kamenev’s 
signing of a telegram to Michael Romanov in April 1917, where Kamenev had thanked him for 
turning down the post of regent. Stalin hoped to reduce any party backlash by slanderously 
tarring Kamenev as a Tsarist conciliator. As outlined in chapter two, Kamenev had merely been 
trying to ensure the inhabitants of Achinsk take revolutionary action, and his signing of the 
telegram had nothing to do with a desire to placate a Romanov.
762
 The party had mistakenly 
deemed his allying with Trotsky as hypocritical, and his reputation had already suffered from 
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Trotsky and Stalin’s continual iteration that he had opposed the October Revolution, but now 
Stalin’s accusation roused a sweeping revulsion within the party ranks. 
In this affair Stalin devised to enlist their fellow Achinsk exile, Muranov, to recall that the 
committee to which Kamenev had participated in voted unanimously for the welcoming letter’s 
acceptance,
763
 and Stalin gathered twenty-three April 1917 Party Conference attendees to provide 
evidence that at closed meetings the party debated Kamenev’s ‘mistake’. Then, with Bukharin’s 
support as editor of Bolshevik, the two barred Kamenev from any significant rebuttal by having 
the journal on 24-25 December rush to print an issue with five separate attestations against 
Kamenev. Despite Krupskaya and 12 others backing Kamenev, Bolshevik only published 
Zinoviev, Smilga, and Federov’s joint declaration that no discussion had taken place at the April 
1917 Party Conference. Thousands of copies were quickly disseminated to CC members. With a 
Stalin-Bukharin Politburo, the leading party organ stonewalled Kamenev’s request for justice on 
account that the Politburo was not a ‘judicial panel’.
764
 When he appealed to the CCC, the 
sympathetic commission’s head, G.K. Ordzhonikidze, repeated to Kamenev on 5 January 1927 
what he had already privately told Kamenev’s supporter, V. Vardin, that the CCC was ‘powerless 
to act’.
765
 In fact, the CCC was extremely hesitant to do anything because the Politburo now 
considered Kamenev’s refutations of Stalin’s accusation as an oppositional struggle! Symbolic of 
his tight hold on the party, challenging Stalin personally had become tantamount to attacking the 
whole party. 
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Stalin therefore succeeded in erasing what little remained of Kamenev’s good name. Even 
associates who had long known Kamenev were taken in by Stalin’s deception, confronting 
Kamenev on the matter in person. It happened so often that Kamenev began to stuff his pockets 
with supporting documents to prove his case whenever he was approached on the subject.
766
 With 
the telegram taken out of context, it was difficult for the party at large to believe in Kamenev’s 
commitment to the ideals of the revolution. Stalin was truly making Kamenev not just an 
opponent, but a party enemy. 
It was in this atmosphere of hostility that the Politburo resolved on 27 January 1927 to 
dispatch Kamenev to Italy to serve as Soviet ambassador. It was clearly a move to weaken the 
opposition by depriving it of its chief organizer. Although Alexis Pogorelskin has argued that 
Kamenev was ‘ambivalent’ to the posting, and surely he made the best of his situation by trying 
to organize the Italian Communist Party to form an oppositionist bloc inside the Comintern,
767
 
there is, nevertheless, no question that he considered his lowly appointment a form of exile. In his 
own words in a CCC meeting he had quipped that he would rather go to Achinsk than Italy, an 
insightful reference to his former place of exile indicating that he deemed the Politburo’s decision 
a form of political banishment.
768
 Pogorelskin’s flirtation with the idea that Stalin selected 
Kamenev as Soviet ambassador in hopes he would be assassinated in Rome is also not supported 
by the evidence in the archive.
769
 The Politburo had originally considered Japan his proper place, 
but on 5 November the country had refused his appointment on account of his oppositionist 
                                                          
766
 RGASPI 323/2/76/78. 
767
 Alexis Pogorelskin, ‘Kamenev in Rome’, The NEP Era: Soviet Russia 1921-1928, Idyllwild: Charles Schlacks 
Publisher, 2007, p. 106-107. 
768
 RGASPI 323/2/76/69. 
769





 Stalin was eager to remove Kamenev from the political landscape, but he had not yet 
fixated on his physical demise. 
The Definitive Split 
The difference between the opposition of 1926 and 1927 was drastic, and Kamenev’s 
departure into exile marked the beginning of the next phase of the opposition’s struggle. In 1926 
they had seen themselves as a ‘second party’ within a party of socialists, but in 1927 they 
divorced themselves from the Stalin and Bukharin dominated party entirely, believing that their 
once beloved party was now so distant from socialism that it had become anti-proletarian, and 
together they discussed forming a separate party.
771
 
There were two main reasons the opposition felt they had to leave the party. The first was 
the majority’s unrelenting and intensifying bellicose invectives. Kamenev stated it clearly at the 
August 1927, declaring: 
‘…when you qualify the opposition as social-democrats, defeatists, conditional 
defensists, disorganizers of the rear, agents of Chamberlain, and finally, counter-
revolutionaries, you push the party and the Comintern to the edge of a precipice. 
This precipice is a second party...’
772
 
As Kamenev later said, ‘the Bolshevik party cannot conclude peace with either a social-
democratic deviation or with those who actually serve Chamberlain’. Stalin’s ruling majority had 
intensified its rhetoric to the point of nearly calling the opposition an outright enemy that in doing 
so they became their enemy. 
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Secondly, the opposition’s definitive break with the party in 1927 was over Stalin and 
Bukharin’s international policy. In order to safeguard Soviet interests in Asia Stalin and Bukharin 
had directed the Comintern to back the Kuomintang government. This decision helped Chaing 
Kai-shek slaughter unsupported Shanghai workers.
773
 With the leadership’s greatly diminished 
resolve to support working class movements abroad, it was not surprising that Zinoviev in a 
message to Kruspskaya equated the Stalin and Bukharin leadership to the Social-Democrats of 
1914 who had abandoned the international movement for nationalistic ends at the outbreak of the 
Great War by voting for war credits.
774
 During the TUC controversy, in the Politburo Kamenev 
had made the same distinction when he freely called the TUC leaders ‘traitors’.
775
 At the July 
1926 CC he had bluntly told K.E. Voroshilov and Rykov that they were making mistakes, ‘the 
same as the opportunists of German Social-Democracy’, but at that time it had been a warning, 
not a direct denunciation.
776
 Due to the leadership’s foreign policy blunders in both England and 
China, by 1927 Kamenev, Zinoviev, and Trotsky had become convinced that Stalin and Bukharin 
had now definitively followed in Social-Democracy’s treacherous footsteps. True, Kamenev had 
not cast all other socialists into the enemy’s camp as many in his party had done in 1914 and 
1917, but in 1927 the situation was different. Stalin and Bukharin had already made Kamenev 
their ‘enemy’, and no hope for compromise remained. Yet, the opposition remained within the 
party out of fear of international intervention.
777
 
Adam Ulam has charged the opposition with concocting the war scare of 1927 as a means 
to try to gain leverage over the leadership by presenting Trotsky as the only man capable of 
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leading the military to victory should Britain and her allies attack the Soviet state,
778
 but others 
such as John P. Sontag have shed light on the genuine fear of impending war among leading 
Soviet politicians.
779
 The idea that the opposition created the war scare to undermine the 
leadership must finally be put to rest. Kamenev’s private correspondence clearly shows that the 
primary reason the opposition did not proclaim themselves a distinct and independent party was 
due to the war scare. Just before the August 1927 CC plenum, Kamenev wrote to Zinoviev and 
Trotsky that they had to ‘avoid moving on to the line of a second party in an atmosphere of 
threating war’ as it would result in the ‘political collapse’ of the country and surely spell doom 
for the Soviet republic.
780
 Had they not been fearful of a real intervention, their correspondence 
indicates that they would have certainly created a new party. 
The three’s summer communication also sheds light on the events of November 1927. 
Isaac Deutscher argued that the purpose of the 7 November United Opposition ‘appeal to the 
masses’ did not have a ‘hint of incitement to insurrection’.
781
 He also asserts that Kamenev, 
Zinoviev and Trotsky were against the idea of an independent party.
782
 This reflects the general 
view taken by historians of the October anniversary protest as simply a move to persuade 
workers to take up their cause to pressure the party.
783
 The truth of the matter was first revealed 
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When Kamenev had returned to Moscow from Italy in the summer of 1927 before the 4 
August CC plenum he had suggested to his co-leaders that they reject the ultimatum of the CC to 
be silent, let the congress condemn them as ‘defeatists’, and then after the XV Congress ‘stand on 
the ground of a second party, conducting a struggle for the overthrow of the current government’ 
(emphasis added).
785
 Kamenev had suggested alternatives, such as remaining in a minority and 
continuing legal forms of protest, but it was clear by November that the party was not willing to 
tolerate dissent of any kind. Furthermore, the possibility that the opposition had chosen to act 
within the legal framework of the party was clearly not the course taken, as by November they 
had already begun to print and distribute illegal leaflets about their platform. Trotsky and 
Zinoviev were even expelled at the 23 October CC plenum for their actions. The November 
protest was therefore in accordance with the plan contemplated in August. The demonstration 
was a recruitment drive to gather support for a future move against the party after the congress, to 
overthrow it by force if necessary. 
Their motions for revolution, however, were more symbolic than actual. From their 
experience in October 1917, Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev understood that to overthrow the 
government they would have needed to subvert the army. They knew their chances of doing so 
were near impossible. Further, the Communist leadership had reduced the working week to 
placate workers and although dissatisfied with their wages and living conditions, workers for the 
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moment were little interested in active protest. The leadership itself was also beginning to move 
leftward. Throughout 1926 and into 1927 the party had begun to gradually focus on 
industrialization as economic growth was tapering off. Against his previous assertions, Bukharin 
was now urging greater state interference in the agricultural sector and state planning.
786
 By 
October 1927 he had even reversed his premise that cooperatives would build socialism and 
began endorsing collective farming.
787
 For his part Stalin had adopted Kamenev’s primary 1925 
concern about the kulak danger, and he too favoured greater investment in industry. The 
leadership had stolen the thunder the from the United Opposition’s warnings about the dangers of 
NEP and moving the country onto a more proletarian line by correcting their own policies. Keven 
Murphy has also illustrated that the fits and starts of the United Opposition’s campaigns from 
1926-1927 left many workers who were ready to challenge Stalin and Bukharin’s leadership 
hesitant to lend their support.
788
  
Clearly their efforts were derailed long before they received a lackluster response from 
both the party rank and file and the masses in November 1927. Nevertheless, they persisted. In 
the month preceding the tenth anniversary of the October revolution the three had tried to gain 
ground among the working class through secret meetings and gatherings, and on 7 November the 
United Opposition energetically took to the street to rally workers to their cause. Workers, 
however, were generally unmoved and apathetic. Not only had the leadership’s leftward shift 
cooled worker dissatisfaction with the regime, but on account of the denunciations in Pravda 
against the opposition, Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev’s appeal had greatly diminished. Within 
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the party only 83 had signed the opposition platform, and even the 3,500 signatories Smilga 
claimed to have obtained were a paltry few.
789
 
It is rather surprising then that given the lukewarm atmosphere to their calls for protest 
that Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev even bothered to stage their revolutionary protest. Trotsky, 
however, later supplied their reasoning, writing that: 
‘We realized only too clearly that we could make our ideas the common property 
of the new generation not by diplomacy and evasions but only by an open struggle 
which shirked none of the practical consequences. We went to meet the inevitable 
debacle, confident, however, that we were paving the way for the triumph of our 




They realized their efforts were in vain, but proceeded anyway to leave a lasting mark for 
posterity. 
Whereas the United Opposition had merely contemplated violent confrontation, Stalin 
had begot their 7 November protest with actual violence. When Trotsky and Kamenev had toured 
Moscow to rally supporters police rebuffed, cursed, and harangued them. Smilga, whose flat was 
ransacked, wrote on 18 November that the events were nothing short of a ‘terrible intra-party 
terror’.
791
 Kamenev, N.I. Muralov, and Smilga wrote that day that ‘every Moscow party member 
knows that these fascist groups received instructions from the raikom Secretariat and that at the 
center of it all… is the Secretary of the CC.’
792
 Stalin had even trumped up a charge that a 
Wrangel white officer had aided in the opposition’s pamphleteering. 
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The drive to revolution ultimately failed to counter Stalin and Bukharin’s revisionism. 
Kamenev and Zinoviev gloomily exchanged notes: 
‘Kamenev: …Even free discussion in the party would not have given us a 
majority. The way to a second party, is it possible? How? What for?... The middle 
path, nothing will come of it. 
Zinoviev: …there is nothing to speak about. Let everyone go their own way. 
Kamenev: These are grave words for the bloc’ (emphasis in the original).
793
 
With Kamenev’s words ‘Bolshevik Centrism’ in the party came to a decisive end. Never again 
would he attempt to unite opponents to a common political cause. 
Aftermath 
It may have seemed like great hypocrisy on Kamenev’s part to capitulate to Stalin and 
Bukharin’s camp at the end of the 2-19 December XV Congress and to beg forgiveness for being 
an ‘anti-Leninist’, but the idea Robert Daniels has proffered that he was afraid of being left 
outside the party is not sufficient.
794
 While it is true that he had a change of heart considering the 
ineffectiveness of their November efforts, it was primarily the leftward shift in policy the 
congress accepted that moved Kamenev to believe compromise and unity were again possible. 
The XV Congress adopted a five-year-plan focusing on the development of industry and 
collective farming. Both he and Zinoviev genuinely felt that the party was giving ground to years 
of opposition.
795
 For Trotsky, an ideological shift was not enough, Stalin had to be removed. He 
therefore continued on in protest. However, it was foolhardy for Kamenev and Zinoviev to 
believe that like-minded ideological pursuits could mend deep animosities and the November 7 
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demonstration was not something the unforgiving Stalin would ever forget. Stalin had explicitly 
stated that there could never be unity with the opposition.
796
 Bukharin remained unmoved as 
well, backing the XV Congress to expel Kamenev and 75 others from the party. 
Conclusion 
The ‘middle-path’ so intrinsic to Kamenev’s ‘Bolshevism Centrism’ had to muster an 
alliance with Trotsky and the Communist left and exclude the party majority position primarily 
due to Stalin and Bukharin’s relentless derision of the opposition. The United Opposition which 
materialized in 1926 saw itself as a ‘party within a party’, not all that different from how the 
Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks had co-existed under the umbrella of Social-Democracy. The 
United Opposition contained numerous centrist policies from Kamenev, Zinoviev, Krupskaya, 
and Sokol’nikov’s 1925 platform and at no point rejected those views for a purely leftist position 
and therefore the view that they were opportunists adopting leftist views must be completely 
discarded. 
The exceedingly rocky relations between the United Opposition and the party majority 
took an abrupt turn when Bukharin and Stalin failed to uphold the party’s long-standing 
commitment to internationalism. This, coupled with Stalin leading the party majority to discredit 
the opposition by portraying them as party enemies forced the United Opposition to move 
towards a distinct and separate party. Stalin and Bukharin’s policies and ceaseless attacks left 
them no hope that they could remain a ‘party within a party’, but out of concern for the war scare 
with England in 1927 they balked at founding a new independent party. Despite realising the 
futility of their efforts due to the lukewarm attitude of the working class to their position, they 
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pressed forward with their 7 November protest that was in spirit far from oppositional business as 
usual. Although their prospects were knowingly dismal, their demonstration was essentially a 
dress rehearsal to rouse the working class to their banner to, if necessary, violently overthrow the 





At the same time that the United Opposition faced its political demise in November and 
December of 1927, the state gathered only half of the amount of grain it had obtained in those 
months a year before. Commodity shortages and the fear of war had led peasants to withhold 
grain despite the third year of a relatively good harvest. Lacking their own ideological course to 
resolve the economic difficulties, Stalin’s leadership reacted and adopted defensive policies, 
moving from crisis to crisis. Under Stalin’s direction in early January the Politburo sanctioned 
‘extraordinary measures’, the use of force in the procurement of grain to overcome economic 
difficulties. Although Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomskii initially agreed, by February they were 
voicing their concern over ‘excesses’ in the campaign and feared ‘middle peasants’, and not just 
kulaks, were at the receiving end of state heavy handedness.
797
 The Stalin and Bukharin alliance 
quickly came to an end and Stalin whipped the party machine and pivoted his position to the 
party left to gain support to outflank and remove Bukharin and his allies from power. Following 
their ouster, Stalin left NEP behind and embarked on an unachievable industrialisation drive 
while simultaneously implementing a violent, bloody, and repressive ‘collectivisation’ and 
‘dekulakisation’ campaign to force peasants on to collective farms in an effort to overcome state 
deficits in agriculture.  
The Crisis of NEP and the Centrist Alternative 
Although Kamenev’s pursuit of ‘Bolshevik Centrism’ came to an end with his party 
expulsion, it did not mean that he had privately surrendered his views. There is a dearth of 
archival evidence as to Kamenev’s post United Opposition views on politics, but two extremely 
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valuable and lengthy personal notations of Kamenev’s survive. Written only for himself in 1928 
and 1929, the documents shed light on two critical points in Soviet history. Whereas the year 
1928 marked the decisive break between Stalin and Bukharin, 1929 was the year Stalin 
championed the First-Five-Year Plan to set in motion an overly-optimistic industrialisation drive 
and a horrific collectivisation campaign. In the face of these events, Kamenev remained on 
centrist ground. 
When it was clear an economic crisis was at hand, Kamenev was hopeful that the party 
would ask the opposition to return. After all, they had predicted the crisis, and on the 2 February 
Kamenev wrote in his notes that the party could ‘only really cure the crisis with us and on the 
basis of our views…’, and as economic troubles deepened on Bukharin’s revisionist path, ‘these 
views (and us) will become more needed every day.’
798
 Sensing a rift between Bukharin and 
Stalin had occurred he felt the party would need the former opposition to overcome the party 
right.  
However, Stalin did not need their support. Even though within Stalin’s Politburo group 
Kalinin and A.A. Andreev showed signs of disapproval over Stalin’s peasant policies, it was 
never enough for them to aid the rightist Bukharin group. Furthermore, Molotov, Mikoyan, 
Kuibyshev, and in time, the wavering Voroshilov and Ordzhonikidze, were all prepared to aid 
Stalin, against Bukharin, in directing the country away from NEP. 
Stalin had no intention of taking up a centrist line, or any position for that matter, which 
would demand compromise and diminish his power. He was intent on carving his own path and 
for that he began to champion causes of the party left by adhering to their call to mitigate the 
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growing class differentiation in the countryside and in the city. In March and April Stalin evoked 
class warfare as an alternative to Bukharin’s NEP policies. Stalin moved from overt methods of 
repression to advocating the mobilisation of poor peasants to extract grain from kulaks as 
advanced by Kaganovich.
799
 Known as the ‘Ural-Siberian Method’ for its initial place of 
implementation, its ideological roots lay in Lenin’s ‘Committees of the Peasant Poor’, which 
although abandoned, had been implemented during the civil war to serve the same class dividing 
purpose. Bukharin rightly saw this as a reactionary policy, not a planned one, writing to Stalin in 
August that the party was ‘ideologically disorientated’ and had ‘neither a line, nor a general 
opinion’.
800
 Applying the same principle to the proletariat, Stalin orchestrated the 18 May to 6 
July Shakhty Show Trial to shift economic difficulties away from the leadership by casting blame 
on bourgeois specialists, denounced as ‘wreckers’, for causing Donbass coal shortages. Thus 
Stalin pitted trade union workers, long distrustful of specialists, against the remaining 
bourgeoisie. By winning the support of poor peasants and workers Stalin gained the political and 
ideological strength to challenge Bukharin’s position. 
While Stalin may have believed Kamenev was ‘in his pocket’ with his changing position 
on class warfare,
801
 nothing could have been further from the truth. Kamenev called Stalin’s  
ideological shift to the left to be ‘thunder from a clear sky’ and a definite ‘turn to Leninism’,
802
 
but he could not reconcile himself to policies which echoed the repressive measures of War 
Communism, nor to its defensive and unplanned ‘jerks’ and ‘leaps’ which were leading the 
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country in a ‘vicious circle’.
803
 Repressive measures, even if conducted through the village poor, 
were a ‘blind alley’, exacerbating economic difficulties instead of resolving them. Kamenev had 
long defended the need for bourgeois specialists, and was not in favour of reducing their role. 
Further, War Communism methods required heroic working class zeal, and by Kamenev’s 
assessment workers were ‘lukewarm’ at best. He remained unconvinced of grass root initiative, 
writing in his personal notes that Kaganovich and Stalin’s policy was a ‘bureaucratic parody on 
War Communism’; nothing more than a masked ‘politseishchina’ (police rule).
804
 However, 
Stalin’s leftward policies meant Kamenev held hope that he could ideologically begin to find 
common ground with the General Secretary. 
Kamenev had no idea that Stalin intended to use his politseishchina to abandon NEP 
completely. As the state failed to gather grain comparable to the previous year, Kamenev 
predicted that after the grain procurement had been satisfied private traders would be 
‘handsomely compensated’ due to extra-budgetary anxieties, forcing the state to buy high-priced 
grain from well-supplied kulaks.
805
 This is the very measure Robert Conquest contends would 
have resolved the crisis.
806
 Kamenev, however, raised some valid points as to why such a solution 
was unpalatable. Strapped for money to pay for grain, he feared the Soviet Union would have to 
export gold, which would both devalue their chervonets and prove insufficient to cover import 
expenses against an export shortfall. Already receiving German loans, they would have to take 
foreign credit ‘under any condition’, making the country economically dependent on foreign 
capital. Nevertheless, he saw it as necessary step. Kamenev was much more adroit in practical 
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economic considerations than Bukharin, and far more economically literate than Stalin or the 
remaining Politburo members. He correctly understood that the grain shortage was a symptom of 
larger inherent defects and that no temporary ‘extraordinary measures’ were going to resolve a 
two-year misdirected economic plan. The leadership’s industrialisation plans had reduced the real 
salary of workers. Their wages fell 11.7 percent in April alone.
807
  Further, that same month 
NKTorg released figures indicating that the purchase of industrial goods in the countryside was 
up 17 percent from the previous year.
808
 This was problematic as state reserves of finished goods 
had by June drastically depleted to a net value of 25.1 million rubles against the previous year’s 
286.6 million. The purchasing power of the well-off peasants had risen at a disproportionate rate 
compared with production, even with Gosplan’s 13 percent projected growth in light industry. 
The goods famine was not subsiding, but had reappeared and was gaining momentum.  
Kamenev found official remedies disagreeable and was remarkably accurate in assessing 
the weaknesses of the leadership’s economic plan. Kamenev’s NKTorg replacement, Mikoyan, 
wanted to reduce the prices of light industrial goods to compensate, but this meant 
correspondingly cutting production costs. NKTorg’s plan was to cut expenditures on improving 
worker housing, avoid wage increases, and defer industrialization loans. To combat diminished 
exports NKTorg promised to increase industrial exports (oil, timber, cotton, etc…). This policy 
was clearly a dead end, as grain exports were falling short of their projections by 300-375 million 
rubles. Industrial exports would have had to increase 75 percent in production to combat such a 
deficit, a complete impossibility. Even Gosplan’s most optimistic figures fell fall short at a 50 
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 The Soviet Union wanted to achieve record exports at a time many factories 
sat idle for want of raw materials, and Kamenev believed Bukharin and Mikoyan’s policies 
nakedly revealed their ‘economic illiteracy’ and ‘political thoughtlessness’.
 810
 
Kamenev’s harsh words were justified. His appraisal that curtailing industrial goods 
prices was a colossal mistake has been corroborated by Simon Johnson and Peter Temin. The two 
have shown that when Bukharin and Mikoyan’s policies reducing industrial goods prices went 
into effect in 1927, state enterprises were unable to stay afloat and had to balance their books by 
borrowing from Gosbank. With greater price controls and increased inflation to offset bailing out 
failing enterprises, the cheaper industrial goods were quickly bought up and thus failed to reach 
the countryside. The ‘goods famine’ worsened as there was no reduction in prices in the 
countryside to counterbalance the low purchasing power of peasants. This in turn led to peasants 
withholding their grain and brought NEP to the crisis situation in 1928.
811
 Kamenev clearly 
understood far better than the leadership where the country’s policies had been headed and his 
‘slow down’ policy would have allowed for more stable development as industries would not 
have required the bailouts necessary to sustain their overly optimistic projections for industrial 
growth to maintain Bukharin’s ‘equilibrium’ in development. 
In the summer of 1928 outside Moscow in Kaluga Kamenev outlined political and 
economic changes to turn the country around.
812
 At the core of his critique was what he had been 
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saying since the civil war, that the country had in fact never established a ‘dictatorship of the 
proletariat’. It was, to him, a ‘dictatorship of the party’, and in order to move forward the party 
had to acknowledge this inconvenient truth. With uncharacteristic frankness he wrote that those 
Communists who were ‘thick-headed, bureaucratic, bumbling and gossiping about the fact that 
“it is impossible to draw the working class near to the government because it is a workers’ 
government”, must be flung from the path of the party as carrion infecting the air’ (emphasis 
added).
813
 With this in mind he addressed reforms that had been demanded by the ‘the platform 
of the four’ and the recently defeated United Opposition. Although he never mentioned the 
Secretariat directly, he blamed the ‘lukewarm’ spirit of the working class on the absence of true 
party democracy. Kamenev candidly complained that worker apathy was due to the Soviet 
system having become an ‘exploitation of their political rights’ (emphasis in the original).
814
 His 
statement is striking for its similarity to the protests made by the 1921 Kronstadt sailors and the 
Workers’ Opposition. He even revived one of their demands, wanting elections from factory 
committees and trade-unions all the way up to the CC through secret ballot and not by raising 
one’s hand.
815
 Kamenev took the charges against the Shakhty engineers seriously. Tomskii’s 
trade unions’ inability to detect the alleged bourgeois sabotage occurring in the Donbass 
indicated that the Bukharin group had not foreseen NEP’s inherent dangers, and that the truth 
could not continue to ‘fall down from the pages of newspapers like a brick to the head’.
816
 The 
party had to openly admit the difficulties facing the country as it had done when they signed the 
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. To regain party trust, he returned to the failed United Opposition’s call 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
place during the meeting had his assessment of the current state of the economy been written afterwards. His lack of 
its inclusion indicates that his notes were most likely written mid-June, just before the plenum. 
813
 RGASPI 323/2/50/43. 
814
 RGASPI 323/2/50/42. 
815
 RGASPI 323/2/50/44. 
816
 RGASPI 323/2/50/46. 
259 
 
to raise the living conditions for workers, increase their salaries, and to increase their number in 
administrative posts.  
It is difficult to surmise just how Kamenev imagined his ideas coming to fruition. 
Returning to worker democracy would have required an unreserved relaxation of the party 
dictatorship, a ship that had long since sailed and was unlikely to garner any party support under 
Stalin’s thumb. Furthermore, he knew very well the General Secretary was at the centre of the 
problem and so far every attempt to unseat him had failed. Kamenev was naïve to think Stalin 
was going to invite him to aid in resolving the country’s economic woes, but he was deluding 
himself in thinking Stalin would relax his personal party dictatorship. 
In the realm of the economy, Kamenev recommended an immediate decree to expand the 
use of sovkhozy (state owned farms employing landless peasants as hired labour) to bridge the 
gap between the state and the peasantry. Although he and Stalin were in agreement on this, 
Kamenev did not consider it an immediate remedy. True, Stalin was thinking it would take 5 
years to have sovkhozy provide sufficient grain reserves, but for Kamenev that was too short a 
time for such results. He predicted that even after 5 years the best possible crop yield from 
sovkhozy would net the state 100 million puds of grain. This, he believed, would fall far short of a 
future peasant economy able to produce up to 1.5 billion puds, only one-fifteenth the total.
 817
 It 
was thus beyond the scope of one five-year-plan. This measure had to be combined with what 
Kamenev called ‘cooperativization’ (kooperirovanie), the gradual but absolutely necessary 
consolidation of poor and middle-peasant land holdings for cooperative production. The highest 
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stage of these farms were of course ‘collective farms’, kolkhozy, something the party left had 
long desired.  
At face value his proposal on agriculture was the course Stalin ultimately tried to fulfil 
beginning in 1929, but what cannot be ignored is the significant difference between their views 
on how to implement the programme. Nowhere did Kamenev endorse the use of force to 
consolidate peasant farms and neither did he sanction the use of poor peasants to extract grain 
from the kulak. In fact he said that it was regrettable that such measures had already taken place 
and rightfully believed that if the leadership had heeded the opposition’s warnings, they would 
have never occurred at all. Returning to his centrist ‘platform of the four’, he advocated that high 
taxation would push peasants to voluntarily join the kolkhozy. This had been the accepted plan of 
the 1927 XV Party Congress. From Kamenev’s writings it is clear that he believed the sovkhozy 
would serve as the instructive model for large-scale farming. Poor peasants earning more as hired 
labourers would shed their concerns about large-scale collective management. Proof of sovkhozy 
profitability would in turn convince middle-peasants of its viability. This combined with high 
taxes would merge poor and middle-peasants into ‘cooperativization’ and then kolkhozy on a 
volunteer basis. Kamenev believed this process would gradually change the ‘balance of forces’ in 
the countryside against the kulak.
818
 The kulak would remain, presumably until communism. The 
use of violence, arrest, class warfare, and execution to relocate peasants to collective farms at a 
breakneck speed between 1929-1932 was not a policy taken from Kamenev or the party left, but 
was a measure Stalin and his coterie planned, sanctioned, and implemented without ideological 
precedent. 
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With the weakening of currency reserves, a disastrous expansion of the goods famine on 
the horizon, an ill-conceived increase in state expenditure, an inevitable decrease in the 
importation of manufacturing equipment, and industry growing dangerously dependent on 
foreign credit, Kamenev imagined that his centrist 1925 ‘state capitalism’ position could satisfy 
the peasant market to escape the ‘vicious circle’ of violence. Again, his ‘slow down’ policy re-
emerged, advocating that the government raise the price paid for grain and on raw materials and 
reduce the tempo of industrialization. He also soundly advocated weakening the monopoly on 
foreign trade.  
Aside from his proposal on relaxing the state’s monopoly on foreign trade, returning to 
his centrist NEP policies of 1925 would not have immediately abated the current crisis. James 
Hughes has shown that the increase in peasant income had outstripped industrial production by 
such a large margin that even when the state had increased taxation in early 1926 it had done 
little to counter the disparity.
819
 Further, higher taxation and greater grain compensation was not 
going to resolve the present deficits in industrial goods. That was why Kamenev proposed 
alleviating difficulties by allowing peasants access to foreign trade. This would have proved 
successful as it would in the short-term have resolved the lack of goods reaching the peasantry 
and given the state breathing room to realign its economic prerogatives and return to a more 
sensible economic programme. 
It is difficult to assess whether Kamenev and Sokol’nikov’s 1925 fiscal policies would 
have prevented the economic decline from 1926-8 if they had not been discarded in favour of 
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Bukharin’s. This is in part because economic historians have traditionally not demarcated 
Kamenev and Sokol’nikov’s led NEP (1922-5) from Bukharin’s NEP (1925-8). Their central 
focus has generally remained on whether or not NEP was a viable economic system of 
development in general.
820
 With that said, from the literature that does exist comparing the two 
periods it is possible to discern that had Kamenev and Sokol’nikov’s policies not been interrupted 
by Bukharin’s, the grain problems in 1928 may have never come to the fore at all. L.N. 
Dobrokhotov has illustrated that NEP’s decline began when Kamenev and Sokol’nikov’s 
successful ruble reform was undone by Bukharin’s reassessment of the country’s economic 
priorities in late 1925. When the state accepted foreign credit to increase the industrial sector of 
the economy beyond what Kamenev and Sokol’nikov had projected, the ‘goods famine’ 
increased as investment failed to bring sufficient production results. This inevitably pushed the 
country’s positive trade balance to become negative, as the state tried to overcome the shortfall 
through trade.
821
 Kamenev’s fear that the government would expend their gold reserves to 
overcome the crisis proved unwarranted, but only because the regime chose a path he had not 
predicted. Instead of buying grain at higher rates the state implemented a food rationing system in 
1928. Then to overcome the problem in general Stalin used unrelenting violent force through 
collectivisation.  
 
                                                          
820
 Davies, Soviet economic development, p. 36. 
821
 L.N. Dobrokhotov, ‘Dolgaya zhizn’ denezhnoi reform 20-kh gg.’, Denezhnaya reforma 1921-1924 gg.: sozdanie 





 or an Alliance with Stalin? 
Historians such as Paul Gregory, Robert V. Daniels, Catherine Merridale, and Stephen 
Kotkin have all stated that Bukharin desired to meet Kamenev so that he would not aid Stalin.
823
 
Bukharin was in a panic fearing the triumph of Stalin’s far left alternatives and the resurgence of 
abandoned War Communism methods of grain procurement and through their mutual friend 
Sokol’nikov summoned Kamenev to Moscow from Kaluga during the July 4-12 1928 CC 
plenum.
824
 Stalin had come forward in favour of exacting ‘tribute’ from the peasantry, a 
resurrection of Preobrazhensky’s earlier idea to treat the peasantry as a colony by extracting 
capital from it to finance industrial development. Bukharin’s main concern was that such a policy 
would alienate the middle-peasant and lead the country to ‘civil war’. Further, in order for Stalin 
to avoid giving any credence to the idea that the United Opposition had predicted the kulak 
strangulation of socialist development, Stalin had asserted that class conflict intensified as 
socialism progressed. Bukharin described Stalin’s theoretical understanding to be complete 
‘idiotic illiteracy’,
825
 and knowing how Stalin’s intriguing had ruined Kamenev and Zinoviev, 
Bukharin feared losing his hold on the editorial boards of Pravda and Komsomolskaya Pravda. 
He even went so far as to state on 11 July that the ‘disagreements between us and Stalin are many 
times more serious than all of the former disagreements that we had with you,’ and that he, 
Rykov, and Tomskii had unanimously agreed that ‘it would be better if instead of Stalin in the 
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Politburo, there was Zinoviev and Kamenev.’
826




The evidence is rather thin from Kamenev’s letter to Zinoviev as to what Kamenev 
thought of the meeting, and aside from Kotkin who writes that Kamenev held hopes to ‘resume a 
high position commensurate with his self-perception and past’, historians have largely ignored 
what would have motivated Kamenev to meet. Kotkin’s analysis is wholly inadequate as it 
completely ignores Kamenev’s ideological considerations and misrepresents him as being driven 
by a pursuit of power at any price.
828
 Kamenev listened to Bukharin, but did not understand just 
how far Stalin was going to depart from NEP principles and thought that Bukharin was ‘carried 
away’ with his fears.
829
 Between the two, Bukharin had a better sense of where Stalin’s 
repressive policies were headed, which was odd because Kamenev’s secretary F. P. Shval’be 
understood Stalin, complaining that ‘he decides complex questions…with such force! Yes, 
talentless people decide all questions only with force, only physical force!’
830
 It is clear from 
Kamenev’s private writings from 1928 and 1929 that his primary aim in meeting with Bukharin 
in 1928 and in January 1929 was indeed to probe him about the possibilities of Stalin inviting 
him back into the leadership on the grounds of ideological agreement. At Kamenev’s first 
meeting he inquired after the article Zinoviev had written concerning the ‘right danger’. 
Kamenev had given the text to Stalin and was curious to know his reply.
831
 For their second 
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, Kamenev, and Bukharin met at a hospital under the pretense of seeing a 
sick comrade.
833
 Not very interested in Bukharin’s new economic platform, Kamenev questioned 
Bukharin about Stalin asking for his cooperation. The former oppositionists believed an 
‘economic Brest’ was close at hand and were hoping Stalin required their help.
834
 
Disappointingly, at both meetings Bukharin knew nothing about Stalin’s plans.
835
 
Could Bukharin and Kamenev have formed a bloc? They both deeply opposed the 
repressive measures used against the peasantry to acquire grain and both opposed the idea that 
industrial exports should be used to redress grain export shortages. They agreed that exacting 
‘tribute’ and alienating the middle-peasant was not conducive to the future of socialism. 
Bukharin’s ‘Notes from an Economist’ in September 1928 even showed his willingness to 
consider greater investment in industry if its tempo was in equilibrium with agricultural 
prosperity. Bukharin also iterated his acceptance of collective farming as the highest stage of 
socialist agricultural production and desired that industrialisation proceed much faster than at a 
‘snail’s pace’. 
However, Bukharin’s mild alterations to his views were not enough to overcome his and 
Kamenev’s fundamentally different ideological principles. Kamenev wanted the gradual 
implementation of left-wing measures (collective farms, state planning, greater worker 
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democracy, etc…) and the reconciliation of worker and peasant interests without the 
politseishchina, whereas Bukharin remained convinced that they could develop socialism with a 
peasantry increasing its wealth through private trade. Bukharin’s inability to understand social 
process was so frustrating to Kamenev that in his private notes Kamenev explicitly stated that he 
was following in the footsteps of the ‘god-builder’ Bogdanov, the man who Kamenev believed 
had disregarded dialectics in practice and in theory with his support of Lunacharsky.
836
 The ‘god-
builders’ and Bukharin had both challenged the essential Marxian premise that only through 
economics could one find class consciousness. The ‘god-builders’ had espoused a path to 
socialism akin to a religious endeavour which did not depend on economic class relations,
837
 and 
Bukharin felt that with the state in their hands, socialism could be achieved through capitalist 
methods, again, violating Marx’s rule on class relations. Bukharin never understood that 
increasing the strength of bourgeois elements could not attain socialist ends. Bukharin erred in 
this capacity because he thought the state was already under the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ 
and could simply change course when it desired without considering its economic orientation. 
Believing the state a ‘dictatorship of the party’ which had to change labour relations and practices 
to move on the path to socialism,
838
 Kamenev adamantly disagreed, and in 1929 Kamenev 
admitted that during the conversation with Bukharin there developed ‘an absolutely clear picture 
of the theoretical disagreements dividing them.’
839
 If there was going to be an alliance, Bukharin 
would have to move towards Kamenev’s centrist position, and there was no indication Bukharin 
was willing. 
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Zinoviev and Kamenev had used Bukharin as just one avenue to try to connect with Stalin 
throughout 1928. Wanting to aid Stalin’s position with their economic programme, Kamenev 
appealed to Molotov in hopes of the party allowing him publically to support the general line, but 
was rebuffed and told he was not needed.
840
 He further entreated Voroshilov, Ordzhonikidze, and 
E.M. Yaroslavskii, at different times to no avail.
841
 Stalin’s group was immoveable. 
No Place for ‘Bolshevik Centrism’ 
The reason there was never reconciliation between Kamenev and Stalin in 1928 rests 
solely on the General Secretary’s shoulders. First and foremost, when Zinoviev and Kamenev’s 
six-month suspension ended and they returned to work on 22 June, Zinoviev became the rector of 
Kazan University and Kamenev was appointed head of the Scientific and Technical Department 
of the Supreme Economic Council (NTU VSNKh). However much he called NTU VSNKh the 
‘centre of technological enlightenment’ to educate the masses, making movie reels to train 
workers hardly needed his expertise.
842
 The fact was that Stalin and his supporters preferred that 
Kamenev and Zinoviev remain neutral. Allying with them would appear hypocritical and Stalin 
was not going to make the same mistake as Kamenev and Zinoviev had done in politically 
befriending Trotsky. By placing Kamenev and Zinoviev in positions devoid of any real party 
responsibility, Stalin consequently prevented them from making any serious atonement for their 
past opposition. Without the ability to make amends, they in essence became perpetual 
oppositionists. Orzhonikidze seemed the only one sympathetic.
843
 He went so far as to ask 
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Kamenev for some ‘practical’ solutions to combating bureaucratism from the perspective of NTU 
VSNKh, and was prepared to incorporate them into his report at the upcoming April 1929 XVI 
Party Conference as insight ‘from below’.
844
 However, as Orzhonikidze was in favour of high 
industrial targets, there was no hope that Kamenev’s ‘slow down’ industrialisation views could 
have had influence.  
To compound matters, Trotsky made it difficult for Stalin to believe Kamenev’s sincerity. 
When Trotsky wrote to the CC on 21 October denouncing the leadership’s path to ‘Bonapartism’ 
on account of the growing economic crisis, he postulated that Kamenev was trying to frighten 
Stalin politically. As a capitulated opposition leader Kamenev could wait in the wings and spring 
forward should the crisis exacerbate and find the leadership completely discredited.
845
 During 
Kamenev’s meeting with Molotov, the leadership had confirmed that they were indeed ‘scared’ 
of the opposition.
846
 Writing to Stalin, Kamenev quickly denounced Trotsky as having committed 
‘the greatest mistake of his life’ by not submitting to the CC majority and rejected Trotsky’s 
accusations.
847
 Stalin had the perfect opportunity to play the party peacemaker and unifier, the 
very person Kamenev had accused him of not being at the XIV Party Congress, but he 
obstinately held to his own course and refused conciliation.  
Kamenev, who had always listened to both sides of an argument, found that simply 
having an open ear to Bukharin under Stalin’s leadership was near tantamount to sedition. Stalin 
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struck in early January 1929, as Trotskyist newspapers abroad began to publish the letter which 
Kamenev had written to Zinoviev concerning the meeting with Bukharin. He was hauled before 
Orzhonikidze and the CCC on 27 January, where he confirmed the veracity of the letter and their 
consequent meetings. However, Kamenev professed his innocence as to having given it to 
Trotskyist supporters, declaring that such a thing would have been ‘a crime against the party’. 
From 30 January to 9 February the Politburo and the presidium of the CCC debated whether their 
meeting constituted what Stalin alleged to be a Trotskyist bloc against the CC. Kamenev 
defensively objected that simply listening to one Politburo member’s criticism of another did not 
justify a bloc.
848
 With Bukharin’s unwillingness to completely admit fault in talking with 
Kamenev, the Politburo censured him, giving Stalin the political impetus to force Bukharin out of 
the leadership.
849
 The April XVI Party Conference declared Bukharin’s ideas a ‘right deviation’ 
and as Bukharin had predicted, he was ousted from Pravda’s editorial board and from the 
Comintern. Although he retained his Politburo seat, his political career was essentially over. 
How had the letter fallen into Trotskyist hands? It was certainly not Kamenev who had 
given it to them. He wanted to return to Stalin’s favour, not attack him. In Kaluga Kamenev had 
neither a secure writing table nor a steel filing cabinet, and it is likely that a Trotsky sympathiser 
swiped the document for publication.
850
 Kamenev’s ex-wife and sister to Trotsky, O. D. 
Kameneva, fell under suspicion, but fortunately for her she had been in Sochi on holiday from 16 
August until 10 October, making it impossible for her to have played the courier as Trotsky had 
most likely acquired the document sometime in September when Kamenev’s flat was left 
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unattended. Kamenev cast his suspicion on a Communist from Vienna who was temporarily 
housed in the flat while Kamenev was away, but no evidence ever substantiated his claim.
851
 It 
could have also been the OGPU acting under Stalin’s orders as Kotkin has suggested, but there is 
no evidence either way.
852
 
Had Stalin orchestrated the theft, it played out brilliantly. To the party Kamenev appeared 
to have compromised his political beliefs with Trotsky on the left, and although untrue and 
unfounded, now appeared to have gone volte-face into Bukharin’s camp. Molotov attacked 
Kamenev as ‘disloyal’, and OGPU boss and Stalin ally, V. R. Menzhinsky, professed that 
Kamenev’s actions indicated that he ‘harbours thoughts of revenge’. Menzhinsky’s accusation 
was without merit. Kamenev’s letter to Zinoviev had disclosed only Bukharin’s thoughts and had 
not stated anything of his own. The letter only proved that Kamenev had remained politically 
neutral. From the party right, Uglanov criticized Kamenev for weakening the party. He 
understood that Kamenev’s meeting with Bukharin weakened not only Bukharin’s position, but 
that of Tomskii and Rykov and the entire right-wing opposition as well.
853
 
Stalin had successfully kept Kamenev and Zinoviev from re-entering party life and made 
it easy for the party to condemn them. On 27 March 1929 the Politburo concurred with Molotov 
that Kamenev’s conversation with Bukharin was an act of ‘disloyalty’ to the CC. The 23 April 
united plenum of the CC and presidium of the CCC passed a resolution calling the ‘negotiations’ 
an ‘act of factionalism’. Kamenev, however, escaped punitive measures. The only thing he had 
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not done was tell the Politburo about the meeting. When on 8 May Kamenev and Zinoviev 
presented the Politburo with a written declaration of their loyalty, the Politburo ruled to take no 
part in clearing their names.
854
 Stonewalled at every turn out of vindictive spite for past 
opposition, Kamenev finally understood he had no hope at all of re-joining the leadership and 
participating in party life. The contest of leadership had become polarized between Stalin’s new 
left and Bukharin’s right. There was no place for a centrist position. 
Kamenev’s Evaluation of the First Five-Year Plan 
The last substantial document in the archive which Kamenev wrote sheds light on the 
period shortly after March 1929, and it substantiates the view that Kamenev remained committed 
to his 1925 centrist views. The First Five-Year Plan set by Gosplan and accepted at the XV Party 
Congress that began at the end of 1928 followed the ‘minimal’ plan, but by the end of April the 
XVI Party Congress adjusted the ‘minimal’ projections to a new ‘optimal’ plan. Reasons 
explored by historian Holland Hunter, R.W. Davies, and S.G. Wheatcroft, provide insight as to 
the causes in increasing their industrialization goals. The threat of war, optimism spurred by 
finally marking industrial gains over pre-war values, personal changes in VSNKha and Gosplan, 
and perhaps most importantly, Stalin and his political ambitions to outflank the party right, all 
played their part in setting unattainable goals.
855
  
As Davies indicated, changes in the leadership of Gosplan and Vesenkha throughout 
1926-1927 had left those desiring higher targets at the helm.
856
 During Kamenev’s tenure as head 
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of STO from 1924-1925, he had constantly fought officials clamouring for high investment 
targets.
857
 With his removal from STO, i.e. the removal of his sphere of influence which had 
challenged the country’s ambitious and idealistic economic goals, Stalin’s influence penetrated 
the country’s economic institutions. Although Rykov had succeeded Kamenev in STO, Stalin’s 
rout of Kamenev had placed that powerful economic institution under Politburo approval.
858
 
Therefore the Politburo, not the chair of STO, was the country’s leading economic organ. 
Furthermore, Stalin’s ally in removing Kamenev, Kuibyshev, had been appointed chair of 
VSNKha in 1926, and by 1929 he had become a staunch supporter of rapid industrialisation. 
Those left-wing idealists within VSNKha and STO who had been restrained under Kamenev’s 
‘slow down’ policy became leading directors. 
With the party having been unwilling to support Kamenev’s centrist positions since 1925, 
the party was left with two diametrically opposing choices, Stalin’s newly found desire to support 
leftist policies and Bukharin’s much detested revisionist and rightist views on expanding the 
capitalist practices under NEP. Kamenev’s ‘Bolshevik Centrism’ had aspired to dull the fiercest 
antagonisms of the right and left with prospects of more sensible policy, but with Stalin’s triumph 
over Kamenev and Zinoviev there was no chance for a ‘middle path’. 
 Understanding all this, Kamenev committed his gloomy thoughts about the prospects of 
the ‘optimal’ plan to paper. He repeated his long-standing criticism that the party should not set 
the ends before the means. In general terms, the whole Five-Year-Plan focused on future results 
and carried few practical measures for the present day.
859
 Even minimum projections set 
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improvements two years away.
860
 In his public speeches from NTU VSNKh Kamenev sometimes 
stated this opinion aloud, but in the beginning when industrial goals were more reasonable he had 
toed the party line.
861
 Yet after the party’s acceptance of the ‘optimal’ industrialization targets, he 
privately believed that the Soviet Union lacked the industrial base for such a grandiose plan and 
that neglecting the XV Party Congress’s original decision to increase trade, currency, and tax 
reserves would prove ruinous.
862
 He was still very much the man of 1925, concerned with 
directing the economy through finance. He was not in support of the leadership’s move to focus 
on heavy industry. He believed light industry alone had the power to end the goods famine and to 
restore peasant trust. 
On agriculture, Kamenev’s private writings reveal that he remained oblivious to the idea 
that Stalin was considering brutal force as a continued practice to push through his agenda. He 
did not know that behind closed doors Stalin was implementing collectivization by force; official 
policy indicated that ‘extraordinary’ measures were coming to an end.
863
 Nor had Kamenev 
anticipated Stalin’s December 1929 policy of ‘dekulakization’, which orchestrated the liquidation 
of the kulaks as a class by means of arrest, violence, and often execution. This was never 
something Kamenev believed could ever be a solution for long-term policy goals, and his 
writings show that he continued to advocate ‘socialist legality’; repressive measures would only 
serve to widen the gap between the state and the peasantry.
864
 As he had advocated since the civil 
war, the key to winning peasants to socialism was through positive incentives and taxation. 
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Socialism could not be built on repression. Kamenev predicted that the Five-Year-Plan would 
protract the economic crisis and increase its severity to the point where it would threaten the 
stability of the entire Soviet system.
865
 
Kamenev was right. The ‘collectivization’ campaign was abrupt, quick, and conducted 
with astonishing force. Stalin’s breakneck speed industrialization drive showed a marked increase 
in industrial output from 1928-1933 (but still falling short of their targets in almost every sector), 
but it was at the cost of reducing workers’ living conditions, creating a terrible famine, and 
decreased agricultural output by 14 percent, contrary to the projected 55 percent increase.
866
 
Kamenev no doubt felt a sort of self-vindication when in 2 March 1930, Stalin retreated from his 
‘collectivization’ campaign with his article in Pravda, ‘Dizzy with Success’. About 60 percent of 
all farms had been forcibly collectivized, creating severe economic difficulties in the agricultural 
sector. The First-Five-Year plan had initially had more realistic ambitions, but conducted under 
Stalin party left-wing idealism had trumped the right and the centrists with one fatal blow, 
destroying any remaining peasant trust for either a Kamenev or a Bukharin plan of economic 
development. 
The Ryutin Affair 
Both documents reveal that while Kamenev abhorred the use of force that was employed 
in the countryside and was doubtful Stalin’s programme would succeed, he did feel the party was 
moving in the right direction. The means to which Stalin implemented his policy and the tempo 
to which he set economic development were his fundamental issues of disagreement. With 
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Bukharin, he labelled him a follower of the ‘god-builders’ and completely dismissed him. 
Combined with the evidence known from the conversations between Kamenev and Bukharin in 
1928, it is clear that Kamenev was not searching for an alliance with Bukharin at all. Therefore, 
there is no reason to believe Kamenev was involved in any plots against Stalin emanating from 
the party right. Although he could have had a change of heart by the time the former Moscow 
Party secretary M.N. Ryutin
867
 tried to unite all former opposition members to remove Stalin as 
the General Secretary in the wake of Stalin’s catastrophic collectivization and ‘dekulakization’ 
policies, the evidence during his interrogation corroborates the narrative that he would broker no 
alliance with them.  
In the spring of 1932 Ryutin wrote two documents, establishing the ‘Union of Marxists-
Leninists’. The one document particularly venomous was his ‘Stalin and the crisis of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat’, which explicitly denounced Stalin and his ruinous collectivization 
campaign. The platform called for the whole party, especially former oppositionists, to band 
together to remove Stalin. In June Ryutin’s circle widened, and by 21 August in Golovino, 16 of 
Ryutin’s supporters convened and elected M.S. Ivanov, V.N. Kayurov, P.A. Galkin, V.I. 
Demidov, P.P. Fedorov to its central committee. In spite of Ryutin’s hatred for Kamenev and 
Zinoviev,
868
 at the group’s second meeting they agreed to use G.E. Rokhkin and Ya.E. Sten to 
pass the platform documents to Zinoviev and Kamenev.
869
 Sharing a dacha, Zinoviev received 
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the news first and anxiously waited with Sten until the 15 September to speak with Kamenev 
when he returned. 
The discussion that took place had no semblance of conspiracy or acceptance in joining 
Ryutin. Initially Kamenev brushed off the document as a work of Trotskyists, but Zinoviev and 
Sten convinced Kamenev that it was the work of rightists. Based on the data presented therein, 
they concluded it had been written in the spring and was therefore already known to the party 
authorities and the OGPU. However, when Zinoviev saw Kamenev off on holiday the next day at 
the train station, the two came to the agreement that Zinoviev would call Kaganovich to inform 
him about the ‘counterrevolutionary nonsense’, just in case. Verified by Kaganovich’s secretary, 
Zinoviev called Kaganovich three times, but Kaganovich did not return his calls.
870
  
What was not so clear was whether Kamenev and Zinoviev initially agreed with the 
platform. Kamenev denied discussing it, but Sten indicated that they did.
871
 They no doubt agreed 
with Ryutin’s assessment of Stalin’s lust for power and blamed Stalin for the failings of 
collectivisation. Yet, Kamenev stated truthfully during questioning that it had been impossible for 
him to aid Ryutin because with his ‘entire soul’ he was against the party right. All the evidence 
indicates that Kamenev was not lying to shirk responsibility. Besides, with what force could 
Kamenev have helped challenge Stalin? He was surrounded by would-be bourgeois intellectuals, 
not party revolutionaries. His friend Maxim Gorky had worked to enable Kamenev to essentially 
run the publishing house ‘Academia’ in all but name by September of 1932.
872
 Further, even if he 
had considered it, which was extremely unlikely, the OGPU broke up the organization before any 
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action was possible. In fact, the exact day Kamenev first heard about the platform the OGPU 
arrested M.S. Ivanov, V.N. Kayurov, V.B. Kayurov, and V.B. Gorelov. Ryutin was arrested on 
23 September. By the time Kamenev returned from his holiday, the affair was coming to an end.  
The only real reason Kamenev fell under such a cloud of suspicion was due to Stalin, who 
sensing party discontent with his leadership in the wake of his catastrophic collectivisation policy 
believed that his enemies were scheming to challenge him. On the 27 September the presidium of 
the CCC pressed the OGPU to be more vigilant in locating those aware of the platform, and 
under Stalin’s personal direction on the 2 October, the united CC and CCC plenum declared that 
anyone who had read or known about the ‘Ryutin platform’ and had not informed the CCC would 
be expelled from the party. Clearly Stalin had widened the net for the sole purpose of ensnaring 
Kamenev and Zinoviev. The CCC interrogated Kamenev and Zinoviev on 9 October under the 
leadership of Ya. E. Rudzutak. Less distinguished party figures such as Rudzutak, A.S. Enukidze, 
B.A. Roizenman, and E.M. Yaroslavskii, tried their best to provoke Kamenev with heated 
accusations. As was his custom, he remained remarkably calm. Contrarily, the same could not be 
said for Uglanov,
873
 who broke down in tears during questioning. Zinoviev pleaded not to be 
expelled.  
Kamenev asked the important question, ‘In whose interest is it’ to declare Zinoviev and 
Kamenev counterrevolutionaries? Cleary it was in Stalin’s interest. With a declining standard of 
living for the working class, leftist opposition was stirring and directing their hopes on to the two 
fallen leaders. However, Stalin was to blame for the meagre influence that Kamenev and 
Zinoviev retained as he had forced them to remain neutral. Now the two represented a symbolic 
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leadership alternative. It was for this reason that in February the OGPU began arresting numerous 
members of the former left opposition, including I.N. Smirnov, Preobrazhenskii, and V.A. Ter-
Vaganyan. Having read the Ryutin platform, Zinoviev and Kamenev gave Stalin the excuse for 
the CCC to expel them both from the party. On 11 October the OGPU sentenced them to three 
years exile in Siberia. Kamenev was sent to Minusinsk, 290 kilometres from where he had lived 
in exile under the Tsar. 
Despite the convincing evidence that Kamenev and Zinoviev had played absolutely no 
part in trying to ally with Bukharin in 1928 or aid Ryutin against Stalin in 1932, there remains 
two potentially damning pieces of evidence against him. On the 20 February 1933 Kamenev 
wrote a letter to the Politburo and the CCC denouncing his past actions in the United Opposition, 
admitting to negotiating with Bukharin for an ‘unprincipled bloc’, praising ‘socialism in one 
country’, and declaring that collectivization was the greatest thing since the October Revolution, 
calling it both ‘theoretical and practical’.
874
 Pravda printed this letter on 18 May and Zinoviev’s 
on 20 May. To make amends Kamenev wrote to Stalin on 22 February 1933 reminding him of 
their past friendship and praising his leadership for uniting the party, something he had thought 
impossible. He then heaped the blame on himself for having created a neutral position by which 
‘any enemy of the party and of your leadership could place hopes on my possible sympathy...’ 
concluding that ‘years from the party have taught me that I can work under your leadership…’
875
  
Why then did he falsely prostrate himself before the party? With Stalin feeling politically 
vulnerable the leadership needed to remove any possible threat to their power and were therefore 
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willing to allow Kamenev and Zinoviev to publically break their neutrality. Kamenev had no 
interest in politics and appeased Stalin to return to the literary work he now considered far more 
important than events in the past he could not change or a socialism he could no longer build with 
peasant trust irrevocably destroyed. In fact, he was so consumed with his literary efforts that in 
exile he wrote articles and introductions for Gogol’s Dead Souls, a biography of Chernyshevskii, 
and a preface to Herzen’s The Bell reprint.
876
 This explains why Kamenev stopped keeping 
personal notes. There was no centrist position that could effectively restore the damage Stalin had 
done with collectivisation.  
With Gorky’s help and his confession, Stalin allowed Kamenev to officially head the 
‘Academia’ publishing house. By the end of April Kamenev had returned to Moscow, and in 
December the CC and CCC returned his party card. However, his exile had taken its toll. Upon 
meeting Kamenev, children’s writer K.I. Chukovskii
877
 wrote of him in his diary 1 June 1933 that 
‘During the year his head had turned entirely grey.’
878
 Even though Kamenev had given up on 
politics, Stalin had not forgotten about him and Kamenev was exhausted in trying to prove his 
innocence. 
Conclusion 
Kamenev’s personal writings prove that he harboured no desire to cooperate with 
Bukharin and the party right to challenge Stalin. To the contrary, they reveal that he was 
anticipating joining Stalin against Bukharin in hopes of reviving the working class with the 
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acknowledgement that they had in fact a ‘dictatorship of the party’ and not a ‘dictatorship of the 
proletariat’. Kamenev abhorred Stalin’s politseishchina, but he thought the Politburo’s 
‘extraordinary measures’ were only a temporary policy. The only reason the alliance did not 
occur was because Stalin and the leadership did not want to share any power with Kamenev and 
Zinoviev, make compromises to the two’s centrist views, or lose face in reconciling with 
previous opponents. The two were forced into a position of neutrality whereby without the 
possibility for atonement, the leadership kept them perpetual enemies. Under Bukharin’s 
economic policies the party had led the state to its 1928 crisis, something Kamenev’s more 
moderate policies could have avoided. By 1929 Kamenev had become increasingly sceptical of 
Stalin’s leftward policies in overcoming the ‘extraordinary measures’ taken against the peasantry 
and was convinced his centrist position following his and Sokol’nikov’s 1925 fiscal taxation 
policies was the key to restoring peasant trust. His 1929 notes indicate that he was not prepared to 
challenge Stalin directly. He remained silent and his personal notations came to an end. His turn 
to a literary career and abandonment of politics illustrates that after Stalin initiated his 
collectivisation and ‘dekulakization’ campaigns he stopped contemplating future socialist 
development. He felt the path to socialism was irrevocably destroyed. 
However, Stalin’s disastrous campaign in the countryside worried the General Secretary 
immensely. He therefore ensured that together with Ryutin’s ‘Union of Marxists-Leninists’, the 
neutral Kamenev and Zinoviev were arrested and exiled so that no leadership alternative was 
possible. This occurred despite the obvious fact that aiding Ryutin’s rightist agenda was against 
Kamenev’s ‘entire soul’, and that outside having read Ryutin’s platform there was no evidence 
they were going to join his cause. Even the ambitious Zinoviev had made efforts to inform 
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Kaganovich of the Ryuitin platform to show party loyalty. Nevertheless, at the personal will of 






From 1933 to 1936 the crisis of collectivization and industrialization, and above all the 
famine crisis of 1932-3 abated, and the economy entered a phase of relatively stable growth. 
Political opposition to the regime receded but misgivings within the party concerning the way 
policy had earlier been handled remained and evidence of this discontent with Stalin and his 
policies may have surfaced behind the scenes at the XVII party congress. The assassination of 
S.M. Kirov in Leningrad in December 1934 stoked a new wave of repression, with Kamenev and 
Zinoviev being arrested. Whilst there is evidence of a certain relaxation of repression in 1934 and 
1935, the threat of war became more ominous. In August 1936 the first major show trial signaled 
a dramatic new phase in the drive against internal opponents of the regime, with the execution of 
Kamenev and Zinoviev and other defendants. There is no archival evidence to shed light on 
Kamenev’s views in this period, but we have evidence of his thinking from his writings on 
Russian literature, especially those works that relate to the development of the Russian 
revolutionary movement from the mid-nineteenth century onwards. 
The Aesopian Kamenev 
In 1930 Kamenev developed his career outside politics. Initially his writing was devoid of 
contemporary political meaning. That year he worked on the republication of Herzen’s The Bell 
(Kolokol) newspaper, and wrote an introduction to N.N. Apostolov’s work on Lev Tolstoy.
879
 In 
1931 he wrote an introduction for I.S. Turgenev’s Fathers and Sons,
 880
 and edited a three volume 
                                                          
879
 Lev Kamenev, ‘Predislovie’, in Lev Tolstoi i russkoe samoderzhavie, Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo, 
1930, p. 1-2. 
880
 Lev Kamenev, ‘Predislovie’, in I.S. Turgenev, Otsy i deti, Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo, 1931, p. 5-13. 
283 
 
collection of works by A.I. Herzen.
881
 At the end of July 1931 he joined Lunacharsky at the 
Institute of New Russian Literature.
882
 At no point in this time period had Kamenev written any 
Aesopian attacks on Stalin.
883
 His son’s wife recalled that in these years that all Kamenev ‘ever 
thought about was books, art, and music. He never discussed politics at home.’
884
 
It was only in 1933 after Stalin vindictively authorised Kamenev and Zinoviev’s exile that 
Kamenev employed Aesopian methods to attack Stalin and his policies through works of literary 
criticism. Alexis Pogorelskin argues that Kamenev had already used such methods in November 
1928 when he wrote that Chernyshevskii had defiantly written that even ‘under censorship 
articles can educate real revolutionaries.’ This she argues was a reflection of an emergent alliance 
of Bukharin and Kamenev.
885
 Whilst both Bukharin and Kamenev to some degree shared their 
assessment of Stalin as ‘Asiatic’ or a ‘Genghis Khan’, the two remained poles apart politically. 
His choice of words might instead reflect his own frustrations of writing under censorship, with 
an implied criticism of the General Secretary’s penchant for using administrative and coercive 
means to overcome political and economic problems. His real Aesopian work did not fully 
commence until Kamenev was forced into exile and then publically manipulated to praise the 
very policies he deplored.   
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As Pogorelskin shows, in writing about Chernyshevskii in 1933 Kamenev clearly adopted 
Aesopian means of commenting on contemporary politics. Kamenev focused on the nineteenth 
century writer’s disdain for ‘tribute’ exacted from the peasantry to challenge Stalin’s 
collectivisation campaign. The charge that the Soviet regime was exacting tribute from the 
peasantry as part of a system of military-feudal exploitation was something that had also been 
voiced by Bukharin. Stalin had spiritedly responded to these charges in his speech to the CC and 
CCC in April 1929 on ‘The Right Deviation in the Party’.
886
 Kamenev now returned to this 
theme. The state, Chernyshevskii contended, was acting as if they were a conquering nation. The 
parallel was with the Soviet state’s colonisation of the peasantry to finance industry. Pogorelskin 
also notes how Kamenev accentuated the Tsar’s role in overseeing the fabrication of evidence 
used in Chernyshevkii’s 1862 arrest; uncannily resembling Stalin’s own interest in the meager 
materials that were used in justifying Kamenev’s exile concerning Ryutin.
887
  
In Kamenev’s unpublished preface to Herzen’s The Bell, he again specifically addressed 
state sponsored violence. Kamenev quoted a poignant letter from Herzen where he described 
growing up under ‘terror’ and ‘under the black wings of the secret police’. No doubt this was 
selected to speak of Stalin’s Russia. Kamenev reminded ‘contemporary readers’ of the value of 
The Bell in its account of the ‘scourging Tsarist court, bureaucracy, nobility, and its now 
shocking descriptions of the suppression of peasant unrest…’ Here Kamenev directed 
‘contemporary readers’ to the parallels between the brutal policies of the Tsarist state and Stalin’s 
rule.  
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There is one work that personifies Kamenev’s disagreement with Stalin best, and that was 
his introduction to Niccolò Machiavelli’s The Prince, where Kamenev thrice accorded 
Machiavelli the position ‘secretary’. The title equated Machiavelli as the Florentine secretary, the 
master of duplicity and subterfuge, with the General Secretary. Through his words about 
Machiavelli, Kamenev illuminated that Stalin had ‘no gift for profound philosophical enquiry,’ 
and that ‘the social content of power, its social determination, interested him very little’. In 
essence, Stalin cared little for Marxism and was only interested in power.
888
 Kamenev was right 
to make this statement. True, Stalin had applied Marxian dialectics to the countryside to 
understand social processes after the United Opposition had been defeated, and there are those 
such as Robert McNeal who believe that Stalin’s leftist conversion was sincere,
889
 but the fact 
Stalin did not deviate from that line after the defeat of the right is not convincing proof of his 
changed convictions or of his Marxist understanding; there was never another opposition for him 
to overcome to test his beliefs. Stalin had his own views and objectives, but his most important 
theoretical ideas were born out of conflict to overcome his opponents. Stalin had advanced 
‘socialism in one country’ in conflict with Trotsky and in 1925 wielded it to dismantle Kamenev 
and Sokol’nikov’s economic policies. Then, Stalin converted to the left and proffered the theory 
that class struggle intensifies as socialism approaches only at the moment he needed to overcome 
Bukharin. 
One of the most revealing passages in Kamenev’s introduction to The Prince was not 
about Stalin, but about Kamenev. In the introduction Kamenev referenced Lassalle as the exposer 
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of Machiavelli’s vision to simply ‘express what is’.
890
 Kamenev could have selected any 
revolutionary’s opinion on Machiavelli, but he chose Lassalle specifically for the comparison. 
Lassalle had been the sole reason Kamenev had started on his revolutionary career and the labour 
leader had heavily influenced numerous of Kamenev’s post-revolutionary policies. It is clear that 
in the introduction Stalin was Machiavelli and Kamenev was Lassalle. By referencing Lassalle he 
expressed to readers the two Communists’ fundamentally different approach to politics. Similar 
to Lassalle, Kamenev had sought unity, bringing opposing forces together by focusing on 
unifying objectives along centrist lines. Stalin was the divider, the Machiavellian man bent on 
destroying opponents and exerting total control. Again, Kamenev’s depiction was an accurate 
one. Stalin could have allowed Kamenev and Zinoviev to support him in 1928, but he had refused 
solely due to issues of power. Kamenev’s view of himself as Lassalle was also fair. From the 
Duma debate in 1907 to his 1925 NEP policies and ideas, time and time again Kamenev had 
sought unifying goals between opponents, even with Trotsky, and on one occasion, the 
bourgeoisie. 
Lies, Fabrications, and a Show Trial 
The accuracy of Kamenev’s depiction of Stalin and his Machiavellian aspirations finds 
abundant confirmation in the way Stalin personally directed the police and the party to hound 
Kamenev and Zinoviev. On 1 December 1934, Leonid Nikolaev assassinated Leningrad party 
boss Kirov at Smolny. Whether Stalin planned the killing remains unknown, but there is no 
question that he used Kirov’s death to remove Kamenev and Zinoviev from the political scene 
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permanently. It did not take Stalin long to instruct NKVD head, N.I. Ezhov, to ‘Find the killer 
among the Zinovievites’. The two were arrested on 16 December 1934. Ezhov, evidently with 
Stalin’s connivance, fabricated Kamenev and Zinoviev’s link to the murder. Kamenev and 
Zinoviev were accused through their continual opposition of having influenced Nikolaev’s 
actions, labeling their group the ‘Anti-Soviet United Trotskyist-Zinovievite Centre’. Stalin 
invited the deputy procurator, A.Ya. Vyshinskii, into their circle to aid in framing Zinoviev and 
Kamenev. Arkady Vaksberg has shown that although Stalin personally took direction, he allowed 
Vyshinskii the necessary leeway in falsifying the details of the charges.
891
 Kamenev and 
Zinoviev were charged with being associated with the conspiracy of the ‘Moscow Centre’, which 
allegedly had been conspiring to remove the CC leadership since 1928,
892
 which, as has been 
shown, was a fabrication. Further, an NKVD worker, A.I. Katsaf, recalled in 1956 that during his 
14 and 15 January 1935 interrogation, Kamenev denied the accusation even when he was 
promised not to be executed for his admission. In fact, the only thing Kamenev and Zinoviev 
acknowledged took place was that for a time after 1928 they together with G.E. Evdokimov, I.P. 
Bakaev, A.S. Kuklin, and Ya.V. Sharov met to discuss rumours, politics, and news.
893
 
Their denials only strengthened Stalin and Ezhov’s resolve. They circulated a closed letter 
to the CC 17-18 January 1935, maintaining that the evidence showed conclusively that 
Zinovievite groups had conspired to kill Kirov. Indirectly responsible, Stalin requested the CC to 
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‘arrest and isolate’ the anti-party groups, which after only a day’s consideration the CC accepted. 
Convicted of ‘moral complicity’, as leader Zinoviev was sentenced to ten years in prison, 
Kamenev five. 
Stalin, however, appears to have been dissatisfied with the prison sentences that were 
handed out. In January Kamenev’s relatives were implicated in the imagined ‘Kremlin Affair’ 
which was aimed at pressuring him to falsely confess. With arrests starting 20 January and 
continuing until 5 February, deputy chair of the OGPU Ya.S. Agranov and Commissar of Internal 
Affairs G.G. Yagoda worked with Stalin to unmask a conspiracy within the Kremlin to kill the 
General Secretary. Kamenev’s brother’s ex-wife who worked in Molotov’s personal library, N.A. 
Rozenfelda, was implicated in the plot.
894
 Angering her accusers with denials, the police 
expanded their efforts and soon her ex-husband (Kamenev’s brother) B.N. Rozenfeld and her son 
(also B.N. Rozenfeld), together with F.I. Muzyka, Kamenev’s secretary, were arrested. Within 
days they had retracted their innocent pleas and confirmed their plans to kill Stalin by poison or 
other means. When asked who directed the conspiracy, of course they answered ‘Kamenev’. On 
21 March Kamenev was interrogated, but the scheme to coerce Kamenev had failed. Again 
accepting only moral responsibility, he denied any knowledge of his brother’s plot. In June 
Ezhov made the case that Kamenev and Zinoviev were not only ‘morally complicit’, but had 
directly participated in Kirov’s murder. 
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Kamenev had no knowledge of the plot. Everything against him was a sham. Upon his 
return Kamenev had employed his brother as an illustrator for ‘Academia’,
895
 and had taken on 
the responsibility of two additional publishing houses, becoming the director of the Institute of 
Russian Literature on 4 May, and the director of the Institute of World Literature 14 June. He 
further wrote introductions for Turgenev’s Rudin, and completed his introduction to The Prince. 
Yet his most time-consuming work was in arranging the collected works of Pushkin, a massive 
undertaking which was a labour of love that he continued to work on even in prison.
896
 He had 
become a writer, not a reborn revolutionary. 
During the interrogation Kamenev recalled that Zinoviev had worryingly told him that 
their arrests were akin to the 30 June 1934 arrests in Nazi Germany, ‘the Night of the Long 
Knives’, when Adolf Hitler had ordered the arrests and executions of Ernst Röhm, Kurt von 
Schleicher and hundreds of others. Whilst Röhm and Schleicher had real potential for political 
activity in Germany, Kamenev and Zinoviev had essentially no means at their disposal to take 
any political action. Obviously displeased with the interrogation charade, when Stalin read the 
transcript of the proceedings he wrote in the margin that it was a ‘foolish questioning of 
Kamenev’.
897
 Kamenev was sentenced to ten years in prison. 
Why then did Stalin find it necessary to implicate Kamenev and Zinoviev in Kirov’s 
murder when the two were so far removed from politics? J. Arch Getty has shown how any 
dissidence to the unconfident regime was scrutinized and repressed under Stalin no matter how 
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big or small their dissent,
898
 and although Getty demonstrates that Stalin perhaps wavered on 
what to do with Kamenev and Zinoviev, he was ultimately the deciding factor in sentencing them 
to death.  
 During the August 1936 ‘trial of the sixteen’, Kamenev, Zinoviev, Evdokimov, Smirnov, 
Bakayev, Ter-Vaganyan, S.V. Mrachkovski, E.A. Dreitzer, E.S. Holtzman, I.I. Reingold, R.V. 
Pickel, V.P. Olberg, K.B. Berman-Yurin, I.I. Kruglyanski, M. Lurye, and N. Lurye were accused 
of murdering Kirov and of plotting to overthrow the leadership and seize power with the help of 
fascist German agents. Trotsky’s assertion that Stalin did not foresee the ramifications of 
murdering Kamenev and Zinoviev and that he just wanted them gone is not only the best 
explanation for the origins of the Great Terror, but corresponds to Stalin’s leading direction of 
moving from crisis to crisis without forethought of consequences.
899
Any bottom-up pressure for 
reprisals against the accused for the death of Kirov was created from years of constant iteration 
from Stalin’s group that Kamenev and Zinoviev were ‘double-dealers’, ‘disloyal’, and ‘traitors’. 
Their executions were not even to draw the population’s attention away from economic 
woes. R.W. Davies has shown that the year Stalin orchestrated the first Moscow Show Trial in 
1936 the economy was stable.
900
 The two’s deaths, among others, were only for Stalin’s 
psychological benefit to escape his paranoia that Kamenev and Zinoviev would somehow rise 
from their political graveyard and lead an assault on his leadership. Stalin used the psychodrama 
of Kirov’s assassination to justify a move against all those whom he deemed opponents or critics 
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of his rule, and he used this as the means to prepare for a major purge, to remove entire 
categories of those he considered disloyal or suspect, to provide the basis for the advancement of 
new people, to use the repression as a means of mobilising vigilance and support for his 
leadership, and for constructing a system of more repressive political control. In this Stalin drew 
lessons from Hitler’s ‘Night of the Long Knives’, of which Kamenev was so keenly aware.   
The argument that Kamenev and Zinoviev brought their 1936 punishment upon 
themselves for continually defying the party is highly questionable. Although they had tried with 
all their effort to remove Stalin from 1925-1928, there is no evidence to indicate that either 
Kamenev or Zinoviev had actively continued their opposition to Stalin from 1928 to the 1932 
Ryutin Affair. In fact, they had wanted to join him! During the ‘trial of the sixteen’ the 
prosecutor Vyshynsky used Kamenev’s Aesopian writings against him, but they were a far cry 
from an organised oppositional struggle. 
Ezhov’s threatening of Kamenev’s brother and secretary in 1935 had not been enough for 
him to falsely confess to plotting to murder Stalin or Kirov, but by 20 August 1936, clearly Stalin 
had devised something to make Kamenev admit to treason as an ‘enemy of the people’ alongside 
his long-time friend and ally Zinoviev.
901
 On 24 August 1936, the Military Collegium of the 
Supreme Court of the Soviet Union under the direction of V.V. Ulrich condemned the 16 to be 
shot, but it was Stalin, the trial’s puppet master, who far from the proceedings on holiday rejected 
their plea for mercy and gave the final word to execute them. With his usual calmness, early in 
the morning of 25 August in the Lubyanka Kamenev met his death. All his life he had been 
prepared to die a revolutionary, but with his vision of socialism irrevocably destroyed with 





Stalin’s horrific policies, he was even denied martyrdom. Not enough the man and his dream 
were dead, Stalin ensured his son Yuri was shot just two years later at the age of 17. His oldest 
son Alexander was then executed in 1939, and Kamenev’s ex-wife Olga Kameneva met her end 
under Stalin’s repression on 9 November 1941. 
Final Thoughts 
For someone who typically remained friends with his opponents and had no great 
ambition for personal power, it was strange that Kamenev died for Stalin’s want of absolute 
political authority. In spite of all their disagreements, Kamenev’s personal relationship with 
Lenin had been on the best terms. Trotsky wrote that Kamenev ‘sincerely loved Lenin’.
902
 Often 
in disagreement with Kamenev, Ryazanov had ‘unbounded affection and endless respect’ for him 
and the two exchanged birthday cards and letters long after both had left politics.
903
 Kamenev had 
also befriended Zinoviev, of whom Clare Sheridan recalled ‘I never heard anyone except 
Kamenev have a decent word for him’.
904
 While Mikoyan’s cordiality with Kamenev has already 
been recounted, Kamenev did have friendly relations outside his own party. The Trudovik V.B. 
Stankevich recalled from 1917 that Kamenev ‘was, undoubtedly, not the enemy...’
905
 The 
Menshevik N.N. Sukhanov noted of his friend Kamenev that ‘personally he was gentle and good-
hearted’.
906
 Lewis Namier who interviewed Kamenev in the UK in 1918 was surprised that 
despite his strong convictions he was ‘ready for free discussion’ and appeared ‘perfectly honest’ 
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 The writers’ circles and intelligentsia society in which Kamenev had found 
mutual respect and acceptance could not believe that Kamenev’s work had all been a 
smokescreen to murder Kirov.
908
 Chukovskii recounted that Kamenev was ‘kind and cheerful’.
909
 
Although she seemed to despise his softness, Louise Bryant remembered that Kamenev liked ‘to 
be magnanimous and promises everything to everybody.’
910
 One of the only negative 
descriptions of his character came from Beatrice Webb, who noted that he had a ‘somewhat 
unpleasant personage’ and possessed a ‘self-assured manner and easy address of one accustomed 
to exercise power.’
911
 However, this was partly because at the time he met the Webbs he was 
travelling with Krasin, one of the few people with whom Kamenev had rocky relations. Stalin 
became Kamenev’s enemy because he was incapable of doing what Kamenev could, and that was 
separate politics from personal relations. Until Stalin, Kamenev did not have ‘enemies’ and never 
ordered the death of anyone. Not even Kornilov, Kamenev had maintained in 1917, was 
deserving of such a punishment.
912
 The general consensus on Kamenev’s character was that he 
was kind, sympathetic, generous, and honest. It should be no surprise that Kamenev took so 
strongly to Lassalle’s ideal proletariat state because it aimed to win over opponents by finding 
common ground. His ideological course was, in part, a reflection of Kamenev’s character. 
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Lenin’s unilinear conception of politics had created the 1912 split with the Mensheviks, 
ensured the break with the Second International, made enemies of fellow socialists in 1917, led to 
outlawing other parties, and justified force to achieve economic and political objectives. Making 
only a handful of gains, Kamenev’s ‘Bolshevik Centrism’ had tried to connect socialist 
opponents by finding common cause through discourse but had always been rather ineffectual 
within the party under Lenin, drowned out by the leader’s growing intolerance to dissent.  
Kamenev’s ‘Bolshevik Centrism’ faired far worse under Stalin, whose party position combined 
with the kind of monological thinking utilised by Lenin proved the source of Kamenev’s 
senseless death. Stalin believed there was only one true ideological position, the one espoused by 
him. Thus, the Lassalle of Bolshevism was needlessly crushed under the heavy Machiavellian 





This thesis has set as its aim a detailed examination of Lev Kamenev’s goals, socialist 
vision, motivations, and their theoretical underpinnings. It challenges the existing historiography 
which either presents Kamenev as an inconsequential figure, or at worst an opportunist. It has 
aimed to interpret his political position in terms of a consistent adherence to an ideological 
conception of socialism, derived from Marx and from Lassalle. In this it offers a radically new 
understanding of Bolshevism. Kamenev’s political position is best characterised as ‘Bolshevik 
Centrism’, reflecting a commitment to find unifying inter and intra-party goals within the 
framework of Bolshevism. This did not mean that he was simply a man with a propensity for 
compromise. If that were the case, then this investigation would have been far less fruitful and 
not had any impact on the understanding of Bolshevism as a whole. It is of critical importance to 
understand that through Kamenev’s words and actions it is possible to discern that his centrism 
was predominantly shaped by the views of Social-Democracy’s founder, Ferdinand Lassalle, a 
hitherto neglected theoretical influence in the study of Bolshevism. 
The guiding light of Kamenev’s socialist vision and determination came from Lassalle. 
His ideas on the development of working class culture and of building a strong independent 
political organization brought Kamenev close to Lenin and Bogdanov in the early years of the 
Bolshevik party. Although Lassalle did not differ fundamentally from Marx in defining the 
socialist stages of development, he had a drastically different outlook as to how each stage 
advanced. Lassalle emphasised the necessity of raising the political strength of the proletariat in 
order to bind the class together culturally through party and common identity. In the ‘Fourth 
Estate’ he argued that proletarian culture had to first predominately transform society to working 
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class views of equality and morality before revolution. This was a more evolutionary approach to 
Marx, who heavily focused on revolution, with proletarian culture developing within the confines 
of class struggle, believing that proletarian culture would only truly develop once the conquest of 
power had been attained. Kamenev had tried to reconcile the two views within early Bolshevism 
by declaring loyalty to Lenin politically and to Bogdanov theoretically. Kamenev’s 
understanding of social processes through a Lassallean paradigm shaped his formulation that the 
revolution in February 1917 was an ‘incomplete’ bourgeois revolution and explains why he 
opposed the Revolution of 1905 and the October Revolution. Without a fully developed 
proletarian culture and political consciousness, he judged revolution at those times to be 
premature.  
Lassalle’s influence on Kamenev persisted after the revolution. Lassalle’s vision of a 
future socialist state without coercion set him at odds with Lenin, Trotsky, Bukharin, and Stalin 
at different times throughout his career. Lassalle’s ideas also shaped Kamenev’s perception of the 
Soviet state under NEP. Similar to Lassalle, Kamenev viewed the state as the central organising 
tool for building socialism and endeavoured to draw the masses closer to the state so that they 
would accept it as their own. This kept Kamenev from ever endorsing programme’s that ran 
along syndicalist lines or in accepting Bukharin’s rightist position which favoured capitalist 
models and undervalued the need to develop proletarian labour practices. It also made him 
adverse to repression; force would only drive the masses away from the state and make building 
socialism along Lassallean lines impossible. 
Kamenev’s ‘Bolshevik Centrism’ was forged within his understanding of Social-
Democracy. In his time Lassalle had been able to manifest varied opinions into a unitary force of 
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action. Kamenev’s ‘Bolshevik Centrism’ was a tactic that sought to not only find unifying 
objectives to forge compromise within his own party, but one which aspired to align all socialists 
in general. Unlike Lenin who assumed a monological position with the outbreak of war and cast 
those in disagreement with him as enemies, Kamenev focused on concrete objects that could hold 
divided Social-Democrats together. In 1914 he focused on the need for a Third International 
rather than on dismantling the Second International. Unlike Lenin, he avoided combating fellow 
socialists directly in the hope of later winning them round. In March 1917 Kamenev used the 
policy of peace to solicit Bolshevik and Menshevik unity around a common goal and at numerous 
points throughout the year attempted to forge cooperation. After the Petrograd Soviet had 
endorsed the Provisional Government’s ‘Liberty Loan’, Lenin branded the Mensheviks and SRs 
traitors and brooked no compromise. Lenin and Kamenev thus moved in different directions. 
Although Lenin’s political line ultimately defeated Kamenev’s ambitions for an all-socialist 
multi-party state, Kamenev’s open dialogue with the Mensheviks and SRs was critical in 1917. 
His failures emboldened Lenin’s line. Kamenev was able to force Lenin’s hand to invite the Left 
SRs into the Soviet government after the October Revolution, but that coalition was short-lived. 
During the civil war Kamenev sought to unify a politically diverse working class movement in 
England, and through dialogue with fellow socialists led the charge to curb Cheka abuse in hopes 
of them one day joining the Bolsheviks in government in peacetime. 
Despite his desire to keep all of the ‘shades of socialism’ together against the bourgeoisie, 
it is critically important to understand that Kamenev was never a party ‘rightist’. His centrism 
within Social-Democracy was always dependent on Bolshevik directives, meaning his desire to 
aid fellow socialists was more on libertarian lines rather than on agreement on theoretical 
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outlook. As Bolshevism evolved over time so did Kamenev’s views. During the revolution of 
1905, he adhered to the principles outlined in Lenin’s What is to be Done? far more than either 
Bogdanov or Lenin in his opposition to the 1905 Revolution. He aided Lenin in defining the 
Bolshevik position and he never contemplated joining the Mensheviks. Concessions to the 
bourgeoisie ran contrary to the core Bolshevik premise that Social-Democracy had to retain its 
political independence to ensure that worker psychology developed without bourgeois influence. 
Kamenev differed with Lenin on tactics as to the role Russia would play, but after 1914 Kamenev 
supported revolutionary civil war, and historians have greatly erred in ever contending he was a 
‘defencist’ much like Tsereteli. Despite differences with Lenin over the October Revolution, in 
1918 he came round to the idea of the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ to ensure the Soviet state’s 
survival. When the Kronstadt revolt ended any possibility of a multi-party state, Kamenev 
acquiesced to the party majority. When NEP was introduced in 1921, it became the cornerstone 
of his policies for the remainder of his life. He was always a Bolshevik. 
Within the party itself Kamenev’s ‘Bolshevik Centrism’ continually endeavoured to 
alleviate disagreement by channelling disputes to focus on goals mutually beneficial for both 
sides. In 1908 he attempted to reconcile Lenin and Bogdanov with a compromise on the Duma 
boycott. During the civil war he was sympathetic to the Democratic Centrists and agreed to 
implement soviet reforms to placate their dissatisfaction. In the trade union dispute he urged 
Trotsky and Lenin to find agreement to keep the party from fractious debate. In 1925 he tried to 
rally the party around opposing the kulak danger. 
Most importantly, his ‘Bolshevik Centrism’ aimed to maintain a balance between the 
party left and right throughout NEP. Kamenev better understood Lenin’s final articles to be an 
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outline to manage NEP on a middle course. Lenin’s views on cooperatives did not call for a 
change of direction; they were to advance the current ‘state capitalism’ to one of a more socialist 
type. To preserve this middle path Kamenev spurned Trotsky’s leftist super-industrialisation 
proposals in 1923, attacked Stalin’s ‘socialism in one country’, and from 1926 struggled against 
Bukharin’s rightist line. He criticised Trotsky for advocating an economic policy that 
disadvantaged the peasantry. He criticised Stalin’s ‘socialism in one country’ as a move which 
abandoned the international working class movement and undermined NEP’s sustainability by 
jeopardising its connection to the international market. He criticised Bukharin’s reforms for 
antagonising the party left by its dedication to raising the peasantry through the use of capitalist 
incentives. Kamenev’s position on NEP cut through the very middle of these debates by 
attempting to counter every one deviating from the NEP model established under Lenin – ‘state 
capitalism’. 
Kamenev was stalwart in protecting the moderate course of NEP because of his 
theoretical opinion that the state was in fact the ‘dictatorship of the party’ and not the 
‘dictatorship of the proletariat’. The point cannot be overemphasised. He had warned in 1905 and 
twice in 1917 that the Bolsheviks were taking the path of the Jacobins. After the seizure of power 
he well understood that they had in fact established a ‘dictatorship of the party’ and not a 
proletarian state. This drastically set him apart from Lenin, Bukharin, Stalin, and Trotsky who 
claimed that by capturing the state apparatus they had in fact established a working class state. 
Lenin, for example, promoted the smychka to balance the proletarian state and the peasantry. 
Kamenev supported the smychka, but not just to connect the state with the peasantry, but to use it 
as a policy to win both workers and peasants round to the state. Tipping NEP to favour either 
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class risked jeopardizing their relationship with the other. When Kamenev allied with Krupskaya, 
Sokol’nikov, and Zinoviev on the ‘platform of the four’ in 1925, it was to safeguard ‘state 
capitalism’ and the ‘dictatorship of finance’ centrist NEP position which provided income for the 
state from bourgeois traders and higher income peasants. It was rather unfortunate that 
Kamenev’s colleagues failed to grasp his Lassalle inspired idea on individual profit sharing as it 
would have served to aid both peasant and worker alike, bring them closer to the state, and truly 
try to establish socialist labour policies. The party rejected the idea because Lenin, Bukharin, 
Trotsky, and Stalin had all justified utilising capitalist and exploitive labour policies to fill state 
coffers on the grounds a proletarian state was already in existence and thus exploitation 
impossible. When his ‘Bolshevik Centrism’ brought him into common cause with Zinoviev and 
Trotsky in the United Opposition the alliance retained numerous centrist NEP ‘platform of the 
four’ policies and was never a capitulation to high-flung leftist idealism. 
There were serious drawbacks to Kamenev’s position. At each important juncture within 
the development of Bolshevism he had different allies. His support base was rather thin because 
his positions often wavered depending on the unifying policy he hoped to achieve. This therefore 
meant that when trying to mediate disagreement he typically never had any followers generally 
backing his every move like Stalin or Zinoviev. In some cases, such as when he tried to restore 
relations between Bogdanov and Lenin from 1907 to 1908 on an alternative boycott scheme, he 
had no supporters whatsoever. In 1917, Sokol’nikov and Ryazanov were his allies throughout, 
but Zinoviev, Lunacharsky, Stalin, and Nogin all backed and opposed him at different points in 
the year. During the civil war Kamenev found common cause with Gorky, Bukharin, and 
Lunacharsky against repression, but sparred with the latter two later under NEP. Rykov was 
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Kamenev’s ally in 1905 and in 1917, but he was his fierce opponent in 1925 and beyond.  At 
other times such as when Bukharin sought his council in 1928 and when Ryutin’s group had 
hopes Kamenev and Zinoviev would aid their cause in 1932, Kamenev’s principles held him 
back from getting entangled in their affairs. His ‘Bolshevik Centrism’ typically placed him as a 
mediator between groups. As time progressed, the party left and right became much more rigid 
and thus Kamenev’s influence dwindled as few gravitated to the centre. Until 1923 with Trotsky 
he had few political enemies, but afterwards the party grew lukewarm to his compromising 
behaviour as many unfairly blamed him and Zinoviev for the rupture with Trotsky. Stalin used 
intrigue to remove Kamenev from his post as chair of the Moscow Soviet to avoid potential 
backlash, but that proved overcautious as after seven years of heading MPO there was little 
resistance when Uglanov rolled up the entire organisation to unquestionably follow Bukharin and 
Stalin in 1925.  
Kamenev and Zinoviev were friends, but contrary to the views of most historians, they 
were not unconditional allies. The idea that Zinoviev and Kamenev were in accord on nearly 
every policy must finally be put to rest. Before the revolution Zinoviev stood with Lenin when 
Kamenev came into disagreement with the party leader. Zinoviev did not aid Kamenev in his 
efforts to find a compromise between Lenin and Bogdanov and he certainly did not support him 
in trying to prevent the party from taking up arms for revolution in 1905 and in 1917 Zinoviev 
aligned with Lenin’s April Theses against Kamenev. The two opposed the October Revolution, 
but soon after Zinoviev capitulated to Lenin. During the civil war Zinoviev was not among 
Kamenev’s allies in confronting Lenin and Dzerzhinsky on the excessive reliance on repression, 
nor did he advocate returning to a multi-party state. Their alliance only truly solidified when they 
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forged the ‘troika’ with Stalin, and even then Kamenev backed Stalin against Zinoviev, Bukharin, 
and Trotsky’s attempt to reform the Secretariat at the Kislovodsk ‘cave conference’ out of 
principle. Kamenev’s alliances were first and foremost out of ideological agreement, not power 
politics. The reason the two got on well with each other from 1923 onward was because more 
often than not Zinoviev endorsed Kamenev’s position. 
With Kamenev’s heavy Lassallean influence and his ‘Bolshevik Centrism’, it is no longer 
tenable to maintain that Kamenev was an ‘inveterate intriguer’ for political gain or that he lacked 
vision. This work has demonstrated that Kamenev’s ideological perspective was the reason he 
challenged Trotsky and backed Stalin in 1923. Kamenev could not sanction Trotsky and 
Preobrazhensky’s ‘primitive socialist accumulation’ as it negatively impacted both workers and 
peasants alike. The state to him was not proletarian, and Trotsky’s policies would have driven the 
masses away from embracing the state as their own. He had denigrated Trotsky for his 
‘Menshevism’ and helped create ‘Trotskyism’ to sully his image beyond what his ideological 
convictions warranted, but resorting to intrigue was not his customary modus operendi. Trotsky 
had left Kamenev little choice with his continual rejection of compromise and his perpetual 
attacks on the leadership. Kamenev desired Trotsky’s expulsion from the Politburo, but was 
willing to cooperate with him as Commissar of War. He wanted to deprive him of his ideological 
influence on the party and the state’s theoretical line, but did not want him removed from the 
political scene altogether. Trotsky was a socialist and not an enemy. 
Kamenev’s approach to politics in general was rather naïve. He always assumed that his 
socialist opponents were as ideologically driven as himself. When the struggle with Trotsky 
began, Kamenev assumed he and Stalin were both in agreement at the outset that the present 
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‘state capitalist’ model of NEP should continue. He therefore turned a blind eye to Stalin stacking 
the party against Trotsky and was wholly unprepared for Stalin’s pursuit of power and his course 
change to ‘socialism in one country’. Stalin enabled Bukharin’s line to triumph over the 
‘platform of the four’ and the United Opposition, and then shifted left to best Bukharin. Kamenev 
thought Stalin’s movement leftwards was legitimate and even after he had contemplated violently 
overthrowing Stalin and Bukharin’s government in 1927 as part of the United Opposition, he 
prostrated himself before Stalin between 1928-1929 when he believed Stalin’s policy shift 
brought the two closer together. Kamenev was confident he could earn Stalin’s trust to move the 
party to a more centrist position to overcome the party right. Stalin had no desire to share power 
and spurned their involvement. Zinoviev and Sapronov had warned Kamenev of Stalin’s abuse of 
power in 1924, but Kamenev had thought they were exaggerating. They were not, and Stalin 
became so paranoid of losing power after his disastrous collectivisation campaign that he in time 
framed Kamenev and Zinoviev and charged them with moral complicity in the murder of Kirov 
and orchestrated a sham trial to have the two executed. 
Kamenev was himself to blame for unwittingly helpingly facilitate the rise of Stalin’s 
brutal dictatorship. His alliance with Stalin was just as much out of ideological consideration as 
was his opposition to Trotsky. Believing that the Bolshevik regime in Soviet Russia represented 
the ‘dictatorship of the party’, following Lassalle Kamenev felt the amalgamation of the party 
and state was an absolute necessity to bring the masses round to the Communist cause through 
state institutions. The historian T.H. Rigby has demonstrated that Lenin’s government relied 
much more on Sovnarkom for decision making than the party Politburo.
913
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Kamenev as head of the government there had been a tangible division of duties between 
Sovnarkom and the Politburo. However, due to Kamenev’s theoretical belief that the party had to 
connect to the masses through the state, he voluntarily ceded state authority to the party, and 
consequently, Stalin. That was why he was the first to embrace Lenin’s proposal to reorganise 
Rabkrin to provide effective party oversight over state institutions. Lenin had hoped to curtail 
capitalist elements emerging under NEP. Out of disagreement with Trotsky, Kamenev and 
Zinoviev helped Stalin by ignoring his abuse of power as the General Secretary and even saved 
his position when Lenin’s testament called for his removal. Then when Stalin began to deviate 
from NEP through his ‘socialism in one country’ and to back Bukharin’s NEP reforms, the 
authority Kamenev had helped endow him with enabled Stalin to best Kamenev and to subject 
STO to Politburo approval. This stripped Kamenev of his leading role in the affairs of state. With 
Kamenev having lost his direct role over the economy, Bukharin was able to put NEP on a path 
Kamenev rightfully felt was both economically unfeasible and ideologically contradictory to 
building socialism. Then his continual assault on Bukharin’s economic line prepared the way for 
Stalin’s left course. The General Secretary made use of Kamenev’s fear of a growing kulak and 
economic prognoses to assail Bukharin. Albeit Stalin used violence and brutal repression rather 
than economic remedies, Kamenev and the left had given Stalin the ideological means and 
economic understanding to thwart Bukharin. 
Ultimately Kamenev’s ‘Bolshevik Centrism’ failed to have any lasting influence. 
Kamenev was a master negotiator and could organise alliances and find common ground better 
than any Bolshevik politician. He was the essential link in the ‘troika’, the ‘platform of the four’ 
and the United Opposition. However, his greatest achievements were all in the end undone. His 
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unification of the British labour movement in 1920 under the COA, getting the Left SRs into the 
government, negotiating the Vikzhel talks to accept an all-socialist government, improving NEP 
with the stabilisation of the ruble and the monetary tax on the peasantry, and his successful 
negotiations with the bourgeoisie to aid the Soviet government in abating the terrible famine in 
the Volga, were all in some capacity wrecked by either Lenin, Trotsky, Bukharin or Stalin. 
Lenin’s monlogism, forged in 1914 in response to his fellow socialists’ abandonment of 
revolution, eventually became the party’s core value after Kronstadt. The Bolsheviks saw 
themselves as the sole organisation in the world that knew the true path to socialism. This was 
one of the key conflicts between Lenin and Kamenev in 1917, as Kamenev felt there were 
‘shades of socialism’ and that a broad ‘revolutionary democracy’ was needed to affect socialist 
change. When Lenin’s uncompromising line defeated Kamenev’s, at first it served to alienate the 
Bolsheviks from their fellow socialists. Intra-party discussion remained open. Prior to Kronstadt 
there was the Military Opposition, the Democratic Centralists, the Workers’ Opposition and Left 
Communists.  
The X Party Congress ban on factions put an end to intra-party dissent with demands for 
unquestioning support for the official party line as set by determined by party congresses and 
conferences. Kamenev tried to salvage his dialogical position by being rather lenient to 
opposition groups within the party despite the faction ban. He did so because he felt that they 
expressed legitimate concerns and under his leadership Moscow tolerated greater debate than any 
other place in the country. Against Trotsky he thought he was removing one of the most 
uncompromising and immovable personalities from formulating the party’s theoretical direction, 
but he was mistaken. Stalin developed Lenin’s monologism and showed no tolerance to 
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ideologically dissenting views or for those desiring an equal role in decision making. Through his 
leading role in the party he unleashed invectives, insults, and venomous slander in a denunciation 
campaign orchestrated to eradicate opposition to his authority and to aid in defining what the 
party’s true ‘Leninist’ ideology was by establishing what it was not. Kamenev, Zinoviev, and 
Trotsky were all at the receiving end of his intolerance. With the party under Stalin and 
Bukharin’s unbending rule and their intent to crush fellow Communists, the United Opposition 
began to think of themselves as a separate party. Their greatest desire to overthrow Stalin’s 
government, however, remained nothing but an unachievable dream. 
In the end Kamenev’s Lassallean vision to establish a socialist society where opponents 
were not coerced into accepting proletarian rule but were instead converted through positive 
example was irrevocably destroyed with Stalin’s nightmarish collectivisation campaign. This was 
what Kamenev believed, but the truth of the matter is that his vision had truly become 
incompatible with Bolshevism once it was clear there would not be a multi-party state. His efforts 
to turn the one-party dictatorship into an all-encompassing political organ capable of reflecting 
the views of the masses bereft of political agency by merging it with the state apparatus was 
never going to work within the framework of a party with such an ingrained rigidness in 
ideological outlook and propensity for leftist illusions. The monologism that became predominant 
within Bolshevism meant a tightening of political dictatorship when the state and the party 
unified. Kamenev’s inability to effectively rein in state-sponsored coercion meant winning over 
the masses was impossible. Much can be blamed on Stalin and his unrelenting pursuit of power, 
but it was Lenin who trampled on Lassalle’s Social-Democratic vision of a future socialist 
republic when he effectively declared war on his socialist opponents from 1914 onward and when 
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later he, Trotsky, and Bukharin justified repression and coercion as key principles in building 
socialism. However, it was not until the blood-letting in the countryside during the Soviet 
Union’s First Five-Year Plan that Kamenev felt his ‘Bolshevik Centrism’ no longer had any 
possibility to forge a socialist state. He surrendered his dream and political work and turned to 
literature. Paranoid of losing power, Stalin set his sights on Kamenev and orchestrated his arrest 
and execution. It was fitting that in Kamenev’s last years through his Aesopian writing he 
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